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This thesis considers the role of union full time officers in union organising strategies. 
Two decades of promoting union organising influenced by models developed by the 
AFL-CIO, has failed to arrest the decline of UK trade unions let alone produce evidence 
of renewal. Focusing mainly on one region in the UKs largest public sector trade union, 
Unison, the research provides for a detailed account of how organising strategies 
affect union work, presenting thick and deep data from full time officers (Regional 
Organisers), Regional Management, Senior National Officials, other Unison staff and 
lay representatives. The research focuses on the previously neglected role of full time 
officers in union organising strategies and considers how such strategies can change 
both the role of the full time officer and relations with other union constituencies. 
The research contributes to the ongoing study of trade union attempts to renew in the 
cold climate of globalisation and neo-liberalism. In doing so it also considers the much 
ignored area of the role of union bureaucracy in union organising strategies and the 
potential distortion or opposition it may present. Consequently the research also 
synthesises literature on union organising with classical theories of trade unions.  
Unison embraced the TUC’s promotion of grassroots organising and, it has been 
claimed, has been transformed into an organising union. The research questions this 
judgement by revealing a disconnection between organising strategies from workplace 
realities, resulting in an increasing managerialism and attempts to extend control over 
full time officers. A key consequence of these developments is the deterioration in the 
ability of Unison to represent members, both collectively and individually, leading to a 
potential crisis in representational capacity and ability providing the prospect for 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis considers prospects for trade union renewal after thirty five years of decline 
or at best stagnation. Specifically it examines union organising strategies in Unison and 
their failure to change its fortunes. In doing so it focuses on the role of union full time 
officers (FTO’s) who have been largely neglected in the abundant research on trade 
union organising efforts, both in the UK and abroad. The thesis identifies the 
importance of union bureaucracies and their ability to oppose or distort strategies for 
union renewal. 
My interest 
Over twenty five years as a union full time officer I have observed and experienced, 
from the inside, the failure of three trade unions (NUIW, MSF and since 2001 Unison), 
to develop effective strategies for union renewal. Whether through merger (NUIW into 
MSF), ‘new realism’ with the  positioning of workers as consumers of union services 
(expressed in ‘MSF in the 21st Century’) (see Carter 2000), or the contrary approaches 
of promoting employer partnerships or organising as an alternative to servicing 
unionism, adopted strategies have failed to provide the elusive pathway to union 
renewal. Crucially my observations of union leaderships engrained in me a deep 
scepticism that exhortation to follow one of these ‘yellow brick roads’ was based on 
proper analysis or rationale. The nature of trade unions, the position of full time 
officers, the industrial and political environment in which trade unions operate, the 
erosion of trade union power and growth of individualised employment rights require 
a comprehensive assessment of position and prospects which has been noticeably 
absent in developing strategy.  
From the mid-1990s the TUC in public promoted among its affiliates a back to basics 
grassroots organising approach to union work. Heavily influenced by US and Australian 
experiences, it suggested a shift to a more radical union orientation; in reality this has 
proven not to be the case as in practice this was not lived out (Lustig 2002). At the 
sharp end of this strategy while employed by MSF as a Regional Officer, I have seen the 
promise of building union organisation evaporate as emphasis moved from the 
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‘organising model’ approach to union work towards the short term goal of recruitment 
(see Saundry and Willerby 2013 on Unison). Given this experience my own subjectivity 
regarding organising strategies is acknowledged and the ethical issues which arise in 
this research from my role are considered within the explanation for the methodology 
in Chapter Four. However, putting these aside for now, S. and B. Webb’s classical work 
on trade unions (1894: xxv) noted the limitations and a preference for an internal 
examinee and perspective that enabled: 
a continued watching, from inside the machine, of the actual decisions of 
the human agents concerned, and the play of motives from which these 
spring. The difficulty for the [outside] investigator is to get into such a post 
of observation without his presence altering the normal course of events. It 
is here, and here only, that personal participation in the work of any social 
organisation is of advantage to scientific inquiry. The railway manager, the 
member of a municipality, or the officer of a trade union would, if he were 
a trained investigator, enjoy unrivalled opportunities for precisely 
describing the real constitution and actual working of his own organisation. 
Unfortunately it is extremely rare to find in an active practical 
administrator, either the desire, the capacity, or the training for successful 
investigation. 
This contribution to the abundant research on organising is undertaken from that 
preferred position as a full time trade union officer with the advantages inherent in a 
partly auto ethnographic approach (see chapter four).  
Explanations for trade union decline 
The wider context of this research is the undisputed decline in trade unionism, its 
explanations and proposed strategies for reversal. In 1979 membership of UK trade 
unions peaked at 13,289,000 (Certification Officer TUC, quoted in McIlroy 1995), 54.5% 
of the UK workforce. Despite various union strategies the atrophy of the British trade 
union movement continues: union density reduced from 32% in 1995 to 26% by 2011 
(Brownlie 2012). The consequential loss of political and industrial influence, together 
with the reduced number of workers covered by collective bargaining arrangements, 
had much earlier reached what was deemed crisis levels (Hyman 1989). According to 
the latest WERS, public sector trade unionism, the area of research, is weakening with 
less than three fifths of workplaces covered by collective bargaining setting pay for two 
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fifths of the workforce: contrasting with two thirds as recently as 2004 (van Wanrooy 
et al. 2013).  
Previous expansions of trade union membership had come from workers themselves 
seeking improvements in pay and working conditions through trade union 
organisation: not from national union strategies or voluntarist attempts by FTO’s. 
Surges in union membership coincided with periods of industrial militancy (Cronin 
1984). Membership levels in the UK were then sustained through the ability of unions 
to regulate workforces through industry wide agreements (Hyman 2007, Bowden 
2009). Across Europe trade union organisation was underpinned by a combination of 
working class political parties prepared to support trade union organising, systems of 
centralised industrial relations which addressed employer resistance to union 
organisation and, in some European states, unions organising unemployment 
insurance (Western 1997).  
In the UK, from the 1960s onwards, the commitment of successive governments to 
policies of full employment - through Keynesian aggregate demand economics - a 
welfare state and the recognition of the legitimacy of trade union influence, had grown 
increasingly strained. In 1979 such arrangements were terminated with the 
introduction of market based economic policies that would profoundly affect industrial 
relations and trade union power (Howell 2005). UK trade union influence has 
subsequently waned to the extent that the triumph of ‘New Labour’ saw the 
continuation of neo liberalism and a weakening of trade union political support (see 
Mooney and Law 2007, McIlroy 2010a, Smith and Morton 2010). 
The loss of power has led some to view trade unions as institutions in permanent 
decline, as outdated anachronisms in the new post-modernist service based 
economies (Eldridge 2003). This latter perspective is but one of a number that cite 
external reasons for decline. Others include the growth of individualism within society 
(Storey 1995); negative employment laws which have constrained the effectiveness of 
trade unions (Ewing 2006), employer strategies of union avoidance (Dundon 2002) and 
the impact of human resource management techniques (Guest 1997). More broadly 
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economic restructuring has seen the long-term decline in strongly unionized heavy 
industries and the growth of new sectors based on services in which trade unions have 
been traditionally weak and unsuccessful in organising (Carter and Fairbrother 1998a). 
Whilst all the above explanations have varying degrees of legitimacy it is also the case 
that unions possess some capacity and ability ‘to respond to and to shape the 
circumstances in which they find themselves’ (Carter and Cooper 2002:713) given ‘the 
capacity of unions to construct policies and make their own histories, as opposed to 
being merely victims of circumstances’ (Carter 2000:118). Nevertheless the challenges 
for trade unions which such conditions present should not be underestimated.  
From 1979 employers and government were able to press home their power and 
advantage through individualized employment practices; restrictive employment 
legislation and the ending of tripartite institutions that had provided for trade union 
representation and influence (see Hyman 1989, Undy et al. 1996, and Howell 2005). In 
combination the effects not only undermined trade union organisation in unionized 
workplaces but hamstrung efforts, if any, to organize in new sectors of the economy 
(Howell 2005). With the economic conditions underpinning previous trade union 
growth evaporating, across western liberal democracies trade unions were presented 
with similar problems of declining membership, reduced industrial power and loss of 
political influence. There were exceptions with national union organisations in Sweden 
and Belgium retaining political support and maintaining social insurance schemes 
(Western 1997).  
The achievement of trade union objectives through collective strength and industrial 
militancy no longer seemed to work as major industrial defeats, most notably of the 
National Union of Mineworkers, exemplified (Beynon 1985). The subsequent 
undermining of confidence in the ability of workers to defend and advance their 
interests through forms of industrial action cannot be overestimated. Furthermore a 
consequence of the legal restrictions on industrial action was to give greater control to 
union bureaucracies for official authorisation of industrial disputes. The previous 
introduction of a raft of workers’ rights including those of health and safety, protection 
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from unfair dismissal and the outlawing of sex and race discrimination commenced a 
programme of individual legal rights over and above the protections arising from 
actions of collective solidarity (Howell 2005). This emphasis on individual rights 
coupled with the encouragement of procedural resolution of workplace grievances 
was to militate against the willingness and ability to mobilise workers, isolating 
individual issues within internal employer procedures ‘encouraging legal and individual 
action against employers rather than strikes and solidarity’ (Carter and Cooper 
2002:715). This proliferation of individual rights resulted in a significant rise in demand 
for trade union representational work presenting major practical and logistical 
problems given dwindling resources (Carter 2000). It follows that any successful union 
renewal strategy should acknowledge these issues and respond appropriately.  
New Unionism 
For trade unions the rhetorical appeal that ‘something needs to be done’ had 
apparently been answered by the response to crisis of unions in the United States. 
Signs of potential for revival came through successful organising campaigns based on 
supporting grassroots activism and a ‘back to basics’ approach to union organising 
(Milkman and Voss 2004). Notwithstanding differing conditions, industrial and political 
systems, culture and tradition, the US, and Australia (following the US example), were 
held up by the TUC to show how internal initiatives can arrest decline, rebuild 
confidence and ultimately renew trade unionism (Carter and Fairbrother 1998b). 
Reinforcing the view that trade unions had some control over their destiny it was 
proposed that by addressing internal organisation and transforming from servicing to 
organising, renewal would occur (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998).  
In 1996 the TUC relaunched itself under a ‘new unionism’ banner, encouraging 
commitment to the widespread adoption by affiliates, including Unison, of an 
organising approach to trade union work (Heery 1998). Indeed, organising was to be 
the ‘top priority’ (McIlroy 2010b:100). An emphasis on organising workplaces and 
promoting union activism provided for the potential for a different orientation of trade 
unionism and promised to challenge managerial prerogative (Howell 2005). Suggesting 
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a radical change in direction from previous union strategies, organising simultaneously 
questioned the role of union FTO’s and lay representatives. A narrative emerged, 
influenced by US and Australian experiences, suggesting FTO’s spent too much time 
‘servicing’ and not enough time ‘organising’ (Carter 2000). The proposition that the 
work of FTO’s could be separated or compartmentalised in such a manner is a 
contentious point. Certainly, whilst research into trade union FTO’s has been 
infrequent, the assertions within this narrative were contrary to what were then 
recent findings predating ‘new unionism’ that concluded: 
Union officers appear to be enabling rather than ‘disabling’ professionals in 
that at the heart of their work is an attempt to establish vigorous, self-
supporting and relatively autonomous workplace trade unionism  
Kelly and Heery 1994:119 
Promoting organising as a priority for UK trade unions, given these findings, suggests a 
reinforcement of existing approaches of FTO’s on a familiar terrain. However the 
narrative of the FTO as a ‘servicer’ not an ‘organiser’ was to prevail. 
Furthermore emphasising organising was but one part of a strategic response to crisis. 
The TUC simultaneously encouraged union affiliates to enter into partnership 
agreements with employers, replacing pre-existing collective bargaining arrangements 
in the process (Heery 1998). In this ‘new’ approach to industrial relations unions and 
employers were to emphasise more collaborative working arrangements. In reality 
unions were to become junior partners in change management processes (McIlroy 
2000). A questionable narrative of the approach of FTO’s to union work and an 
industrial relations strategy at odds with the promotion of a combative grassroots 
membership confirmed contradictions and inconsistency in the ‘new unionism’ 
strategy. Furthermore the failure to appreciate or acknowledge the impact on union 
work from the demands emanating from the raft of individual and collective 
employment legislation since the Donovan Commission report (see page 18), and later 
EC directives, was in error. This workload has been amplified with recent 
developments in Unison (see Chapter Five). 
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Development of the research question  
The research question came out of consideration of the decline in UK trade unions, the 
specific threats to public sector unionism from government policy, including new 
public management, and subsequent trade union responses. My initial thoughts were 
to consider the consequences for trade union organisation of outsourcing and 
privatisation of public services (see Whitfield 2001, 2006, Mooney and Law 2007). 
Linked to this area were the prospects for union renewal in UK public sector unions 
given the potential for new, more workplace focused trade union forms, contrasting 
with the centralised arrangements built around national bargaining. Such analysis 
connected to both the organising model that had provided a framework for US 
organising (Russo and Banks 1996) and the British work claiming the possibility of 
union renewal that increasingly focused on the public sector (Fairbrother 1996, 2005, 
Fosh 1993). However the literature review revealed that the scope of the intended 
research was too broad. What became apparent was that ideas of trade union renewal 
and strategies for organising were often articulated without consideration of internal 
constituencies and often competing interests within trade unions.   
The organising element of ‘new unionism’ has attracted a significant volume of 
academic research focusing on the apparent successes and failures of such an 
approach to union renewal. Within this research work there has been limited direct 
analysis of the consequences for the union FTO and their importance to organising 
strategies (Carter 2000, Gall 2003). In focusing on the impact on the FTO role, the 
thesis analyses how FTO’s both respond to, and are affected by, organising strategies.  
Developing trade union strategy requires examination of internal union constituencies. 
Union constituent parts have to be united if a renewal strategy which proposes 
significant change is to succeed. Yet organising had been pushed down from above, 
and from the onset of the TUC re-launch in 1996 the narrative of the FTO as a ‘servicer’ 
not an ‘organiser’ became central in strategic consideration. Not only were they 
excluded from strategy development but FTO’s were being informed that they needed 
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to change approaches to their work and unions needed to consider employment of 
staff with ‘organising’ in contrast with ‘servicing’ skills and experience .  
The narrative became that changing the practice of existing staff, devolving 
representational responsibilities and investment in union organising work could 
potentially square the circle of both servicing existing members whilst simultaneously 
increasing capacity for building union organisation. The lack of evidence to support this 
narrative and the contention that organising and servicing could be defined and 
separated confirmed shortcomings in understanding of the practice of union work.  It 
also illustrated a lack of critical consideration of the consequences of US organising 
approaches, where in union recognition campaigns, organising is defined as winning 
the recognition vote, whilst servicing was the subsequent contract negotiations 
(McAlevey 2012). Furthermore, it suggested that broad comparison could be made 
between UK FTOs and US union business agents in their approach to industrial work. 
Consequently a significant gap in the substantial research on union organising, ignoring 
both the nature of trade unions and the position of the FTO, was identified. 
Specifically the research focuses on the changing role of FTO’s in Unison, the UK’s 
largest public sector union.  It examines how FTO’s impact on, and are affected by, 
Unison approaches to organising. This focus requires not only a critical account of 
classical theories of trade union bureaucracy, but also appreciation and evaluation of 
contemporary debates on union strategies, two areas that have yet to be synthesized.  
Of some significance to consideration of trade union organisation is Michels (1962) 
theory of the existence of an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which has been subject to critique 
and debate given its deterministic analysis of socialist parties and trade unions. The 
concerns that arise from these areas are then utilized to see what insights they throw 
on the web of relations in which FTO’s are engaged and, significantly, the prospects for 
trade union renewal.  
Traditional research into trade unions, their place in society and their potential for 
influencing radical societal change, has placed or assumed the union FTO as a brake on 
the development of radical union memberships (see S. and B. Webb 1894, Pearce 
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1959, Cohen 2006). FTO’s are classically positioned within the bureaucracy and 
‘constitute a distinct and relatively privileged social layer with interests different from 
and contrary to those of rank-and-file union members‘(Darlington 1994:27). However 
my own experience informs a view that the relationship between FTO’s and union 
memberships is more complex. Hence the role of the FTO in organising strategies is of 
importance.  
Walliman (2006) identifies six features of a suitable research problem, being able to 
state the problem clearly and concisely, be of great interest to the researcher, be a 
significant problem, delineated, be able to obtain the required information and be able 
to draw conclusions to the problem and in doing so find some answers: these criteria 
are met. The problem relates to the position of union FTO’s in the context of 
continuing union decline despite proclamations to the contrary and apparent union 
transformation (see among others Waddington and Kerr 2009, Heery et al. 2000, 
Heery et al. 2003). The issue is of great interest to the researcher given my own 
employment position and previous academic interest in the new unionism strategy of 
the TUC. The issue of trade union strength and influence, or lack of it, is timely given 
the evidence to support the position that policies within a framework of neoliberalism 
produces record levels of inequality in society (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). What is a 
significant problem is heightened by the failure to connect the decline in trade union 
power with this growing inequality gap. The question is suitably focused to be clearly 
defined, the information is readily available and it has enabled the drawing of some 
conclusions.  
There is an assumption in the question that union organising strategies impact on the 
role of the FTO but also that in turn the FTO has a degree of control over how 
organising strategy is delivered. How these influences are on the one hand, 
complementary, on the other oppositional, is at issue. The contrast between ideas of 
building workplace unionism, or reinforcing union bureaucracies, is clearly rooted in 
the extent of the potential for trade union orientations, a question examined through 
sociological theories in Chapter Three. In addition identification of union objectives 
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and which constituent parts those objectives serve requires analysis given the 
implications for FTO motivations.     
The research aims  
The research considers how FTO’s reinvigorate workplace based unionism, or, in the 
alternative, reinforce existing bureaucracies. In doing so it seeks to make a unique 
contribution to the growing research on trade union organising strategies in three 
ways. Firstly, as identified, the research into union organising comes from an internal 
perspective as opposed to external research. Secondly, the focus is on FTO who has 
been, despite the pivotal role played, a neglected agent in consideration of union 
organising both in terms of development of organising strategy and subsequent 
analyses. Thirdly, the research places such analyses in the context of classical 
sociological theory and in doing so emphasises the potential for distortion and 
opposition from trade union bureaucracy in the face of attempts to develop potentially 
more radical trade union forms. 
The research will question both the nature of Unison’s organising strategy and its 
impact on the role of the Unison FTO. There are under the general rubric of organizing 
a number of theories and strategies proposed for trade union renewal and 
revitalization. Theories around organising, renewal through decentralization, social 
movement unionism and mobilization theory, it could be argued, are in many respects 
complementary (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998, Fairbrother 1996, Fairbrother and Yates 
2003, Moody 1997 and Kelly 1998). All have implications for the role of FTO’s that can 
be unclear, uncertain and dependant on prevailing circumstances. This approach is in 
contrast with theories around partnership and servicing which suggest a 
predetermined and set way of working that is more prescriptive and less dynamic 
(Bassett 1986). It follows that research on organising needs to be put in the context of 
explanations for the position of union officials set apart from the general union 
membership (see S. and B. Webb 1894, Michels 1962). Inevitably, there arises a need 
to re-examine theories of union bureaucracy (Michels 1962) and relations to rank and 
file membership (see S. and B. Webb 1894, Pearce 1959).  
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Of particular relevance is the theory that the bureaucratisation of trade unions has 
gone beyond FTO’s to encapsulate workplace representatives (Hyman 1989b). This 
extension of the tentacles of bureaucracy can arguably be traced back to the Donovan 
Commission which recommended greater integration of union representatives into the 
structures of trade unions and encouraged the later introduction of statutory rights to 
paid time off for representation, training and facilities for trade union work as 
elements of the ‘social contract’ between the TUC and the then Labour government 
(Howell 2005). Incorporating shop stewards into formal procedural relations and 
official union institutions provided the possibility for increased bureaucratic control of 
union activity. Later, other factors increased this potential with union mergers, a 
strategic response to the unfavourable climate of the 1980s, leading to the 
development of ‘super’ unions such as Unison, enhancing the ability to counterpoise 
the interests of the union as a whole (and thereby the interests of the full time 
machinery of government or bureaucracy) against sectional interests (Michels 1962). 
The consequential reduction in the number of unions limited the potential for 
membership competition between unions, a potential lever for disaffected members 
seeking alternative representation in such circumstances (Allen 1954).  
The position of, and approach to, organising strategies by union bureaucracies is 
significant given these tendencies to bureaucratisation. Whilst proclaiming a shift in 
focus towards workplace based grassroots trade unionism, this has to be in doubt. The 
lack of consideration of the role of bureaucracy in organising strategies and the impact 
on union bureaucracies themselves is a gap which requires addressing. The failure to 
consider the implications for relations at the workplace and the effect on trade union 
democracy inherent in the organising model approach, together with the promotion of 
workplace partnerships, suggests mere lip service was paid to the organising model by 
UK trade unions. Similarly while there are some relatively recent accounts of the role 
of FTO’s (Watson 1988, Kelly and Heery 1994), there is an absence of any appreciation 
of their position in theories of trade union renewal. When FTO’s have been considered 
it is limited to them being portrayed as a barrier to implementing organising strategies 




As identified the uniqueness of the research is in connecting two specific areas of 
interest, classical and contemporary but complementary and relevant. Firstly, 
questions of union renewal and union organising have arguably neglected the role of 
the FTO, who are pivotal in determining the success of organising strategies. Secondly, 
the question of union organising strategies has not been linked to, and analysed, in the 
context of classical sociological theory relating to the nature and form of trade unions 
and the FTO position. Hence the need for two chapters which consider the 
development of organising strategies in light of ‘new unionism’ and separately the 
sociology of trade unions. With this in mind, the literature review, as Cooper (1989) 
identifies commonly, has three main purposes: to commence identification of previous 
scholarly work of importance, to build bridges between related topic areas and to 
identify the central issues in the research. In addition, the theoretical review is of some 
relevance for the analysis of organising strategies, the objectives within those 
strategies and the relationship with the FTO. 
On union organising initiatives there is a vast amount of research in the United States 
identifying success, failure and the internal and external obstacles faced. The 
domination of business unionism post Second World War based on an alliance 
between US unions and corporate USA, underpinned by the Taft-Hartley Act, limited 
trade union ability to organise and challenge managerial prerogative (Carter 2001).  
Given this inherent conservativism the extent to which the organising model could 
break old habits and force a radical new direction for US unions is questionable. The 
lack of vision and clarity around issues such as power at work, unions in politics and 
internal forms reinforces this scepticism. Nevertheless unions which had previously 
kept labour academics at arm’s length were now embracing their ideas for responding 
to a position of crisis. This no doubt contributed to the creation of a climate of 
enthusiasm and support for union organising work. Within subsequent analyses 
identifying differing aspects of union organising work included the application of 
comprehensive techniques which lead to successful union recognition campaigns 
(Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998) together with 
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differing interpretations of the consequences for internal  union structures and 
democracy were prominent (see Milkman and Voss 2004, Tillmann and Cummings 
1999).  
To a significant but lesser degree there is a growing body of academic research in this 
area in the UK. Approaches range from critical examination of the coherency of the 
TUC’s ‘new unionism’ (Carter et al. 2003), through the questioning of the relevance of 
the ‘Organising Model’ (De Turberville 2004); the highlighting of the question of 
objectives (Simms and Holgate 2013) to more observational type research on actual 
organising initiatives (see Heery et al. 2000, 2003).   
The research question is set in the context of sociological analyses. As Cooper 
identifies ‘the creativity in research review enters when reviewers are asked to make 
sense of many related but not identical theories or studies’ (Cooper ibid p.19). As a 
starting point key classical texts were examined on trade union theory and the role of 
the full time officer (Gramsci 1977, Lenin 1902, Michels 1962, Webb and Webb 1894). 
In this latter area more recent literature produced sporadically over the past fifty years 
relating to the work and position of full time union officers was analysed: an advocate 
for workplace grievances, as a manager of discontent and as set apart from the union 
membership (Clegg et al. 1961, Watson 1988, Kelly and Heery 1994). 
Chapter 2 of the thesis will examine the origins and nature of the organising model, its 
adoption in the USA and Australia and its impact since its reception in the UK in the 
mid-1990s. It will also consider subsequent debates around the relevance of the 
organising model. Heery et al. (2003) suggest that trade unions can and do adopt 
aspects of the organising model in a pick and mix approach to organising. De 
Turberville (2004) suggests that in effect what might be a one size fits all approach to 
union renewal is inadequate given the diversity and complexity of trade unions in the 
UK. Whilst others suggest that far from being irrelevant, UK trade unions have in effect 
“talked the talk” on the organising model but have failed to “walk the walk”. Criticisms 
of the organising model ignore the reality that all too often strategies apparently based 
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around it are frequently mere recruitment campaigns as opposed to genuine attempts 
to organise workers into self-supporting collectives (Carter 2006).   
Chapter three considers the FTOs position and gives an extended critical account of the 
sociology of trade unions with particular reference to ideas of bureaucracy, 
membership rank and file and the importance of democracy. Prominence is given to 
the idea that trade unions as institutions are inherently conservative and attempts at 
radical structural change, which the organising model implied, would inevitably meet 
resistance. Accepting the existence of trade union bureaucracy, the chapter questions 
the level to which such bureaucracies embrace change. Challenging the 
aforementioned position of FTO’s to the union rank-and-file, the chapter considers 
both the potential for lay activists to be incorporated into union bureaucracy and 
FTO’s ability to act as independent agents.  
Chapter four provides explanation for the research methodology which emanates from 
a critical realist approach to the subject. Justification for the case study method of 
research is provided as is detail of the collation of data mainly through semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups. The practicalities of the research undertaken and the 
detailed process of transcription and coding of data are explained. Finally comment on 
the ethics of the research and its strength given my position as a union full time officer, 
and the part auto-ethnographic approach is made.  
Chapter 5 refers specifically to Unison which has received considerable attention in 
academic circles and this chapter will examine and utilise previous work to outline the 
history, structure and policies of the union relating to the political economy of the 
public sector. As the largest public sector trade union in the UK with a membership of 
1,267,000 (TUC 2014), what Unison does and how it sees its role is of some significance 
for the future of UK trade unions. 
Given the relative strength of trade unions in the public sector, the challenges to public 
sector unions presented by the former Coalition and current Conservative 
government’s austerity policies is significant: as are the threats posed to trade union 
organisation from the 2015 Trade Union bill.  The scale of actual and potential job 
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losses, outsourcing and cuts to terms and conditions, as well as services, questions the 
continued role of public sector trade unions (Grimshaw and Rubery 2012).What public 
sector unions do to resist the assault on them, and what Unison in particular does, is 
therefore of some importance.  
Furthermore with deep seated problems of inequality in the UK compounded by 
continuing policies of austerity, Unison’s position as both a representative of public 
sector workers and a champion of public services is crucial. It is also of interest as a 
body for research given the longstanding doubts expressed of the ability of general 
unions to properly represent workers from across industry, occupation or sectors: 
all the attempts at ‘general unions’ have, in our view been doomed to 
failure’ because of a trade union is formed for ‘the distinct purpose of 
obtaining concrete and definite material improvements in the conditions of 
its members employment’ and the grievances which are prominent within 
different groups of workers at different times in different localities differ. 
S. and B. Webb 1894:139 
As previously identified, trade union growth coincided with periods of worker 
militancy, and not any specific national organising or recruitment strategy, the 
importance placed on such strategies by Unison is therefore also of interest.  As 
chapter five identifies, the position of management within Unison from inception adds 
legitimacy to questions regarding motivations, the nature of union organising 
strategies and, given the complexity of trade unions, the competing interests which 
can emerge.  
The Unison response to the TUC proclamation that organising was the ‘top priority’ 
was the National Organizing and Recruitment Strategy (NORS). Introduced in 1997 the 
objective was to address a decline in union density in the public sector. However in the 
following years Unison membership remained relatively static. This could be seen as a 
success in light of marketisation strategies and when compared to other UK unions. 
Yet the increased investment in public expenditure post the 1999 Budget did not 
reflect in increased membership levels (Waddington and Kerr 2009).  
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NORS was reviewed and amended under the heading “Meeting the Organising 
Challenge” (MtOC) which chapter five considers in detail. This revision introduced new 
grades of organising staff, providing the opportunity for existing non-organising staff to 
undertake organising work as ‘Local’ and ‘Area’ Organisers. The expansion of these 
grades has increased Unison staff resource for organising. It has also resulted in 
changes to the role of Unison FTOs (Regional Organisers): reduced in number, they 
now have management responsibility for Area and Local Organisers and a larger 
geography of industrial responsibilities.  
The guiding themes in the examination of Unison will be the union’s organising 
strategy and the claims it makes about itself. The general context and sociological 
theories will be considered, linked to examination of changing responsibilities for FTOs. 
The research provides for in depth analysis of FTO’s day to day relations with other 
parts of Unison and centres on the evolving changes in Unison with the introduction of 
the organising model through the ‘Winning the Organised Workplace’ (WOW) course 
and the subsequent restructure of staffing through ‘Meeting the Organising Challenge’ 
(MtOC). 
Given the centrality of Unison to UK trade unionism, and its on-going restructuring to 
maintain its organisation, further study is both warranted and timely.  In particular, 
given the absence of concerted reflection on the nature and role of FTO’s the need for 
study is reinforced. While trade unions have been politically unfashionable for nearly 
three decades, there has nevertheless been continuing academic interest in them.  
Moreover, Unison has attracted much attention from its initial formation (Terry 1996) 
through to today. A lot of that interest has revolved around the union’s claim to be 
transformed into an organising union (Waddington and Kerr 2000, 2009). The research 
here focuses mainly on one Unison region, labelled ‘A’ Region, chosen for the research 
given its reputation for successful recruitment levels, innovation in approaches to 
organising work and its influence on national organising strategy. Although experience 
of Unison lay representatives in ‘A’ Region is reflected in the data collated on lay 
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representatives in other regions participating in the critical incident analysis in Chapter 
Six.  
Chapters, Six, Seven and Eight, consider specific findings from the research. They 
address questions of relevance of national union organising strategies, increased 
managerial control of FTOs for purposes of implementing national and regional 
strategies, within a preferred working methodology and how servicing and organising 
has developed into limited recruitment and representation choices. On this latter point 
a representation crisis is emerging threatening further an already challenging trade 
union position. These areas are considered in relation to critical incidents examined as 
an integral part of the research at local, regional and national levels. So chapter six will 
consider the relevance of Unison national organising strategies to the organising work 
of full time officers and activists at workplace level. Chapter seven considers the 
increasing attempts to control full time officer work at regional level and the 
implications for organising work and relations within Unison. Chapter eight considers 
in detail the conundrum of addressing the representational demands of members 
(servicing) whilst attempting to deliver organising objectives and how national 
campaigns have come to undermine ideas of collective organisation. 
Chapter nine provides an overview, analysis and evaluation of the issues as they 
impact upon Unison. It includes remarks about the nature of the union and its internal 
relations, the relevance of national organising strategies and how Unison structures 
and management encourage bureaucratic orientation of both FTO’s and lay 
representatives. 
Chapter ten concludes the thesis with identification of the specific contribution to 
knowledge and theory in relation to union renewal, the nature of bureaucracy and the 
position of the FTO.  Concluding remarks about the general nature of trade unions and 





Defining a Unison full time officer 
Previous research into FTOs defines the position by the work undertaken as union 
employees. I have had job titles such as National Officer, Regional Officer and currently 
Regional Organiser. The duties and responsibilities have been similar, if more recently 
contentious, given what became the dominant narrative around FTO roles as 
‘servicers’ not ‘organisers’. Watson identifies a number of titles for FTO’s within 
different unions such as Regional Official, Area Organiser and District Organiser 
(Watson 1988).  
The key duties and responsibilities as identified by Watson (1988), and also Kelly and 
Heery (1994), include organising, negotiating, representing and dealing with relations 
more generally with employers and union constituency parts. These functions set apart 
the FTO from both the union membership and other paid union staff. However what 
chapter five identifies is that MtOC staffing structures produces a new division of 
labour which to some extent salami slices the FTO role into the new organising grades 
to one of organising or servicing, reskilling or deskilling staff, whilst creating 
management roles which potentially become a mere transmission belt for targets (on 
labour process see Braverman 1974).The focus of this research on FTOs in Unison is 
the Regional Organiser, formally the Regional Officer, although some consideration of 










Chapter Two: The decline of trade unionism and the promise of organising  
Introduction 
This chapter provides both further context for the research and considers the 
introduction of the organising model, how organising became defined and the 
adequacy of existing literature on union organising strategies. On a contextual level it 
commences with a brief consideration of the impact of globalisation on national trade 
union confederations, potential responses and the specific circumstances faced by UK 
trade unions. Specific examination of restructuring in the public sector and prospects 
for union renewal is made. Attention is then given to union organising in the United 
States and the contrasting organising and servicing models of trade unionism. The 
chapter notes how the organising model was borrowed by and influenced union 
renewal strategy in the Australia trade union confederation ACTU.  
Turning to the UK, consideration of the decline in British trade unionism, the rise in 
‘consumer unionism’ and the relaunch of the TUC, with its ‘new unionism’ strategy of 
organising and partnership, is made. This is followed by closer examination of the 
organising model and consideration of debates on servicing, organising and the role of 
the FTO. With exceptions (Fletcher and Hurd 1998, Simms and Holgate 2010), 
neglected in the organising literature is consideration of union objectives. The chapter 
considers union objectives and whether organising is leading to radical or entrenching 
more conservative union forms. Examination of the literature confirms three problems 
which emerge. Firstly is the contested nature of organising and particularly the 
relationship between servicing and organising; secondly the lack of focus on union full 
time officers in organising strategies: thirdly the absence of consideration of union 
bureaucracy and how this can lead to distortion and/or opposition to organising, a 
point considered in more detail in chapter three. 
Globalisation and potential union responses 
The ending of the post-war boom and the onset of economic crisis of the 1970s saw 
the ideology of neo liberalism gain political prominence assisted by processes of 
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globalisation with the ending of financial controls, fixed exchange rates and 
acceleration in information technology. The consequences included increasing shifts 
and divisions in production beyond national boundaries; diversification and increased 
competition: all of which affected the composition of the traditional working class 
(McIlroy 2010). Neo-liberal state’s in social and economic policy deregulates and 
privatises or withdraws from social provision of some public services (see Harvey 2005; 
Whitfield 2001). In the UK, Conservative governments from 1979 embraced such 
ideology with vigour (Callinicos 2010). Their view being summarised by McIlroy 
(2010:28), was that unions: 
had exploited the monopoly position state sustenance and full 
employment had provided, to utilise the closed shop and the strike 
weapon to increase wages to artificial levels and generate inflation. Unions 
distorted efficient deployment of labour through job controls which 
crippled innovation, productivity, investment and competitivity. 
Trade unions’ legal protections and rights became a specific target for attack, ‘There 
can be no salvation for Britain until the special privileges granted to the trade 
unions…are removed’ (Hayek 1980:52). The special privileges included the blanket 
immunity to trade unions in furtherance of a trade dispute provided by the 1906 Trade 
Disputes Act (Howell 2005).   
The ensuing Conservative attack was based on incremental and progressive changes 
within the industrial relations arena. In 1980 the Employment Act abolished statutory 
recognition rights for trade unions, restricting picketing and secondary action, 
introducing the requirement for ballots for new closed shops and providing for state 
funding for union ballots. In 1982 the Employment Act extended the ballot 
requirement for closed shops. The definition of a trade dispute was tightened thus 
increasing the risk of loss of trade union immunities from employer claims for 
damages. The 1984 Trade Union Act claimed to democratize union procedures through 
introducing the requirement for ballots for union key positions, for maintaining 
political funds and before industrial action (McIlroy 1995). For trade unions neo-
liberalism ironically meant more, not less, state interference.  
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Between 1988 and 2003 five other major pieces of legislation were introduced. These 
included postal voting for industrial action ballots, notice required to employers before 
the commencement of industrial action and protection for members who refused to 
participate. In addition giving power to employers to selectively dismiss workers 
involved in unofficial industrial action and making all secondary action unlawful 
potentially limited the effectiveness of strike action. It became lawful for employers to 
offer inducements for employees to accept non-union contracts of employment and 
restrictions on time off for trade union representatives were introduced (McIlroy 
1995).  
The number of strikes declined substantially during the 1980s, from 2125 in 1979 
down to 630 by 1990, reaching its lowest level for 50 years (Edwards 1991). In this 
context trade union and other proponents of ‘new realism’ had argued for the need to 
shift from a class based approach to industrial relations to one based on competitive 
markets. The employer and employee were on the same side in a competition against 
other employers and their employees, both within national boundaries, and 
increasingly outside as globalisation gathered pace (Bassett 1986).  
The problems faced by UK, and other trade union confederations, were not however 
wholly rooted in political ideology. Whilst US unions had also been under attack from 
the federal state following the election of Ronald Reagan (Buhle 1999), in a more 
favourable political climate, Australian unions had experienced decline suggesting 
economics as much as politics as the root cause (Griffin and Svenson 2002). The 
opening of Australian markets to global competition and ensuing structural economic 
change contributed to significant falls in membership: pre-dating political change and 
subsequent anti-union legislation from the mid-1990s (Bowden 2009). The impact of 
globalisation, with intensified product and service competition, makes it more difficult 
for increases in labour costs to be passed on to the consumer (Simms and Holgate 
2013). Given the global nature of union decline, trade union confederations looked 
beyond their own shores for responses to these common challenges. The case was also 
advanced that whilst conditions for unionisation had changed there were internal 
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issues for trade unions in that they had neither adapted to nor adopted effective 
strategies for these new circumstances (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998, Crosby 
2005). Rather than being impotent in the face of such forces, Jarley et al. (1998:277)   
proposed that ‘unions have an important degree of control over their own destiny’. 
The failure of unions to recruit in the developing service sector and new technology 
based industries, whilst simultaneously focusing resources on existing memberships, 
was a weakness of internal union organisation and strategy. Extending managerial 
prerogatives, increased competition and the growing power of corporations may 
enhance employer control over labour processes, but it can also result in work 
intensification, injustice and unfairness sowing seeds for potential union organisation. 
It is in such conditions that mobilisation theory identifies two connected opportunities 
for union renewal (Kelly 1998). At the micro level collectivisation rests on the 
individual belief of the worker that the union has the capacity and the will to address 
their sense of injustice. For the union to succeed, moreover, this belief needs to be 
held by a substantial number of workers. The subsequent collective grievance 
establishes a workplace group identity, not only able to resist management pressures, 
but also to exert counter pressure on those agents (management) able to provide a 
remedy. Mobilisation theory at a macro level recognises the importance of structures 
which are conducive to collective action. Trade unions need to exercise economic 
and/or political power beyond the workplace to demonstrate that at the micro level 
unions can address local injustice. In this theory union revitalization comes from 
demonstrations of bargaining power, political power and institutional vitality. Factors 
which public sector unions were arguably better placed to exercise. Whilst 
globalisation primarily impacted on production of manufactured goods, the public 
sector did not escape change. 
In the public sector 
Public sector unions had not experienced the impact of globalisation to the extent of 
private sector based unions. The challenge however came from neo-liberal policies 
which resulted in significant public sector restructuring with more decentralized and 
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devolved forms of managerial organisation. The creation of internal markets, the 
redrawing of the boundaries of the state sector through market testing and 
privatisation, and attempts to abolish or diminish nationally determined conditions of 
employment became both threats and opportunities for public sector trade unions 
(Fairbrother 1996).  
The threat from new public management was exacerbated by historical functions, 
organisational form and rationale, centred on national, centralised collective 
bargaining systems that emerged under Whitleyism, making public sector trade unions 
structurally (and culturally) ill equipped to meet the challenges presented by such 
changes. As Carter (2000:123) identifies: 
Weak workplace organisation has traditionally been both masked, and at 
the same time reinforced, by a concentration of bargaining at national level 
which was seen as the locus of power and influence  
The shift in managerial decision making to the workplace could present an opportunity 
for trade unions to refashion themselves. Fairbrother optimistically maintained that 
‘unions in the state sector are in a position to begin to develop more active forms of 
workplace unionism than was the case in the past’ (Fairbrother 1996:111). For 
Fairbrother (1996:113) this new form of unionism has three aspects: 
First, this is a union form where there has been a reintegration of 
representations and the procedures associated with these relations, and 
that of mobilization. In other words, representatives become part of the 
process of membership mobilization as active participants. Second, unions 
embody more participatory forms of control and accountability, which 
emphasize the importance of membership involvement and activity. . . . 
Third, members articulate and express their experiences in ways that are 
central to the union mode of organization and operation.  
Fairbrother (1996) contended that the subsequent rearticulation of managerial 
organisation had implications for both management and trade unions. On the 
management side, with service restructuring, privatisation, fragmentation, market 
testing, compulsory competitive tendering, appraisal systems and performance related 
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pay determination, all combined to present a new type of management with 
increasingly individualized work relations reshaping the state sector.  
Whilst centralised national negotiations may have a disempowering effect on union 
members at the workplace, the threat to trade unions from the breakup of national 
bargaining should not be underestimated given the logistical challenges of supporting 
members in a multitude of bargaining situations previously the remit of a single 
bargaining unit. This optimistic view of public sector transformations ignores the 
challenges which even with an enthusiastic and committed national union leadership 
would find difficult to address. It does not explain how union renewal is to occur in 
workplaces with no culture, tradition and limited experience of collective bargaining 
and local union activism.  
These new forms of public management do however challenge the continuing 
rationale of some union structures. This challenge raises both prospects for internal 
union restructure, an apparent prerequisite for union renewal, and internal union 
conflict over differing bureaucratic interests (Hyman 1989). Fairbrother later comes to 
recognise that unions are faced with a stark choice to renew through a strategy of 
supporting workplace based unionism and so decentralizing, or further ossifying by 
maintaining existing bureaucracies (Fairbrother 2000). The apparent promotion of 
grassroots based unionism suggested that some UK unions in the public sector, 
including Unison, were ready to grasp the nettle faced by new public management 
forms. However if radical approaches to union renewal were to be successful traditions 
of conservatism had to be overcome. 
Organising in the US 
Such a tradition of strong conservatism came to dominate US trade unions post second 
world war. The impact of the 1947 Taft – Hartley Act, the effect of the cold war on 
industrial relations and the emergent dominance of business unionism providing for an 
economistic straitjacket on the objectives of US trade unions. The Taft- Hartley Act 
provided numerous amendments to the National Labour Relations (NLRA) or Wagner 
Act, which had provided the legal framework supporting the upsurge in unionisation 
33 
 
among general workers in 1930s ‘New Deal’ America (Lopez 2004). Crucially it was a 
legal framework for workers’ rights arising out of popular protest and workers’ 
demands. Within a few years union membership in the USA had doubled (Turner and 
Hurd 2001). However post-second world war, in the climate of the Cold War, the 
restrictions from Taft-Hartley and the expulsion of left wing activists in anti-communist 
purges led to a more conservative trade union form (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). 
As Bronfenbrenner et al. (1998:4) identified ‘Taft-Hartley included strict limits on union 
organizing and mutual aid tactics while granting employers greater latitude in opposing 
unionization’. Carter (2001) describes the impact of Taft-Hartley as a Faustian pact 
between unions and the state. Unions ceded control of the factory for sharing in the 
economic gains of increased productivity. This business unionism was typified by: 
a new culture in which collective bargaining and worker struggles became 
subject to greater legal scrutiny, regulatory control, and court precedent. 
Disputes were safely contained in a web of administrative procedure. The 
relationship between labor and capital moved from the no holds barred 
battlefield of workplace conflict to the well-ordered administrative terrain 
of industrial relations and human resource management-the province of a 
growing army of labor relations professionals, lawyers and administrative 
managers on both sides of the negotiating table 
Eisenscher 1999:64 
Whilst on occasion there were attempts to change and renew unions through 
democratic challenges the overwhelming dominance of union bureaucracies prevailed 
(see Brecher and Costello 1999, McCarthy 2010).  The battle for union progress and 
advantage was to be limited to the terrain of collective and individual legal rights. 
However the 1980 election of President Reagan saw neo liberalism, with anti-union, 
pro-business practice, dominate US government policy making leaving such strategy 
increasingly futile, even when parties apparently more sympathetic to unions later 
came to power (Brecher and Costello 1999). This in a context were Deery (1995) 
contended that ‘the intensity of employer opposition to trade unions in America is 
without parallel anywhere in the industrial world’. 
By 1990 the state of American unionism, now post-Cold War and with increasing 
problems of aggressive union busters, created some urgency for re-evaluation of union 
34 
 
strategy (Simms and Holgate 2007). Relying on political change to introduce new laws 
favourable to trade unions evaporated with the election of President Bill Clinton as the 
ongoing neoliberal consensus prevailed (Moody 2007). Thrown back on their resources 
some unions began to be receptive to calls for a new model of unionism. This model 
was summarised by Russo and Banks (1996) and contrasted with business unionism 
approaches reflected in a servicing model of trade union work in which: 
SERVICING MODEL ORGANISING MODEL 
The union leadership solves 
problems for members on 
basis of complaints or 
requests. 
 The union leadership stimulates and 
involves members in problem solving in 
group process or collective action 
 There is a total reliance on 
grievances and negotiation 
processes 
 has a modus operandi is not limited to the 
bargaining process 
 There exists a passive 
membership or limited to 
leadership requests for 
cooperation 
 has a commitment to education, 
communications from and participation in 
the union 
 There is a reliance on 
specialists, experts and 
union staff 
 develops and depends on members skills 
and abilities 
 Secretive and closed 
communication channels 
 has sharing of information and open 
communication channels 
 Centralized and top heavy 
organizational structure 
 has a decentralized organizational 
structure 
 Dependent on 
management, reactive 
 is independent of management and 
proactive in its agenda setting 
 Makes distinctions 
between internal and 
external organizing 
activities 
 makes no distinction between internal 
and external organizing activity 
 
The SEIU gained particular weight amongst proponents of the new direction promised 
by an organising model due both to its size and successes. Much publicity and kudos 
was gained by its achievements in the ‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign and the 
‘organizing of 74,000 minimum wage home care workers in Southern California’ (Lopez 




SEIU staffers argue that it makes sense to aim for industries in which a 
union can gain control over the local labour market rather than those that 
are in international competition 
Slaughter 1999:51 
In 1995 the election of SEIU leader John Sweeney to the leadership of the AFL-CIO 
raised the potential for the wider adoption of SEIU organising methods. With an 
apparent realisation that there was a need to challenge, not accommodate, corporate 
capital, and support rank and file intensive workplace campaigns; the AFL-CIO was 
developing a more strategic approach to trade union organising (Carter and 
Fairbrother1998a).  
The proposition that trade unions could renew through emphasizing workplace based, 
grassroots organising was in contrast with traditional business unionism thinking. In 
rejecting previous leadership strategies for union revitalization, regardless of the 
labour laws in place, the point of issue became the need to organise workers into 
effective collective and campaigning organisations (Lopez 2004). The SEIU and other 
unions such as HERE, CWA and AFSCME, seemed to be rejecting business unionism 
practices and reclaiming more radical traditions within American unionism (Rachleff 
1999). Apparently reverting to ideas of worker self-organisation and past trade union 
forms that had been encouraged by the Knights of Labor and the IWW (Wobblies), 
narratives of sustained worker self-organisation recalled past rank and file union forms 
in syndicalism (see Brecher and Costello 1999, Kimeldorf 1999, Tillmann and Cummings 
1999, Simms and Holgate 2008). Furthermore some unions were going beyond 
traditional exclusive business unionism agendas to broader and more inclusive 
campaigns.  
In union recognised workplaces collective bargaining demands became broader 
challenging managerial prerogative and encouraging members to be active participants 
in grievance raising and resolution. A wider agenda seeing unions as a voice for the 
unorganised, developing community links and redefining political roles, led to new 
alliances within communities and affecting relational functions within unions between 
FTOs and members (Eisenscher 1999). Demands for a minimum wage for all workers, 
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unionised and non-unionised, a blanket amnesty for illegal immigrants and the 
development of connection with other social groups who share similar aims around 
social justice e.g. churches and community organisations ensued. Some unions were 
becoming strategic, more community focused, allying with other likeminded 
organisations (Moody 1997). A transformation from a business unionism to a social 
movement unionism comparable to the pre-second world war CIO appeared to be the 
direction of travel. 
The AFL-CIO organising strategy included training a whole new cadre of lay activists 
and shifting union resources for organising from 2% on average to 30% (Rachleff 1999). 
In practice this new organising approach meant shifting financial and staff resources to 
organising new workplaces, in doing so reducing resources available for servicing 
existing members. This was to be addressed by increased reliance on devolving 
representation of workplace grievances to local representatives properly trained in 
grievance handling (Milkman and Voss 2004).  
To support the drive to organising the AFL-CIO had in 1989 established its own 
Organising Institute to train new organisers in the application of organising techniques 
to be utilised across affiliate trade unions (Turner and Hurd 2001). The rationale for 
the Organising Institute was as organising unions were growing, an institute could 
promote organising techniques and approaches across AFL-CIO affiliates, including 
weaker and smaller affiliated unions unable to shift resources to organising 
(Lerner2002). Expansion in the numbers of Organizing Institute graduates occurred 
given evidence of their worth in the field (Hurd 1998). 
Recruitment of new organisers was broadened to include external candidates. 
Believing that the traditional route to FTO positions reinforced past organising failures 
(Voss and Sherman 2000), it was necessary to attract into union organising people 
from other walks of life with skills transferable to the new organising agenda. 
Supporting workers dealing with their own issues and recognising the broader picture, 
adopting campaigning tactics from other social movements and making alliances 
beyond the trade union were part of the new organiser’s strategy (Milkman 2000).   
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This new approach to organising campaigns aimed at winning union recognition 
through the adoption of a combination of organising techniques including an 
organising committee of workers, worker home visits to discuss the union recognition 
bid and its implications, small group meetings, solidarity days, use of local media and 
community groups and the promotion of issues based around fairness, equality and 
social justice (Bronfenbrenner 1998 and Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004). With 
campaigns seeking union influence on the specific labour market, broadened out with 
community alliances and raising issues of social justice, all combined to suggest union 
transformation.  
Some caution has been expressed over the consequences of diverting resources away 
from existing membership bases and in assumptions that a lay member base was ready 
to throw up new activists to pick up the emergent representational challenges. With 
reduced influence at the level of the state, and reduced resources for dealing with 
employers where unions had recognition, unions risked the retention of their existing 
membership base. As one organiser involved in the Justice for Janitors campaign 
stated: ‘Organising is important. You have to organise, but in order to organise you 
have to maintain’ (Williams 1999:213). However the possibility that union support for 
and from existing members could deteriorate was a position which seemed to be 
accepted at the most senior levels within the AFL-CIO: 
Although they did suggest using rank and file organizers to expand, they 
were ominously silent on the culture, level of democracy and participation, 
and internal dynamics within existing unions. Sweeney and Bensinger even 
intimated that members might have to learn to accept less service while 
their full time officers and staff were engaged with the business of 
organizing. 
Rachleff 1999:93 
The apparent success of US organising came to influence other union confederations 





Organising in Australia 
Trade union growth in Australia had been heavily assisted by the application of an 
arbitration system which provided for union recognition, closed shop or union 
preference clauses in employment contracts and national industry based collective 
agreements. The Australian Industrial Relations Commission provided for a highly 
regulated industrial relations system which saw the channelling and resolution of 
disputes within arbitration procedures (Griffin and Svenson 2002). The system is 
described as a ‘union official paradise’ (Crosby 2005:51) and draws comparison with 
the position of the United States FTO, or business agent, in that the tradition for 
addressing workplace issues relied on the ability and knowledge of the FTO and not 
the organisational strength and power of the union membership: in essence a classic 
example of Russo and Banks’ (1996) servicing model of trade unionism. In 1952 
Australian union density peaked at 62%. Whilst by 1982 this was still 50%, the later 
undermining of the arbitration system with economic deregulation, followed by 
political opposition and loss of employer support, accelerated that decline leading to a 
crisis in trade unionism given workplace organisation was often weak or non-existent 
(Bartram et al. 2008).  
Four years after the establishment of the AFL-CIO Organising Institute a delegation of 
Australian trade union officials undertook a study tour of the US. Impressed by 
campaigns such as Justice for Janitors, the Organising Institute and the apparent 
transformation process they returned to Australia enthused and inspired. What they 
had experienced was a potential answer to comparable problems: a commitment for 
resources to establish an Australian version of the Organising Institute was made. 
Trade unions had become procedural organisations servicing a largely passive 
membership far removed from the campaigning bodies of their origins formed through 
industrial struggles (Crosby 2005). The ensuing ‘Organising Works’ programme 
borrowed many of the US organising techniques for purposes of training a new 
generation of union organisers to recruit non-members and getting them organised 
into a union: in doing so aiming to extend the frontiers of trade unionism across 
Australia (Crosby 2005).  
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Organising Works was established as a training unit funded by ACTU with a remit to 
recruit young organisers to build union membership and change the culture of existing 
union branches from the characteristics of a ‘servicing model’ of unionism to one 
based on Russo and Banks ‘organising model’ (Griffin and Svenson 2002). The 
structural changes in long standing industrial relations arrangements led to a 
rethinking of how trade unions organised and represented members (De Turberville 
2007b). The role of the union FTO in Australia, as with the US Business Agent, was seen 
to require reorientation from industrial advocacy to workplace organising (Peetz et al 
2007). 
Turnbull (1997) identified the emphasis became encouraging membership ownership 
of union campaigns based on their own issues at work. The importance of identifying 
leaders among the workers, and establishing committees for organising and mapping 
of members was emphasised. Recruitment of new members was integral to the 
process of union organising. Collective action becomes forms of solidarity action as 
opposed to industrial action (Turnbull 1997). This process is referred to as the 
Organising cycle, “issue-organisation-unity-action”, designed to build union 
consciousness, encourage membership participation and foster rank and file 
leadership. The apparent changes to union work from this new organising strategy 
encouraged inquiry from the TUC:  
Senior trade unionists travelled to the United States and Australia several 
times throughout the mid-1990s, explicitly seeking to learn from innovative 
initiatives such as the AFL-CIOs Organizing Institute and ACTU’s Organising 
Works programme in Australia. These programs strongly influenced the 
thinking of senior UK policymakers within the TUC and affiliate unions. 
Simms et al. 2013:4  
However what was to become known as ’new unionism’ retained a significant element 
of its previous conservatism suggesting at best reform and not revolution at the TUC. 
The decline of workplace unionism and the rise in ‘consumer’ unionism 
For a period in the 1960s and the early 1970s British trade unionism was characterised 
by strong shopfloor organisation that gave rise to the claim in the Donovan 
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Commission that Britain suffered from two systems of industrial relations - the official 
and the unofficial. In reality, this was more the case in the private sector, and 
engineering in particular, than it was generally, but as engineering provided the 
majority of strikes, and they were largely unofficial, the focus was understandable 
(Hyman 1989c). The slowing of the economy from the 1970s and heightened 
international competition stiffened employer resistance to such actions causing 
lengthening disputes and raising the importance of official trade union support. This 
change of emphasis was to be reinforced by the political assault that followed the 
election of the Conservative government in 1979. 
The attacks on trade union organisation that culminated in the 1984 Miner’s Strike 
were both political and economic. The sharp deflation of the economy caused a 
massive loss in industrial capacity and with it a loss of trade union members in areas 
that had high density and shopfloor organisation. In the public sector privatisations 
weakened the power and ability of unions to coordinate strikes. Alongside these 
policies was a programme of legislation restricting the ability of unions to pursue 
industrial action, which further eroded shopfloor organisation and power, increasing 
reliance on the formal institutions of trade unions. The aim of legislation was not to 
make trade unions illegal but to constrain their power through restrictions on both the 
legitimate subject of industrial action and the conduct for prosecuting any dispute (see 
Smith and Morton 1993, Howell 2005). 
Following the Miner’s Strike, the reaction of unions was largely supine, illustrated by 
the movement towards ‘New Realism’ (McIlroy 1995) that embodied a retreat from 
any challenge to government policy and the simultaneous accommodation of 
employer power and prerogatives. Increasingly trade unions mimicked the growing 
neo-liberal ethos of the period, viewing themselves as a contractual service to 
members now constructed as consumers. Such thinking is illustrated in the views of a 
former General Secretary of the MSF union (later merged into Amicus and then Unite): 
We . . . need to see members as our customers. As sophisticated users of 
services, people will make choices depending on what impresses them 
about a particular company or product and what is in it for them. They 
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have become used to high standards and have expectations based on those 
standards. It is in this framework of, of consumer choice that unions 
increasingly have to stake their claim to recruitment. We need to reassess 
what people really want from a union and what will make them join 
Lyons quoted in Heery 1996:183 
What was striking in this view of union members was that whilst previous descriptions 
of UK trade union solidarities may have been exaggerated (Colling 2009) no evidence 
was offered to support the claims made. In such a model members were seen as 
largely quiescent and the locus of any action on their behalf moved to FTOs. Where 
members continued to push for strike action they were increasingly dependent on 
official approval. 
There was little justification in research for this movement towards servicing (but see 
Bacon and Storey1993, Bassett 1986, Bassett and Cave 1993) and there was even less 
evidence that it was a meaningful strategy for recruitment and retention of members. 
Indeed membership figures continued to decline throughout the period up to 1994. 
Heery (1996:190) points out that declining trade union membership was due to 
changing contexts and that motivations for joining unions remained based on 
traditional issues: 
Research on union joining indicates that employee’s motivations are often 
instrumental but that that instrumentality is of a traditional nature. 
Workers continue to join unions or believe unions to be of value because 
they secure better pay, working conditions and job security, provide 
protection from arbitrary management, offer representation in disciplinary 
and grievance cases, and provide legal assistance in the event of injury at 
work 
Nevertheless the view of union members as consumers remained prominent. As 
previously indicated, within ‘new realism’ the FTO role emphasized their professional 
status as an industrial relations expert, set apart from the union membership (Bassett 
1986). Comparison with US FTO’s, the business agent servicing members of trade 
unions dominated by business unionism, is evident. These views of union members 
and FTO’s was to come under apparent challenge as US grassroots organising gained 
influence among the TUC and its affiliate unions. 
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The re-launch of the TUC 
In 1994 the TUC was formally relaunched under a new General Secretary with an 
agenda of internal reform and external campaigning as a voice for the ’interest of 
labour’. Underpinning this change was the introduction of contemporary management 
techniques through ‘managerial unionism’ (Heery 1998). This was followed by the 
adoption of two competing and contradictory visions of the future for UK unions, 
‘Partnership’ and ‘Organising’, combined under the heading, ‘New Unionism’ (Heery 
1998). The dual approach of organising and partnership presented tension and 
potential for inconsistency in approach (see Heery 1998, Carter and Poynter 1999). 
Partnership with employers, a hangover from ‘new realism’, was influenced by 
European models of social partnership (without the structural support): whilst 
organising emerged from the aforementioned fact finding visits abroad.  
Although having different systems of industrial relations, union traditions and culture, 
and not in the position of crisis faced by US and Australian trade unions, the TUC 
seemed to embrace uncritically organising and partnership as the path to union 
renewal. This was despite assessment on the state of US unions which identified 
continued decline:  
Can we see the future of British trade unions in America today? If so, it 
looks like a future of declining influence. Membership dropped from 22 
million in 1975 to 16 million by 1990 with density today around 15 per 
cent. . .the USA would seem to provide lessons to avoid rather than 
emulate 
McIlroy 1995:414-415  
The ‘New Unionism’ strategy could be summed up in that unions should seek 
partnership with good employers and organize against bad employers (Carter and 
Fairbrother 1998b). Nevertheless formally committed to promoting an organising 
culture amongst British workers, the TUC held a future vision of unionism firmly rooted 
in the belief that the apparent success of organising drives in the USA was transferable 




The Organising Model: a closer look 
The organising approach was based on an ‘organising model’ for building union 
organisation by dealing with issues and grievances through the promotion of 
workplace activism as a way to union renewal (Heery 1998). The organising model can 
be described as ‘a proactive bottom up model of collective organisation in which 
members constantly use innovative techniques to empower themselves’ (De 
Turberville 2004:777). Unlike ‘new realism’ where members were viewed as passive 
recipients of union services, in this orientation was a realisation that workers power 
was not achieved, by competent union business agents (full time officers) or through 
accommodation with the capitalist state or employers, but by the collective 
organisation of workers themselves (see Russo and Banks 1996, Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 1998). The language of organising suggested a return to a more radical past 
with the building of more self-reliant union organisation at the workplace, echoing the 
autonomous steward organisation promoted by the TGWU under Jack Jones 
(Darlington 1994). As a strategy for trade union renewal the ‘organising model’ had 
significant implications for relations with and between union members, union FTO’s 
and employers.  
Central to the organising model is the notion of union building at the workplace 
through the mobilisation of members internally and the promotion of grassroots 
activism more broadly (Heery et al. 2000:996). To reiterate it contrasts with a servicing 
model of trade unionism where FTO’s spend their time dealing with servicing issues, 
such as grievances and disciplinary procedures, at the expense of building the union 
organisation. Largely reflecting the role of union organisers in the US and Australia, 
whether the servicing model accurately portrayed the general position of UK FTO’s is a 
contentious point. According to Kelly and Heery (1994:113) the UK FTO was more an 
enabler as opposed to a servicer and in relation to workplace industrial relations: 
. . . 90 per cent of Officers agreeing with the statement that ‘Wherever 
possible workplace representatives should handle their own collective 
bargaining’. There was a widespread belief among officers, therefore, that 
steward organization should be nurtured to the point where routine 
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negotiations and representation could be handled without recourse to 
external support 
The ‘organising model’ approach sees the FTO acting as a promoter and supporter of 
membership activity and not the substitute for it as the ‘professional’ industrial 
relations representative.  
In the US and Australia the organising model was altering union internal relations and 
FTO’s with some becoming lead organisers fostering and developing workplace 
organisation (Bronfenbrenner 1997). Given existing UK FTO orientation the adoption of 
the organising model suggested some refinement of existing practice as opposed to 
role transformation. 
In 1998 the TUC Organising Academy was established with a remit to train new 
organisers in the skills required to help deliver stated objectives utilising the methods 
identified within the organising model (Simms and Holgate 2010). The five key 
objectives of the Organising Academy were to recruit and train a cadre of specialist 
organisers, increase membership and participation, encourage unions to invest in 
organising work, encourage expansionism to non-unionised areas and to promote a 
specific approach to trade unionism encouraging membership involvement (Simms et 
al. 2013:6). More broadly the TUC launched ‘Winning the Organised Workplace’, 
(WOW) training courses based on applying the organising model as a national skills 
training programme aimed to equip union officials and lay representatives with the 
tools of best practice in organisation and recruitment (see Chapter Five on WOW in 
Unison). 
The Organising Academy was an explicit attempt to ‘shake up’ the trade union 
movement by recruiting new people to work in the unions’ so that they ‘could be 
agents of a wider cultural change within the union movement’ (Simms et al. 2013:5). In 
championing organising over servicing it was accepted that whilst structural economic 
and political conditions had combined to cause union decline, unions themselves had 
contributed by focusing on servicing existing members at the expense of organising 
and recruitment. Despite evidence to the contrary, blame was apportioned to FTO’s 
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and other lay union representatives whose priorities were misplaced (Heery et al. 
2000). In addition, the narrative of separation of servicing from organising, the need 
for FTO roles to be transformed and the requirement for specialist organiser roles was 
all accepted (Simms and Holgate 2010). 
Servicing, organising and the full time officer 
The prominent trade union services for members are arguably representation at work, 
collective bargaining and legal support. Trade union members repeatedly cite the 
importance of support at work and protection as the most important reasons for 
joining (see Waddington and Kerr 1999, Waddington 2014). It follows that enhancing 
representational abilities and outcomes should be a top priority or concern in any 
union renewal strategy. The presentation of contrasting servicing and organising 
models provided for different approaches or orientations to union representation 
encouraging passive union membership in the former and activism in the latter. 
However the idea that servicing was a separate function, secondary in importance to 
organising, became dominant. Representation of members was to be delegated to lay 
representatives. In turn, organising itself became loosely defined, and for some, 
synonymous with recruitment (Simms and Holgate 2008, 2010). 
In accepting and adopting such perspectives those responsible for managing trade 
unions were presented with significant challenges in changing the organisational focus 
from representation to organising and/or recruitment activity. With recruitment 
becoming synonymous with organising the inherent conflict of priorities for FTO’s is 
apparent. Institutional priorities of recruitment targets require managers to assert that 
priority over the workplace issues of existing members and their lay representatives. 
Furthermore with an ‘ongoing decline in the quantity of union representatives’ 
(McIlroy and Daniels 2009:77) a strategy which places more responsibility on an ever 
dwindling number of those representatives is questionable. Where tensions over the 
role of FTO’s and lay activists have exacerbated in the context of increased central 
union direction, or member led campaigning (Rooks 2002), resistance from FTO’s to 
the shift from servicing to organising occurs (Fletcher and Hurd 1998). In addition, as 
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Rooks (2004) was to warn, the problem identified in the USA of ‘burn out’ of 
organisers, given the labour intensive nature of organising work, should not be 
underestimated. 
In the UK similar resistance has been found (Daniels 2010): although the reference to 
Carter (2000) in the case of MSF does not acknowledge that much of the FTO 
opposition was not to organising work itself, but to the manner in which it was 
introduced, defined and applied. As Fletcher and Hurd (1998:40) contend ‘some 
application of organising principles to representational work is desirable’ but lack of 
clarity around organising in practice prevails. Furthermore: 
Little attention is paid to issues of representation in advance of the shift, 
and indeed, potential problems are ignored, masked or downplayed. It is 
the organising itself that takes priority. There is an understanding among 
many proponents . . . that the abrupt reallocation of resources and staff 
will inevitably lead to crises in representation . . . and an assumption that 
organizing locals will adapt and figure out how to handle these challenges 
as they arise 
Fletcher and Hurd 2001:183 
A crucial consequence of the drive to organising is: 
This nearly single-minded focus on external organizing potentially relegates 
current members to substandard representation and disenchantment. 
Even newly recruited members face this fate once the first contract is 
signed. The problem inherent in the much maligned servicing model, 
namely a disengaged apathetic membership, are thereby exacerbated 
Hurd 2004:11 
Ironically, this view mirrors the comments of Muehlenkamp (1991) who, then as an 
argument for organising, contrasted the different ways workers were treated before 
and after US unions recruited: 
Instead of constantly developing new rank and file leaders, we act like they 
have all the information and skills they will ever need. Instead of recruiting 
more leaders, we act like whoever already came forward as leaders at that 
point are the union’s permanent leaders. Instead of targeting active 
workers to get them more active, we abandon them. Instead of mobilizing 
workers – now dues-paying members- around issues, we write letters and 
file grievance forms 
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The only difference from servicing to organising seemed to be that in organising union 
FTO’s are not supposed to write the letters, file the grievance forms or engage in 
representation. The crisis in representation which this strategy produces is illustrated 
by the growth of alternatives to traditional trade union work: 
. . . the network of local coalitions on occupational safety and health (COSH 
groups) . . . continues to function in many cities, trying to fill the void left 
by unions that have shifted resources into organising at the expense of job 
safety fights  
Early 2009:68 
For Hurd (2004:12) the AFL-CIO objective of promoting grassroots activism which 
would address workers grievances and concerns ‘was abandoned at the altar of 
quantitative recruitment goals’. The rhetoric of organising morphed into a definition 
which was limited to recruitment activity. However, the narrow objective of 
membership growth has mostly not been achieved, even by those unions who have 
made ‘a financial commitment to organising’ (Hurd 2004:12).  
In the UK the specific conditions which provided the context for the apparent 
organising successes of the SEIU could not be replicated. However, there were some 
parallels with US experience. The radical rhetoric of organising did not materialise. The 
TUC’s continued emphasis on collaborative approaches through the partnership 
dimension of ‘new unionism’ paralleled the pronouncements of collaboration and 
cooperation with corporate America by the AFL-CIO leadership (McIlroy 2013). Also 
the apparent existence of a strategic choice for unions between servicing and 
organising was accepted (Heery 1998) with the FTO role requiring adjusting to 
organising as opposed to servicing.   
Organising for what? 
As in Hurd’s analysis of the limitations in US organising strategy, concerns were 
expressed that organising in the UK context would also be limited to recruitment 
campaigns (Carter and Fairbrother 1998a). In addition, the pre-existing growth in 
managerialism within UK trade unions (Heery 1996) corresponded with US experience 
(McIlroy 2013); and in organising saw an opportunity for clear management objectives 
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limited to recruitment targets, far removed from the potential within the organising 
model. 
De Turberville identifies that for some unions the organising objective is to increase 
the number of stewards in the workplace and build shop steward networks (De 
Turberville 2004). Waddington and Kerr saw increasing membership participation and 
recruitment as the key objectives (Waddington and Kerr 2000). Others look to the 
importance of membership participation, democratisation and increasing militancy of 
membership in terms of their demands as union goals (Cohen 2006). In acknowledging 
that in most cases the objective is the establishment or strengthening of conventional 
recognition agreements, Simms et al (2013:153) also confirm ‘. . . the most important 
outcome of organising is increasing membership’. Given these differing objectives it is 
understandable that confusion abounds over organising work. This is significant given 
Carter’s (2006:424) observation that ‘the means of renewal affect the end’. 
Furthermore organising campaigns stem from union leaderships and not organically 
from workplaces resulting in attempts to implant as opposed to nurture an existing 
culture (Simms 2007). 
The confusion arising from an absence of an identifiable union vision and the tendency 
for trade union leaders to embrace uncritically ideas for union renewal, it is not 
surprising that ‘organising’, despite the pronouncement of it being the ‘top priority’, 
has failed to produce tangible results. Questions posed by Fletcher and Hurd (1998: 53) 
going to the ideological basis of US trade unionism’ and relevant to the UK remain 
unanswered: 
Who is identified as the constituency of organized labor? What is the 
mission of the labor movement? What is the relationship of organized 
labor to corporate America? How do those in the labor movement deal 
with issues of globalization and solidarity? 
Trade union purpose can vary from concentrating on issues of class and social justice 
to being limited to the economic interest of workers. Purpose can also be for 
institutional interests of union bureaucracies (see Chapter Three). Turner (1962) 
proposed that generalisation of trade union goals is not impossible if recognising they 
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possess three main characteristics. Firstly, the rationale for a union is that it pursues 
the interests of its members and is in the last resort controlled by them.  If policy 
priorities are decided by the membership it follows that full time officers become the 
servants of the membership. This, however, suggests a potential for internal conflict if 
membership priorities do not coincide with internal management objectives and/or 
oligarchic priorities of union bureaucracies (see Chapter Three). Secondly, ambiguity in 
trade union goals seems inherent given consideration of different internal and external 
constituencies and interests. This can be illustrated in top down approaches to 
organising, with decisions to mimic US organising decided by senior union officials, and 
not determined by members at conference after widespread discussion. As Simms and 
Holgate (2010: 157-158) identify in relation to organising objectives: 
Membership growth, industrial and bargaining strength, culture change 
and worker self-organisation feature at different times and in different 
contexts, with different – and often competing – degrees of emphasis 
Although in the UK, ‘ the primary interest became to establish a set of organising 
practices that would encourage unions to engage in membership growth activities’ 
(Simms and Holgate 2010:160). 
Thirdly, as Hyman and Fryer (1975) also identify, trade unions can be described as 
secondary organisations in that their existence presupposes that of economic 
institutions employing waged labour. It follows that strategies for trade union renewal 
need to be mindful of relations with employers and the state which frames those 
relations. 
Experience of organising strategies demonstrates that organisational continuity should 
not carry the assumption that union objectives are not open to reinterpretation or 
have changing emphasis and priority. More generally Flanders identified the role for 
trade unions as a ‘sword of justice within the workplace’ (Flanders 1970:15) which 
connects with protection at work, often cited as the primary reason why workers join 
unions (Waddington 2014). Organising is complementary when as Simms and Holgate 
(2010:165) identify, that ‘organising activity must deliver sustainable increases in 
workplace power’.  Furthermore, union strategy requires consideration of the terrain 
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in which it is applied, including the relationships between FTO’s and lay 
representatives, members, employers and the state. Hyman (2001) illustrates the 
potential range of trade unionism through the ‘geometry of trade unionism’ where 
unions can be positioned at various points between class, market and society at any 
given time.  
 





                                Market                                                          Class 
 
UK trade unions historically are positioned between market and class. In contrast US 
trade unions, reflecting the dominance of business unionism, are positioned between 
market and society. Hyman points out that ‘in times of change and challenge for union 
movements, a reorientation can occur . . .’ (Hyman 2001:5).  
Radical or conservative trade unionism 
Organising strategies held out the promise of a more radical orientation, with the 
emphasis on grassroots union organising, UK unions could reposition between class 
and society. Although following the example of a trade union confederation 
traditionally positioned more conservatively warrants some scepticism of that 
potentiality and suggests the direction of travel is towards a more conservative 
position.  Hinting of this possibility, Simms and Holgate (2010:158) point out: 
The fact that the TUC were so keen to play down any political agenda 
around organising meant that, in practice, organising has largely been a 
‘toolbox’ of practices that different unions can apply in different contexts 
to different ends 
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Those different contexts include, for large general unions that have resulted from 
union mergers such as Unison, internal relations which compound the competing 
internal interests underlining the importance of strategic ‘buy – in’ to the shift to 
organising. Without this it is doubtful that the plurality of sectional interests within 
union structures will support strategic change. The potential for increased conflict of 
interest when local disputes conflict with national union strategies is evident. Ironically 
with local workplace unions often portrayed as more militant working against the 
constraints of conservative national union bureaucracies (Cohen 2006), the shift to 
organising suggested role reversals between the local and national unions, with the 
former now resistant to a radical shift in union direction.  
Given the organising model emphasis on greater involvement of union rank and file 
membership in matters of organisation, policy and decision making, the enhancement 
of workplace and internal union democracy which would follow suggests an inevitable 
increase in challenges to managerial prerogative creating conditions for raising levels 
of industrial dispute. However this has proven not to be the case. Furthermore Hyman 
(2007) emphasises the importance of connecting ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ trade 
unionism recognising the realities of organisational capacity and the ability of unions 
to act strategically. In this respect four crucial areas are identified: the structural 
capacity to develop common objectives, the intelligence from research, education and 
information gathering which recognises that knowledge is power, linking intelligence 
to evaluate and plan strategic objectives and finally the efficacy of attainability of 
those objectives. Similarly Upchurch et al. (2012) contend that union renewal requires 
the existence of a strategy based on political congruence whereby a ‘common political 
vision between leaders, activists and members’ is achieved. 
Simms and Holgate (2010) note that the potential for a more radical based trade 
unionism, through organising strategies, did unite differing trade union constituencies 
(see also Darlington and Upchurch 2012). However this was in a context were in the UK 
debates around the politics of organising have been largely limited to, on the one hand 
the merits of organising versus servicing models (see De Turberville 2004 and 2007a, 
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Carter 2006) and, on the other, within proponents of the former, the extent to which 
organising is simply the application of a set of tools in particular circumstances (Simms 
and Holgate ibid.). Nevertheless enhancing the position of workplace rank and file 
trade unionism has some resonance with earlier analyses of UK trade unions 
challenging management control in the workplace and beyond (Coates and Topham 
1970). Such thinking draws on ideas from syndicalist trade union forms. A parallel with 
a revival in interest in the US with more radical union forms is apparent. However 
experience has shown this promise to be over optimistic at best. 
In the United States organising has become a vehicle for the assertion of greater 
control of union leaderships or bureaucracies over existing grassroots organisation.  
For example Lerner (2002) demonstrated that the much touted Justice for Janitors 
campaign was directed nationally over the heads of locals in a belief that the first 
priority for unions at all levels is organising. Milkman and Voss (2004:7) confirm this 
position ‘the key element of J for J (Justice for Janitors) success was the institutional 
decision not to tolerate local leaders who did not want to organize’.  
Lerner (2001) identifies a number of interventions used within the SEIU to assert 
control by the national leadership and prioritise organising. These include supporting 
local leaders who are committed to putting organising first, focusing institutional 
resources they control on that task, willing to create moral and physical crisis in the 
workplace in order to overcome employer opposition, purge union staffers who don’t 
comply, reorganise locals through merger and trusteeships taking over the running of 
locals if necessary. Such an approach is seen as undemocratic and centralist by others. 
SEIU success is based on a ‘bureaucratise to organise’ process with top down control 
over locals and bargaining issues requiring business agent’s approval ( Cohen 
2006:154-5).  Similarly: 
. . . union revitalisation efforts promoted recently by some supposedly 
visionary leaders have relied primarily on bureaucratic consolidation, top 




Furthermore Brecher and Costello (1999:9) propose that the organising strategy 
adopted by the AFL-CIO was limited in objective to protecting the ‘old guard’ 
proponents of business unionism ‘the new voice takeover victory of John Sweeney is 
placed in the shell of the old with the ‘fabled rigidity of the AFL-CIO’. Whilst promoting 
rhetoric of transforming from business unionism to social movement unionism, it 
would seem that given John Sweeney was elected with the support of key unions, 
continuity and reinforcing entrenched bureaucracy has taken place.  
Continuity in the inherent conservatism of US trade unions is confirmed with 
experiences of SEIU and UNITE-HERE were the trade-off of the right to strike with 
employer neutrality in recognition ballots has occurred. These agreements: 
. . . increases the chance for membership gain but workers are relatively 
uninvolved in the process, and the development of an activist core and 
tradition so essential to the organising model is potentially discouraged 
 Dixon and Fiorito 2009:166 
Distilling all of this it is clear that for unions to become organising institutions there 
needs to be a wholesale change in their modus operandi. Trade union organisation 
itself has to transform its communications, decentralise its decision making structures 
and develop and deepen its commitment to education and support for shop stewards 
and the membership more generally. Carter (2000) identifies that there is little if any 
evidence for individual unions affiliated to the TUC identifying with organising in a 
comprehensive way. Developing under the guise of organising is an enhanced form of 
managed activism including recruitment plans; performance management techniques, 
workplace mapping and branch development plans according to De Turberville 
(2004).Such techniques have been adopted by Unison and will be considered in more 
detail in Chapter Five. Contrarily it is these techniques which Waddington and Kerr 
(2009) offer as evidence that Unison transformed itself into an organising union.  
Union organising encouraging workplace membership participation and enhancing the 
organising responsibilities of the FTO can be delimited or subordinated to a 
recruitment strategy. In contrast recruiting new members into poorly organised 
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workplaces with reduced representational support is unsustainable. Crucially the 
ongoing failure to radicalise trade union education undermines efforts at boosting 
union activism and confidence:  
Activism without education, in the absence of a coherent conceptual 
framework by which to comprehend the world around one (and without 
participation in democratic decision-making) is most often dis-
empowering, despite the best of intentions. Many unions have yet to 
confront the challenge of developing and operationalizing a substantial and 
progressive education program 
Kumar and Schenk 2006:55 
Twenty years on formal adherence to organising strategies in the United States, 
Australia and the UK have seen no dramatic upsurge in union fortunes with continued 
decline in all three union confederations (see Hurd 2004, Bowden 2009, Simms et al. 
2013). Daniels (2010) points out that for those unions which have apparently 
embraced organising and commenced some internal transformation there is little 
evidence of renewal despite some impressive individual campaigns. The overall 
experience is organising work as presently conceived has failed to find a well of 
workers clamouring to join trade unions, let alone become activists (see Danford et al. 
2009). Given this position debates around conservative or radical orientations and 
union characteristics and objectives remain secondary to the issue of basic 
organisation. As Danford et al. (2009:77) point out: 
. . . until British unions are able to rebuild workplace structures based on a 
critical mass of union members and activists then the political choice 
between cooperative unionism and more aggressive oppositional union 
forms may constitute a false dichotomy  
It is nevertheless the orientations themselves which can provide both 
explanations for, and resolution to, the problems of weakened organisation. 
Conclusion 
The development of organising and particular successes in the US held out the 
potential for a more general reversal in union fortunes and the development of new 
forms of trade unionism with the emphasis on more workplace based participatory 
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unionism.  The context in which the organising model was adopted in the USA was one 
of crisis for US trade unions. Crucially, the methods based on the organising model 
championed by the SEIU in the USA were in the context of a different trade union 
culture; experience and legal framework (Carter et al. 2003). Nevertheless the 
borrowing of ‘in your face’ organising tactics from the US promised a radical departure 
from previous strategies of collaboration. However, the narrative which emerged 
suggested unions had a strategic choice between organising and servicing their 
respective memberships.  
The choice of organising has a number of implications. One is the reinforcement of 
forms of managerial unionism which attempt to increase control of union resources, 
both financial and human. Another is the downgrading of representation - the basic 
reason union membership - replaced with the priority of recruiting: illustrated in the 
policy of delegating representational work from FTOs to lay union representatives. 
What ‘organising’ is defined as is unclear as are any objectives beyond achieving 
nationally set membership targets bearing no relationship to local conditions and 
workplace developments. The prospect of transforming trade unions through a 
different way of addressing everyday issues of workers has been ignored with 
potentially significant implications for both the role of the FTO and the nature of trade 
unions.  
The original emphasis within the organising model on membership development and 
ownership of issues is a shift away from the business unionism of the AFL-CIO, the 
servicing dominance of the Australian Arbitration system and to a new direction for UK 
unions. This strategy is partly based on a belief that the FTO is culpable for the failure 
of UK trade unions to breakout from traditional areas of recognition to organise within 
the new sectors of the economy. Consequently this also suggests that the daily 
operation of trade unions was inwardly focused and, by opening out to the non-
unionised sectors of the economy, new members would be attracted to new forms of 
trade union organisation supported by new union officials with a campaigning as 
opposed to industrial relations background and experience. Such a turn places a 
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premium on different skills and hence the change to recruitment of external 
candidates with minimal industrial relations experience. Collective bargaining and 
grievance representation are no longer as important given the emphasis on 
recruitment targets. This movement suggests that, rather than changing union practice 
from conservative business unionism to more radical forms of social movement 
unionism, organising introduced by union bureaucracies is as Greer (2003) suggests 
restructuring that bureaucracy.  
If it is the case that trade union renewal is best achieved through the adoption of 
organising then questions in connection with why trade union renewal remains elusive 
needs placing in the context of the nature of trade unions, relations between differing 
trade union constituencies and the variability of trade union objectives. These factors 
highlighted the possibilities of contrasting union forms based on bureaucracy, on the 
one hand, and those which emphasise workplace rank and file participatory trade 
unionism. There are some obvious limitations to the introduction of the organising 
model. Trade unions are not easily malleable: they have formally democratic 
structures, different and sometimes conflicting policies and objectives, and changing 
operational emphases. Major organisational and cultural changes require engagement 
and commitment from all constituent parts. A large general union would have 
particular issues in gaining agreement given the different interests across occupations 
and internal union structures. Such questions are relevant and explain the need to 
consider the nature and sociology of trade union forms.  
Experience also suggests that Fairbrothers’ (1994,1996) assessment that 
decentralisation of public services present opportunities for union renewal are over 
optimistic in light of experience with union avoidance strategies and lack of experience 
at the local union level (Carter 2004). Furthermore: 
Fairbrothers analysis did not sufficiently consider the limited extent to 
which national unions would transfer resources and support the growth of 
such workplace based organization 
Carter et al. 2012:5  
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On the contrary it confirms previous characterisation of public sector unions as 
bureaucratic, centralised and remote from local concerns (Fairbrother 1996).  
The idea that trade union renewal is best achieved through the adoption of US 
organising has weakened in recent years supported by the continued decline of unions 
and reflected in portrayals of it as just one set of techniques that downgrade its 
importance (Simms et al. 2013).  Yet others have attacked its philosophical and 
practical coherence (de Turberville 2004, 2007).  If US style grassroots trade union 
organising promised to be the panacea for union renewal the causes for its subsequent 
failure requires examination. Those writers continuing to support it can point to 
isolated but successful organising attempts and that in the main unions have adopted 
organising more in rhetoric than reality. One of the reasons for this partial adoption 
emerging from this chapter is that trade unions comprise different interests and 
broadly speaking the interests of a bureaucracy predominate shaping initiatives in 
their own interests.  The literature on organising is now extensive but it is as yet not 
sufficiently informed by a longer term discussion of the nature of trade unions and the 












Chapter Three: The social relations of trade unions  
Introduction 
Accounts of organising model influenced strategies, as the answer to trade union 
decline (see for example Heery 1998, Voss and Sherman 2000, Crosby 2005), or those 
sceptical of the appropriateness of the organising model (De Turberville 2004, 2007), 
have in common, no sense of internal trade union dynamics. Even where the need for 
change is acknowledged trade unions tend to implement it in ways which protect 
vested interests from the potential consequences of radical union transformation. Full 
time officers do not necessarily fit within this protected category and, as identified 
later in the thesis, are subject to changes in responsibilities and priorities given their 
pivotal position in delivery of union strategies. To reiterate, given the nature of trade 
unions there has been insufficient appreciation of their ability (even when appearing 
to embrace change) to resist, or distort initiatives. Examination moreover has to go 
beyond seeing the cause of failure as simply the result of the position of conservative 
individuals in leadership positions and to recognise that trade unions as institutions, 
and the structures within, are inherently resistant to radical reform. This examination 
inevitably centres on the existence and role of trade union bureaucracy and the extent 
to which it embraces all full time officers.  
Theoretical frameworks can help explain the implications of and prospects for union 
renewal. Theories of trade unions and industrial relations are important in providing 
an analytical framework in which future plans and strategies are developed. A failure 
to theorise structures risks detaching any strategy or plan from its material base. 
Sociology of trade unions has long counter-posed the interests of bureaucracy and 
rank and file. The importance of a consideration of bureaucracy should not be 
underestimated as it ‘can permeate the whole practice of trade unionism’ (Hyman 
1989:158). Trade union renewal, and with it, the prospect of change in trade union 
formation bringing an influx of new union activism, can threaten and challenge existing 
arrangements and positions within both union bureaucracy and rank and file. 
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The chapter commences by examining differing approaches to trade union support and 
representation of members. It then considers the position of union bureaucracy and 
Michels’ (1962) contention that there is an ‘iron law of oligarchy’. This is followed with 
some critiques of this position but also reference to more recent (from a historical 
perspective) identification of an emergent trade union lay or semi- bureaucracy. 
External as well as internal bureaucratic pressures are identified which lead to some 
recognition of the implications for trade union objectives and organisation.  
Approaches to servicing union members 
Trade union support or provision of services for members has, as Heery and Kelly 
(1994) identify, gone through ‘three discernible phases in post war Britain’, which they 
describe as professional, participative and managerial forms of trade unionism. The 
professional phase being dominant from the 1940s to the 1960s, had the role of the 
FTO as the professional representative, in this period comparable with their US and 
Australian equivalents, representing and negotiating on behalf of a largely passive 
union membership.  
From the 1960s onwards the development of more participative union forms emerged 
shifting the role of the FTO to one of facilitating workplace organisation. For FTO’s 
their independence and ability to resist manipulation by employers, of which shop 
stewards were more susceptible, illustrated the limits of participative trade unionism. 
Furthermore as Gall (2003:232) was to identify ‘FTO’s remain important personnel in 
the creation, prosecution and successful outcomes of unionization and recognition 
campaigns’. 
Whilst professional unionism saw decision making power with the FTO, in contrast 
participative unionism had the FTO supporting a transfer of that power to the rank and 
file. By the 1980s a move to managerial unionism is identified with the view emerging 
of members as consumers of union services and FTOs as a key resource, but one which 
requires greater direction and management towards managerial objectives. Whilst 
managerial unionism sees the assertion of managerial prerogative within trade unions 
and ‘implies a transfer of decision making from lay activists to union leaders’ (Heery 
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and Kelly 1994:10), or an enhancing of internal power of union bureaucracies. To 
reiterate the FTO becomes a key resource to be ‘actively managed in delivering 
services to members’ (Heery and Kelly ibid). It is in the context of increasing influence 
of managerial approaches to servicing union members that ‘new unionism’ emerged. 
In the formation of Unison, NALGO was described as a member led union suggesting a 
participative approach to servicing members. NUPE, in contrast, was officer led, a 
characteristic of professional unionism. NALGO, NUPE and COHSE had however 
previously committed to supporting shop stewards networks. In negotiations on its 
formation Unison aspired to a more managerial approach (see Dempsey 2000). Heery 
and Kelly (1994:14) predicted that such an approach could lead to ‘divestment from 
the core business of representing members’. The introduction of ‘organising’ in the 
‘new unionism’ strategy suggested a reversal to a more participative approach to 
servicing. However the debate on organising and servicing was in the context of a 
managerial union dominance which questioned the servicing function itself. The 
importance of member recruitment and retention emphasised in managerial unionism, 
asserting a key concern of union bureaucracy, was to be the priority (see chapter five). 
However the retention element was itself to be diluted (see chapter six onwards).  
The triumph of bureaucracy 
Historically the momentum of bureaucracy in trade unions was identified by S. and B. 
Webb (1894:15) in their classic analysis of the early trade union movement. The 
emergence of an officer class separate from the membership had significant 
consequences:  
With the appointment of a General Secretary, and later other full time 
officials, the foundations for an elite or governing class were created: The 
setting apart of one man (sic) to do the clerical work destroyed the 
possibility of equal and identical service by all the members, and laid the 
foundation for a separate governing class . . . Spending all day at office 
work, he soon acquired a professional expertise quite out of the reach of 
his fellow members at the bench or the forge  
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The development of union delegate democracy saw tensions between FTOs and the 
lay membership addressed, at least in theory, through a written constitution and rule 
book, reinforced through strong democratic structures (see S. and B. Webb ibid). On 
occasion where, tensions, or other motivations, led to a potential challenger to the 
office of the General Secretary, the challenger, however capable, was at a significant 
disadvantage given the incumbent office holder controlled union communications and 
was readily available to members through that office. A state of affairs which led to a 
view that ‘. . . almost every influence in the trade union organisation has tended to 
magnify and consolidate the power of the General Secretary” (S. and B. Webb 
1894:27).  
For Michels (1962), regardless of the strength of internal democracy and union rule 
book controls, there is an inevitability of union control by an elite cadre of FTOs 
through the necessity of organisational work: ‘Nominally . . . the acts of the leaders are 
subject to the ever vigilant criticism of the rank and file’ (Michels 1962:71). However, 
democratic control of a trade union is illusionary with Michels maintaining that 
democracy and decision making was inevitability dominated by such an elite. For 
Michels this influence over the union membership results in goal displacement and the 
gradual emergence of a ruling oligarchy: 
It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over 
the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over 
the delegators . . . Who says organization says oligarchy 
Michels 1962:15 
Michels explained oligarchy in terms of, “. . . the control of a society or an organization 
by those at the top, is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large scale organisation” 
(Michels 1962:15). For Michels trade unions and socialist political parties, whilst well-
meaning, inevitably succumb to the iron law of oligarchy, a characteristic of any 
complex social system. The requirement for delegated democracy whilst allowing for a 
form of democracy fails to protect from the ‘formation of an oligarchical camerilla’ 
(Michels ibid: 64). As trade union organisation expanded so employing their own staff 
heightened existing oligarchical tendencies: 
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In the trade union movement, the authoritative character of the leaders 
and their tendency to rule democratic organizations on oligarchic lines, are 
even more pronounced than in the political leaders 
Michels 1962:159 
The paradox that members of a union would want the union to be effective provides 
the condition for strong organisation implying strong leadership. It is that organisation 
which inevitably produces an oligarchy given the aristocratic tendencies of those in 
positions of leadership. The members become directed by the professional full time 
officers as ‘the technical specialization that inevitably results from all extensive 
organization renders necessary what is called expert leadership’ (Michels ibid:70). The 
impact on the FTO is significant given the transition from rank and file workers 
representative to bureaucratic administrator is judged on practical competence 
stemming from the expectations of the paid role. In addition the FTO’s direct 
responsibility for their organisation’s security and survival can inevitably produce some 
caution particularly with actions or behaviour which threatens current and established 
bargaining relationships. 
Michels (ibid: 191) also proposed that the separation of the FTO from the union 
membership is not restricted to their respective positions within the union structure 
but extended by the developing differences in social position: 
In every bureaucracy we may observe place-hunting, a mania for 
promotion, and obsequiousness towards those on whom promotion 
depends; there is arrogance towards inferiors and servility towards 
superiors 
Furthermore, ‘what was initiated by the need for organization, administration and 
strategy is completed by psychological determination’ (Michels ibid: 205) in that the 
apathy of the masses is coupled by the leaders desire for power ‘the principal cause of 
oligarchy . . . is to be found in the principal of leadership’ (Michels ibid: 364).  As unions 
become larger and more influential so the paid officials become persons of influence 
courted by the ruling elites and their social position transcends from that of the 
working class, where lies the membership, to the power elites within the ruling class. 
Eventually there develops a position of permanent leaders which Michels argues is 
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’tantamount to the exercise of dominion by the representative over the represented’ 
(Michels ibid: 77). Of particular relevance in examining large unions such as Unison is 
the further claim that: 
The more extended and the more ramified the official apparatus of the 
organization, the greater the number of its members, the fuller its treasury, 
and the more widely circulated its press, the less efficient becomes the 
direct control exercised by the rank and file, and the more is this control 
replaced by the increasing power of committees  
Michels ibid:71 
Organisation consolidates the position of leaders and led. ‘It may be enunciated as a 
general rule that the increase in the power of the leaders is directly proportional with 
the extension of the organisation’ (Michels ibid: 70-71). Conversely the stronger the 
organisation the weaker the democracy becomes as ‘. . . strong organization needs an 
equally strong leadership’ (Michels ibid: 73) 
The idea that union members can be transformed from passive to active members is 
questioned by Michels who viewed union membership as apathetic and indifferent to 
union policy and democracy as they are to politics more generally (Michels ibid: 86). 
This stance has implications for union organising strategies as does Allen’s (1954:15) 
position of union legitimacy coming, not from internal union democracy, but union 
delivery of policy in dealing with employers.  
. . . the end of trade union activity is to protect and improve the general 
living standards of its members and not to provide workers with an 
exercise in self-government 
This apathy of the masses, FTO control of communication and administration and the 
often held veneration of leaders, all combine to create the conditions for oligarchical 
control. The implications are such that: 
In the trade union, it is even easier than in the political labor organization, 
for the officials to initiate and to pursue a course of action disapproved of 
by the majority of workers they are supposed to represent 
Michels ibid: 159  
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Where dissatisfaction may result in a desire to remove leaders the system of 
bureaucracy protects their position and is strengthened ‘by the increase in the tasks 
imposed by modern organization’ (Michels ibid: 190), so incorporating others into the 
bureaucracy. Organization becomes an end in itself with Michels (1962:284) 
prophetically contending that: 
What is above all necessary is to organize, to organize unceasingly, and 
that the cause of the workers will not gain the victory until the last worker 
has been enrolled in the organization 
Given organisational size, the potential for competing objectives both within the 
membership rank and file, and between the FTO led oligarchy, can heighten the risk of 
the interests of the representative dominating those of the represented. However 
these perspectives fail to recognise the importance of democratic participation and 
effective representation to achieve such objectives. 
Iron Law or Tendency? 
There have been a number of challenges to Michels’ framework, both theoretical and 
practical. Hyman (1971b) has disputed the unilinear movement towards oligarchy, 
arguing that while it might be an observable tendency, it is far from an iron law. To 
paraphrase Michels, Hyman’s position might be characterised as ‘Who says 
organisation/bureaucracy says democratic resistance’ (see Hyman 1971b). Hyman cites 
Gouldner’s (1955) argument that the lack of democracy in trade unions is due to 
capitalism and not any iron law: 
It is the pathos of pessimism rather than the compulsions of rigorous 
analysis that leads to the assumption that organisational constraints have 
stacked the deck against democracy. For on the face of it there is every 
reason to assume that “the underlying tendencies which are likely to 
inhibit the democratic process” are just as likely to impair authoritarian 
rule . . . There cannot be an iron law of oligarchy, however, unless there is 
an iron law of democracy 
Hyman 1971:33 
Similarly for Anderson (1967:276) the lack of democracy in trade unions is to be 
understood in terms of ‘the nature of the system into which they are inserted: that is 
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capitalism.’ Within capitalism ‘organisations for the working class can become against 
that class . . .  power for as power over’ (Anderson 1967:276).  
Countervailing tendencies to oligarchy come from , ‘the implications of workers 
‘instrumental’ attitudes to their unions, normative pressures towards democratic 
practice, and the distinctive context of different levels of organisation’ (Hyman 
1971b:29). Whilst improving union organisation, administration and delivery of union 
policy, bureaucracy nevertheless does not overcome competing and conflicting 
interests and objectives. These internal union relations are often presented as a 
dichotomy of on the one hand bureaucracy, and on the other ‘rank and file’. Hyman 
(1989:158) defines the former as: 
in large measure a question of the differential distribution of expertise and 
activism: of the dependence of the mass of union membership on the 
initiative and strategic experience of a relatively small cadre of leadership – 
both ‘official’ and unofficial 
The instrumental attitudes of union members mean that an ineffective union will lead 
to union leaders being ‘swept aside by a democratic uprising of the ‘rank and file’ 
(Hoxie 1923 quoted in Hyman 1971:30). This assumes the influence of the oligarchy is 
not all encompassing. An alternative reaction to such failure could be that workers 
may decide to end their union membership.  
In examining relations between stewards and union members at Ford Motors Beynon 
(1975:202) noted that apathy ‘explains everything and nothing’: rather it is the gap 
between stewards and members which comes through the sustained activism of the 
former. Organising strategies held out a promise of narrowing that gap or at least 
increasing the numbers of activists and strengthening union democracy. The pressure 
on FTOs is necessary to maintain legitimacy of representation and to resist claims of 
unrepresentativeness which at times may be alleged by management and sections of 
the public, as well as the union membership (see Coleman 1956 quoted in Hyman 




Most leaders of British unions achieve office only after many years as lay 
activists; and those at least who have been accustomed to democratic 
control are likely to have been socialised to define their role in a manner 
which precludes the extremes of oligarchic practice 
Trade unions are both defined, but also inhibited, by collective struggle. Whilst it may 
be the case that union activists and/or paid officials agitate for grievances and disputes 
in order to achieve certain goals, in the process of prosecuting disputes the position of 
the official transforms from agitator to mediator in order to achieve resolution of the 
grievance or dispute. Moreover, the processes through which such matters are 
resolved are normally set around procedural norms of industrial relations. This is the 
context to which the FTO is employed and what is expected by both the institution and 
the membership, although such expectations are far from uniform or static.  
Kelly and Heery’s (1994:19) examination of local FTOs found that their work is 
primarily to ‘attempt to establish vigorous, self-supporting and relatively autonomous 
workplace trade unionism’. Notwithstanding the degree of autonomy a cautious 
approach to grievance resolution is often required given the need to maintain relations 
with employers and the state. FTOs have been essentially employed for that purpose 
and, of significance for organising strategies, not to mobilise members. Consequently 
they ‘frequently perform a conservative role in periods of membership activism and 
struggle’ (Hyman 198 9:55). Furthermore, Pearce, referring to the previous work of S. 
and B. Webb, points to the broader conservative nature of the FTO with the 
development of “a whole network of social relations separating them off from their 
original class” (Pearce 1959: 15). 
The labelling of FTOs as bureaucrats is, according to Hyman (1989), a term of abuse 
which merely seeks to use the union full time officer as a scapegoat for the inherent 
contradictions within trade unionism. The corollary of the contention that FTOs are 
organic parts of a bureaucracy holding a privileged position is that their interests are 
antipathetic to those of the union membership. As part of the permanent union elite 
their priorities come to dominate those of the membership and encourage the 
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tendency to adopt more conservative policies. Hence as Hyman (1989:150) was later 
to observe, FTOs: 
. . . though often politically and socially more advanced or progressive than 
many of their members, frequently perform a conservative role in periods 
of membership activism and struggle 
However, policies are context bound and may shift sharply in periods of crisis. Voss 
and Sherman (2000) propose that the response to the crisis facing US unions was 
evidence of the breaking of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’. In emphasising cultural change 
with workplace organising and an influx of outsiders with innovative ideas the position 
of FTOs and members is transformed: 
In the labor movement, rather than democracy paving the way for the end 
of bureaucratic conservatism, the breakdown of bureaucratic conservatism 
paves the way for greater democracy and participation, largely through the 
participatory education being promoted by the new leaders. 
Voss and Sherman 2000:344 
Union organising strategies, which some claim are influenced by earlier radical union 
forms, by prioritising organising over servicing or representation may provide 
confirmation of such a position. 
Trade union focus on grassroots organising illustrates the distinction that can be made 
between the union at the workplace, highlighting the importance of shop floor trade 
unionism, and the formal structures of trade unions. Michels ignores the former by 
focusing on the latter. Yet it is at the workplace where trade union effectiveness is 
often assessed by members and where vibrant and effective democracy can inhibit 
bureaucratic tendencies. Beynon (1975) writing at a particular moment of British class 
relations identified shop stewards as crucial to the defence of workers interests and 
resistance to managerial prerogative. Whilst workplace unionism may have largely 
economistic objectives it also involves regular challenge and resistance to managerial 
control (Beynon ibid). Whilst there was also in this response a potential for 
fragmentation of workers, and with it a level of vulnerability through isolationist 
tactics, this was addressed through joint shop stewards organisation.  
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Lay or semi bureaucracy  
Chapter one referred to the 1968 Donovan Commission report and the ensuing 
pressures to incorporate lay union representatives within formal union structures and 
industrial relations procedures. The report followed a period of growing numbers of 
independent shop stewards, often adopting a militant approach to industrial relations. 
As conditions tightened Hyman (1989:149-150) raised concerns that the incorporation 
of shop stewards into official union structures through facility time, growth of 
procedural resolution to disputes was leading to the extension of bureaucratic 
relations. Consequently considerations of union bureaucracy should not be limited to 
the separation of full time officials from the rank and file but should also examine the 
relations of convenors and other union lay officials as: 
. . . those continuously engaged in a representative capacity perform a 
crucial mediating role in sustaining tendencies towards an accommodative 
and subaltern relationship with external agencies (employers and state) in 
opposition to which trade unions were originally formed. 
Beynon (1975:206) had earlier identified that union stewards are ‘torn between the 
forces of representation and bureaucratisation’. Trade union development in the UK is 
framed within a duality in which trade unions are autonomous bodies but also rely on 
employers for recognition and facilities, a factor that exposes trade unions to a 
measure of employer constraint (Hyman 1989:157).  The movement towards the 
‘professionalization’ of lay union representatives through formal trade union training 
providing expertise in procedures as opposed to member mobilisation reinforces the 
technical, procedural resolution to workplace disputes and grievances (Holford 1994). 
Post Donovan, the consolidation of a hierarchy within shop steward organisations has 
also been achieved partly through ‘The tightening of internal management controls  
and the introduction of new payment systems, job evaluation structures, ‘productivity’ 
agreements and formalised negotiating and disciplinary procedures . . .’ (Hyman 
1989:152). As Hyman (1989:154) further explains: 
A key mediating role is now performed by a stratum of shop steward 
leaders who have become integrated into the external union hierarchies 
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and have at the same time acquired the power status and influence to 
contain and control disaffected sections and sectional stewards. 
These developments led to what Hyman (1989:158) labels a semi-bureaucracy within 
union structures: 
semi bureaucracy might seem appropriate to designate the stratum of lay 
officialdom on whom full time union functionaries are considerably 
dependant but who in turn may be dependent on the official leadership. 
The rank and file shop steward, rather than being the advocate of workplace union 
building, becomes conservative and resistant to shopfloor pressure, illustrating the 
inherent centralising tendencies within shop stewards organisation. Whilst 
organisation may not automatically lead to oligarchy it does mean discipline and 
routinisation ‘channelling and containing workers resistance to the exploitation of 
their labour’ (Hyman 1989:157). The balance between autonomy and incorporation 
can vary but incorporation of the shop floor within trade union structures suggests a 
shift to a ‘corporatist pole’ (Hyman 1989:157). 
Strategies that encourage membership mobilisation and activism threaten incumbent 
shop stewards due to the increased potential for the emergence of new activists and 
may not be complementary with corporatist arrangements, questioning as they do 
current practice and relations with the employer. Consequently resistance to 
organising strategies could be from elements within the existing union activist base. 
More broadly a union oligarchy, if one exists, will have an interest in managing such 
strategies in the longer term interest. Policies in union organising strategies may 
therefore be contentious and problematic for internal and external relations: 
The politics of trade unionism constitute a complex totality highly resistant 
to major strategies of radicalisation and democratisation- which to be 
effective must go hand in hand. 
Hyman 1989:16 
Hyman’s thesis has recently been challenged by Upchurch and Darlington (2011) 
in an analysis grounded in a classical Marxist framework. By separating out the 
position of senior national union full time officers, being ‘primarily concerned 
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with the few dozen individuals who are the principal national officials of the 
larger unions in Britain’ (Upchurch and Darlington ibid: 4), they attempt to 
reassert a more traditional version of the scope of bureaucracy. Concentrating 
on national union officials carries an emphasis on the separation from the union 
rank and file. In a description which Hyman (1989) would not contest, Upchurch 
and Darlington (ibid: 3-4) point to the manifestation of bureaucracy through: 
a separation of representation from mobilisation, a hierarchy of control 
and activism and the detachment of formal mechanisms of policy and 
decision making from the experience of members. 
Furthermore Upchurch and Darlington (ibid: 4) assert a number of sociological 
and political factors which merit separation of FTOs with their own separate 
interests from the ‘rank and file’: 
Their specific social role as intermediary and mediator between capital and 
labour, their substantial material benefits, and their political attachment to 
social democracy. 
These elements provide the context in which arises the need to consider the role 
played by FTOs in the bargaining process and their ‘power relationship with 
union members’ (Upchurch and Darlington ibid: 4). Regardless of the relational 
position of FTOs their existence relies on the existence of the union whose 
function derives from employers and the state. Radical programmes beyond 
reform are therefore against the interest of the union FTO, regardless of their 
individual political view. For Upchurch and Darlington key to a more radical trade 
union form is in the organisation of rank and file union members whose stake in 
maintaining existing social order is less inherent given ‘. . . the rank-and-file may 
seek to question the value of the institutions that constrain their struggle for 
self-improvement’ (Upchurch and Darlington ibid:8).  
Straining their own framework, however, they go on to claim the potential for 
alliances between some FTOs and representatives within the rank and file cutting 
across hierarchical levels in supporting left caucuses and policies. An example is 
provided in the PCS union where: 
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there is some evidence that one of the reasons for the unions recent 
organising and recruitment success has been the establishment of  a left 
leaning ‘political congruence’ between a critical mass of activists at 
workplace level and the national union leadership 
Upchurch and Darlington ibid: 12 (also see Upchurch et al 2008) 
Nevertheless despite congruence they acknowledge that prevailing conditions 
have created a climate in which lay representatives can ‘display similar features 
to that of the FTO’ (Upchurch and Darlington ibid: 13), they continue: 
This process has been reinforced by the decline in workers struggles, lack 
of rank-and-file confidence vis-a-vis management, decline in the number of 
onsite stewards (with some reps effectively covering a number of different 
geographical work locations), increase in the ration of members to 
stewards, longer average tenure of office than previously, and an ageing of 
union representatives 
Upchurch and Darlington ibid: 13 
For Upchurch and Darlington, Hyman’s analysis of extended bureaucratisation 
fails to consider that the position of the lay representative which, although 
increasingly dependent on, as opposed to independent of the FTO, can be 
reversed given changing conditions and with the maintenance of democratic 
accountability which provides for the potential for an influx of new stewards. Of 
course if successful, union organising strategies contribute to creating the 
conditions for that influx, in doing so having the potential to unsettle existing 
arrangements between lay representatives and FTOs. 
Upchurch and Darlington (ibid: 14) maintain that it is the importance of position 
and the ‘underlying fundamental cleavage of interests’ which determine 
relations between bureaucracy and rank and file and that Hymans analysis both 
overstated tendencies to bureaucratisation and underplayed the countervailing 
forces. Hyman’s perspective was not directly empirically evidenced, although it 
came no doubt from a long period of close study of trade unions. Nor have the 
perspectives been widely tested as a period of relative quiescence has seen little 
industrial action and few conflicts that have exposed open tensions within 
unions. One exception is Carter et al. (2012) in their study of PCS at HMRC which 
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confirmed how interests can differ between national and local union 
constituencies. Given its current left-wing credentials PCS is a good testing 
ground for the position of Upchurch and Darlington with its encouragement of 
workplace organisation and militancy. Yet even in the case of PCS conflict 
emerges between national and local union priorities and both full time and 
national lay officers were in conflict with the direct wishes of a militant 
membership.  
The accession of control of the union by an openly left-wing, socialist tendency saw the 
formal abandonment of partnership working with HMRC. However, the national union 
focus became pay and opposition to privatisation; while a history of lack of workplace 
bargaining saw the selective introduction of lean processes. The subsequent 
experience of ‘lean’ at a local level resulted in widespread opposition. Expressed by the 
affected rank and file through challenges at local level, and with motions submitted to 
PCS conference; resolutions passed calling for national action in opposition to lean 
were largely ignored by the national leadership. Subsequent disputes supported by 
members at a local level where not met with appropriate response by a national union, 
whose strategy of opposition to privatisation was partly based on presenting HMRC as 
efficient and competitive, and therefore able to undermine arguments for outsourcing. 
However the conflict was not simply between senior national full time officers and the 
rank and file. Lay officials, regarded by Upchurch and Darlington as part of the rank 
and file, were equally tied to a national perspective and similarly unresponsive to 
demands for action.  
Bureaucratic priorities at a national level whether they be organising strategy, pay 
bargaining or maintaining ‘good’ industrial relations, can be seen as remote to those of 
the membership (Stewart and Martinez Lucio 1998). However not only can national 
officials play a conservative role, lay officers too can still be ‘. . . drawn into a web of 
cooperation with management the corollary of which is a mediating role during 
conflict’ (Carter et al 2012:22). Given the potential for intra union conflict, whether 
between bureaucracy and rank and file or conflicting national and local priorities, 
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organising strategies require significant levels of support from different internal 
interests. The implication is top down initiatives, such as in the case of MSF, (Carter 
2000), have little prospect of successful implementation let alone realising objectives if 
not supported throughout the union organisation.  
Conclusion 
Inquiries into organising have underestimated the constraints on trade unions 
identified by a sociology of trade unions sensitive to the control exercised by FTOs and 
beyond. Whether or not an ‘iron law’ exists, the potential for oligarchic control in trade 
unions is inherent. For Hyman (1989:149) the debate about bureaucracy reflects ’a 
genuine and important problem within trade unionism’. Carter et al. (2012:23) identify 
that ‘Bureaucracy is not a caste made up of particular posts but a series of 
relationships that . . . extend, if unevenly through lay officials’. Furthermore rather 
than debate the fixed boundaries of bureaucracy it is important to ‘focus on a 
synthesis of theoretical concerns and empirical investigations of relations in process’ 
(Carter et al. 2012:23).   
This analysis raises the importance of identifying the interests trade union strategy 
serves given internal stratification of power. The effectiveness of organising strategy 
can be masked within ambiguous or uncertain objectives. The proliferation of trade 
union mergers from the 1980s onwards, including that of Unison, raises questions of 
whether such mergers primarily protected the interests of trade union elites and 
increased oligarchic control extended through organising strategies. 
The relation between the FTO and shop steward is significant in the implementation of 
organising strategy. The FTO may be presented with a choice of challenging or 
preserving relations with the shop steward.  The demand for representation may be 
more deep seated and legitimate than suggested. This view questions the contention 
that a cadre of independent minded shop stewards is waiting to break off the shackles 
of a conservative industrial agenda and win members to the union through more 
radical ideas. As Gramsci (1977 quoted in Hyman 1989:161) proposed: 
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The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon. It becomes a 
determinate institution, i.e. it takes on a definite historical form to the 
extent that the strength and will of the workers who are its members 
impress a policy and propose an aim that define it 
Objectives of organising strategies, their relevance and the interests they serve, the 
impact on FTOs, including relations with their national counterparts, as well as lay 
representatives and their consequences for union effectiveness, from all requires 
analysis. Specifically the position of the FTO as either servant of the union membership 
or authoritative emissary of union bureaucracy/oligarchy has not been considered in 
research into union organising strategies. Nor has the emergent union lay or semi-
bureaucracy and the threat posed to it by potential union renewal been given due 
consideration.  These are some of the problems for trade union organising strategies 
which the literature review poses and to which the case study approach suggests a 















Chapter Four Methodology 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have identified how trade union renewal, whether attempted 
by grassroots workplace organising, or by utilising the potential presented by the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, faces considerable internal obstacles not least 
of which is the inherent conservatism of trade unions. Most theories of renewal and 
approaches to organising have neglected both this latter aspect and the key role of 
FTOs as either advocates for, or resistors to, trade union innovation. These gaps in the 
extensive research on union organising strategies require a specific focus on the 
position of the FTO. Furthermore, the need to explore the role of the FTO requires the 
evaluation of both their relations with other trade union constituencies and with 
employers. Given these objectives the case study approach, adopting semi-structured 
interviews as the main line of inquiry for data gathering, incorporating perspectives, 
observations and experiences of FTOs (and others), was deemed most appropriate. 
The part auto-ethnographic approach added to the robustness of the data and 
research findings.  The research was underpinned by a critical realist approach given 
this philosophy offers explanation and understanding based on a recognition that, 
whilst the objective world exists independently of peoples’ perspectives and 
observations, their subjective interpretations influence how the world is perceived and 
experienced (see Fleetwood 2004, O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014): specific examples of 
critical realist approaches to examination of trade unions includes Lane and Roberts 
(1971) and Carter (1986). 
The chapter commences with further justification for the adoption of critical realist 
ontological and epistemological positions. Justification for the methodology and 
research methods used to address the thesis question is then provided. The strengths 
and weaknesses of the methodology and methods used - a qualitatively based case 
study - will be considered together with the reasoning for the exclusion of other 
potential approaches to data capture. In doing so the chapter will confront issues of 
generalizability which arise as a significant critique of case study research (Kennedy 
1976). The tools used for data analysis are outlined and an explanation as to how the 
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analysis of data collated was undertaken is provided. The primary sources providing 
the data came by way of semi structured interviews and focus group discussions. This 
was complemented by further examination of critical incidents, field notes, ongoing 
participant observation and access to internal union communications. Explanation for 
the selection of Unison, and specifically ‘A’ Region, for the research inquiry and 
comment on the contribution by interviewees and focus group members are made. 
Finally some elucidation on the ethical questions arising from this research together 
with consideration of the part auto-ethnographic approach is provided.   
Ontology, Epistemology and Philosophical debates 
Ontology is ‘concerned with what we believe to be social reality’ (Blaikie 2000:8). 
Traditional ontological positions tend to divide between, on the one hand, realism or 
objectivism in which social phenomena have an existence that is independent of social 
actors and, on the other hand a constructivist view in which: 
Social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished 
by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not 
only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant 
state of revision 
Bryman 2001:16 
However neither realism nor social constructivism can compensate for the inherent 
bias within their approaches. This is the failing that critical realism attempts to address. 
Clark (2008) explains that critical realism views reality as objective existing 
independent of individuals. Given the objectivity of the world, the subjectivity of 
interpretations ensures they are not infallible, are subject to empirical scrutiny and can 
be challenged or rejected. Similarly, Edwards (2015:2) asserts that ‘. . . there exists a 
reality which is in principal knowable; though all knowledge is necessarily provisional 
and contested’. 
From these basic ontological premises there also arise epistemological issues. Blaikie 
(2000:8) defining epistemological processes as: 
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The possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is 
understood to be. In short, claims about how what is assumed to exist can 
be known 
How we came to know what we know gives rise to theories of knowledge, methods 
and validation processes. Competing epistemological positions include two of the 
more important paradigms, positivism and interpretivism. Positivism can be said to 
derive from an epistemological position advocating the application of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality and beyond (Grix 2002). In contrast, at the other 
extreme of the epistemological continuum, Bryman (2001:12-13) defines 
interpretivism as being: 
. . . predicated on the view that a strategy is required that respects the 
differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and 
therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of 
social action  
However the dichotomy presented by these positions suggests that there are 
alternate worlds when in reality the social world consists of related entities, 
stratified at different levels, all of which add up to more than the sums of their 
parts (Mahoney and Vincent 2014). Consequently the study of social structures 
such as trade unions requires deep consideration of the powers at play, the 
structure of the union and the mechanisms from which they were created which 
goes beyond mere recordable events (positivist) or discourse (constructionist) 
positions. From a critical realist position (see below) the thesis seeks to both 
describe and analyse union organising strategies and the relationship with union 
full time officers.  
Realist ontology is normally associated with quantitative, positivist methodologies and 
constructivism with qualitative ones. Such approaches have been used to study trade 
unions but largely fail to recognise the possibilities for deeper understanding of union 
strategies for renewal. Consequently the research was approached on the basis of 
critical realism. Following Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) emphasis on the importance in 
research of investigating relationships, contexts and outcomes for building ontological 
depth, the research addresses the requirement to explain a social reality based on 
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differing interpretations and beliefs of Unison staff and activists in a context of Unison 
structures and strategy that confront them as a given. A critical realist approach can 
capture the complexity of trade unions as organisations and the positions within them 
of FTOs and others, their relations and how they impact on perceptions of reality. This 
relationship between perceptions and structure is influenced by individual’s own 
locations and roles. Power – which may be implicit or explicit in social relations- is here 
given a material base. 
Trade union structures and strategy as an objective reality within a critical realism 
paradigm can affect other realities. Individuals within trade unions have their own 
experiences, perceptions and interpretations which offer the researcher fertile ground 
for explanations and theories about the mechanisms and structures which underpin 
reality. In critical realism knowledge gained is context laden which allows for further 
challenging through research. The complexity of trade unions and the multiplicity of 
mechanisms within trade union organisation warrant such a position. As Ackroyd and 
Karlsson (2014:21) assert ‘. . . although organized social life is undoubtedly 
complicated, it is not impossible to develop reliable accounts of it from research 
activities’. This requires the gathering of data which arises from deep questioning of 
individual interpretations, perceptions and motivations. How FTOs and others in the 
Unison structure perceive and interpret their work priorities and approaches are 
crucial to help explain the impact of union renewal strategies. The conclusions which 
are drawn from the research cannot be placed within a notion of precise forecasting or 
modelling as in natural sciences but are more indicative of the consequences of union 
organising strategies both for the role of the FTO and the union organisation itself. 
Research strategy: justification in the case study approach  
A qualitative as opposed to quantitative methodology was adopted given the nature of 
the research and the ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Qualitative 
methodology determines what exists as opposed to what is quantified and was 
appropriate to explore the complex relations within trade unions. Strauss and Corbin 
(1998:11) also assert:  
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Qualitative methods can be used to explore substantive areas about which 
little is known or about which much is known to gain novel understandings.  
In addition qualitative methods can be used to obtain the intricate details 
about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes and emotions that 
are difficult to extract through more conventional research methods 
If it was the case that the research was merely limited to the exploration of 
recruitment levels, density levels or numbers of activists as a proportion of members 
than quantitative methods may have been more appropriate. However the 
inquisitorial nature of the research did not lend itself to a quantitative methodology 
(see Bryman 2012). The use of the case study as the method of inquiry enabling the 
researcher to obtain deeper insight into the subject is entirely consistent with such a 
methodological approach: although on the point of ability to generalise from the 
findings, a prominent criticism of the case study method, justification is made below. 
Denscombe (2010:52) contends that the strategy of a case study approach provides for 
a focus on, “a particular phenomenon with a view to providing an in depth account of 
events, relationships, experiences or processes occurring in that particular instance”. 
Furthermore, ‘the case study is particularly well suited to researching motives, power 
relations or processes that involve understanding complex social interaction’ (Kitay 
and Callus 1998:104). The nature of trade unions and the position of full time officers 
within, the need to consider the different relational positions, inherent tensions and 
conflict which can emerge from the FTO’s position; whether with managers, national 
officials or lay activists, lend suitability to the case study approach. FTOs, and lay 
representatives, can have different agendas at different times to those in union 
leaderships. Consequently FTOs can mould or shape strategy in trade unions to their 
own purpose. With the identification in chapter three of the potential for opposition or 
distortion of strategy the case study is of particular use for the analysis of bureaucracy 
(see Ackroyd and Karlsson 2014:24).. 
Sociological theory provide a contextual background for explaining the nature of trade 
unions; specifically the existence of a conservative union bureaucracy permeating 
throughout trade union structures inherently resistant to the radical change suggested 
by organising strategies. The case study helps to explain why certain outcomes happen 
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- not just what those outcomes are. Despite the priority placed on organising work by 
Unison and other trade unions, union membership continues to fall (see chapter nine). 
The approach allows the research to explore this problem and to suggest avenues for 
further research inquiry. 
Given the narrow focus of a case study approach on a single unit of analysis two main 
criticisms emerge. Firstly, in relation to questions of the ability to broaden out and 
apply the findings more generally the problem of ‘external validity’, i.e. ‘the extent to 
which the research findings can be extrapolated beyond the immediate research 
sample’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2000:46) arises. In other words, the case study is 
located in the specific instance as opposed to the general. A second criticism is that 
those findings are often limited to description of the phenomenon or instance of study 
thus reducing the possibility for applying more generalisations of the findings. 
In terms of the first criticism the issue of specificity can be overemphasised because 
trade unions are similarly constructed operating within a common framework of 
industrial relations. Moreover, from a strategic standpoint there are commonalities - 
most have conducted internal examinations to assess and change their approaches to 
union work. The Unison organising strategy emerged from the TUC where at the time 
Unison was the largest union affiliate. It is unquestionable that Unison formally 
embraced the strategy espoused by the TUC, a strategy that was itself influenced by 
US and Australian trade union confederations (see Chapter two). Similarly as with the 
TUC, Unison also supported employer partnerships borrowing the language of 
European unions if not arguing for the institutional frameworks that act as a bulwark 
for such relations. Trade union responses have a degree of similarity given comparable 
internal structures or morphology. The same pressures and relations, not least in the 
position of the FTO, are inherent in large general trade unions and many have adopted 
parallel strategies and would conceivably experience similar tensions/factionalism 
arising from similar structures. On the second point this research goes beyond a mere 
description of union work a charge that could be lodged against Watson’s (1988) work 
on union FTOs. The research here provides both analysis and evaluation of organising 
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strategies in Unison (see chapters six to nine). Consequently the findings have wider 
theoretical purchase beyond the case study organisation enabling for some theoretical 
generalisation (see Eisenhardt 1989). 
Ultimately the case study approach allows for the adoption of multiple variables (in 
this case semi –structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation, 
documentary analysis and field notes) to support the research findings: that is data 
validations through triangulation (see Denscombe 2010, see Denzin below on 
triangulation). Furthermore, the case study allows for the improvement of the 
research design in light of emergent themes and potentially fruitful avenues of 
investigation not initially known. Hence, in this instance, the development of a national 
recruitment campaign emphasising the role of Unison as a servicing union and the 
regional initiative around ‘operation workplace’ - both highly relevant to the research 
investigation were incorporated into the study (see Chapters Six and Eight) and are 
consistent with Eisenhardt’s (1989:539) claim that ‘these adjustments allow the 
researcher to probe emergent themes or take advantage of special opportunities 
which may be present in a given situation’. 
Data capture 
In this case the research tools adopted included semi structured interviews initially 
with Unison FTOs. However, given the research was considering the broader issue of 
strategy and how that related to, and was influenced by, approaches of FTOs, it was 
considered essential to give some attention to those layers of staff and lay 
representatives who would be affected by the organising strategy with the apparent 
change in the FTO role. So, interviews were also conducted with regional management, 
senior national officials, staff providing administrative support and Unison branch 
secretaries as well as other lay representatives. In all thirty employees were 
interviewed including eleven Regional Organisers (Table 4.1).  
The approach to the interviews adopted was consistent with that identified by Smith 
and Elger (2014:117) in that: 
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Interviews involve the interviewer and respondent engaging in a fluid 
interactive process to generate a set of responses which formulate 
perspectives, observations, experiences and evaluations pertinent to an 
overall research agenda 
The semi structured interview approach has the advantage of producing data which 
has depth, detail and is based on the insight of the interviewee. It provides opportunity 
for the researcher to ensure that the data gathered is accurate and precise and 
therefore has validity (Denscombe 2010:146). Whilst the researcher has control over 
the broad subject matter this method allows for a large degree of flexibility, which in 
this case enabled an iterative process with review and amendment of the original 
research plan. This demonstrated the advantage of such an approach when compared 
with more highly structured interviews which limit the opportunity for participants to 
offer points of view and explanation for data capture (Rubin and Babbie 2001:407) or 
unstructured interviews which can allow for the participant to set the agenda and 
weaken the focus of the research (Denscombe 2010). 
Given the subject in question was also both current the problematic nature of 
questions requiring historical recall was not at issue. Furthermore, whilst the semi 
structured interview process can be time consuming, it is more likely in these 
circumstances to provide deep and accurate information than methods such as the 
survey (Bryman and Bell 2007). In this case the interviews produced a rich source of 
primary data which formed the main basis for the research findings. From the Regional 
Organiser interviews, the existence of contrasting approaches to union work, 
categorised as traditional and prototypical, became evident. The interviews took from 
fifty minutes to one hour and forty five minutes to complete with a median average of 
one hour fifteen minutes.  
Table 4.1 list of interviewees by category 
Regional Organiser       11 
Regional Manager    3 
Area Organisers    7 
Local Organisers    4 
Administrative staff        3 
National Officers             2 
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Branch Secretaries     2 
Branch Chair                  1 
Total                             33 
 
This activity was followed by three focus group discussions, including the EDC national 
committee; with twenty three experienced lay representatives each lasting 
approximately two hours. This enabled capture of information from a wider group 
providing for examination of how organising strategy is perceived and constructed by 
those with common experience enabling for peers to challenge or affirm data and 
giving the opportunity for elicitation of points not previously considered (Bryman 
2012). This process allowed for, within the planned timeframe, significant contribution 
from Unison lay representatives at the ‘sharp end’ of organising strategy. This was of 
particular relevance given emerging differences in approach to branch support from 
FTOs and differing expectations of that support at branch, regional and national level.  
As Walliman (2006) identifies, the roundtable discussion or focus group still allows for 
in depth analysis of a subject where the participants have a common interest or 
experience - in this case Unison lay representatives. The focus groups provided an 
opportunity for ‘common sense’ perspectives of union support for branches in the 
context of organising strategies to be tested, corroboration of other data and were 
important to the process of triangulation. 
Table 4.2 Focus group Attendees 
‘A’ region Branch Secretaries 5 
‘A’ region Experienced Stewards 13 
Other region Branch Secretaries (EDC) 2 
Other region Experienced Stewards (EDC) 3 
Total 23 
 
Ongoing observation of staff meetings, field notes recorded during my own work and 
examination of internal documents also contributed to the data for consideration. The 
documents analysed included Unison communications to members and staff from 
national and regional offices, regular updates from Head Office, pronouncements of 
the union leadership on organising and recruitment as well as strategy documents and 
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data on recruitment and activist numbers. This accords with various prescriptions for 
the use of multiple data collection methods: 
If each method leads to different features of empirical reality, then no 
single method can ever capture all the relevant features of that reality; 
consequently, sociologists must learn to employ multiple methods in the 
analysis of the same empirical events 
Denzin 1970:30 
Detailed examination of three critical incidents was undertaken essentially for the 
purpose of validating the key general findings from the semi-structured interview 
process and focus group discussions and probing emergent themes in greater depth. 
They provided perspectives on Unison organising at the local, regional and national 
levels. The examination of the recently privatised public service (critical incident one) 
was undertaken through one of the focus group discussions arranged around a 
meeting of the representative committee. A request was made to the committee for 
this purpose which was readily agreed.   
The critical incidents explained how Unison’s industrial work was hindered not helped 
by its organising strategy, how managers attempted to introduce micro management 
of FTO’s and how a national recruitment campaign undermined the idea of building 
active in contrast with passive union membership.  Critical incidents can be defined as: 
Distinct occurrences or events which involve two or more people; they are 
neither inherently negative nor positive, they are merely distinct 
occurrences or events which require some attention, action or explanation; 
they are situations for which there is a need to attach meaning 
Fitzgerald, 2000:190 
The incidents used here fit the criteria identified by Flanagan in being complete, recent 
and having clear consequences (Flanagan 1954). It is quite possible for interviewees to 
give accounts of their own actions and beliefs and those of others only for those 
accounts to be undermined by their behaviour in practical and observable events. 
Chell (1998:68) has argued that under such a research methodology: 
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The linkages between context, strategy and outcomes are more readily 
teased out because the technique is focused on the event which is 
explicated in relation to what happened, why it happened, how it was 
handled and what the consequences were   
Thus the critical incidents contributed to the triangulation process. 
The data collected showed how regional priorities were not matched to workplace 
requirements for union support across Unison. This was reinforced in the second 
critical incident, the ‘operation workplace’ initiative by regional management requiring 
FTO’S to prioritise the organising of three workplace meetings a day for the purpose of 
listening to members, conflicting with both requirements for support from branches 
and national union priorities. The data was collated through observation and 
participation in team meetings, discussion with staff affected and through notes of 
reactions of lay representatives to this attempted imposition.  
The third critical incident, the national recruitment campaign, emphasised union 
membership as an insurance service ‘cover at work’, was undermining an organising 
approach which encouraged active not passive membership. Conversely, it was itself 
undermined, by the emphasis on recruitment in Unison’s organising strategy at the 
expense of representational work. Similar to the second critical incident, data was 
collated through participant observation and record of views from lay representatives 
and staff.  
The practices of participant observation and annotation of field notes were used to 
supplement the research work and complement the evidence collated during the 
interviews and focus groups. The relevance of examination of internal communications 
has long been recognised, with Webb and Webb (1894: xxvi) identifying the 
significance of such method to sociological research “The use of the document in 
sociology possesses a method of investigation which compensates for the inability to 
use the method of deliberate experiment”. Furthermore: “Sociology, like all other 
sciences, can advance only upon the basis of a precise observation of actual facts” 
(ibid: xix).  
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This methodology contributes robustness to the research findings by addressing the 
problem of interviews constructing the social reality of organising work as opposed to 
revealing that reality. Placing the interviews within a framework of observational 
research and analysis of documentation, together with ongoing reflective awareness, 
provides for critical engagement and legitimate, credible explanation. 
Consideration of quantitative methods in the research plan acknowledged that 
research methods based on questionnaires and social surveys have three crucial 
characteristics: they implicitly provide a wide coverage of participant points of view, at 
a specific time, and assert the importance of empirical research (see Denscombe 
2010:11). Given that surveys are useful for obtaining factual information from people 
this method was considered.  However surveys are more relevant to obtaining mass 
data from a large number of people on a specific issue. In this case researching 
sensitive and complicated issues around organisational strategy and its relation to key 
staff in a highly contentious area required detailed evidence and insight based on the 
experience and motivations of union staff and workplace activists. Given the 
importance of placing trade union organising strategy within a framework of 
sociological theory and that survey outcomes tend to focus on the data based on a 
‘speaks for itself’ approach, the latter was considered inappropriate  without the 
contextual framework provided by sociological theory identified in chapter three. 
Why Unison and ‘A’ Region? 
Unison is the self-contained identity chosen for the research case study focusing on 
organising work and the implications which emerge from that work for Unison FTOs. A 
detailed inquiry which the case study provides for can uncover issues and reveal 
knowledge not provided from other more restricted types of inquiry. Since its 
formation in 1993 Unison has placed importance on the development of national 
strategies for building the organisation.  Given its position Unison experience has 
implications for general prospects for union renewal.   
When US organising based on the ‘organising model’ was introduced into the UK 
Unison was the largest UK trade union, dominated by structures which were formed 
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for supporting national collective bargaining arrangements and was arguably the first 
UK trade union to adopt and embrace managerial approaches to staff, including FTOs, 
and achieving stated national objectives through a national recruitment plan (Unison 
1995). Given the development of new public management and the reconfigured 
delivery of public services emerging from neoliberal ideology, Unison, as the main 
public service union, presents an ideal vehicle for exploring the internal conflicts 
inherent within trade unions. Furthermore, Unison enthusiastically embraced the 
organising agenda (Waddington and Kerr 2000, 2009) and has been influenced by the 
SEIU whose success in responding to new public management forms is referenced 
earlier in the cases of care workers and janitors. It is also a typical trade union in that it 
is a general union with a declining membership base making it appropriate for issues of 
theoretical generalisability. Although the examples of success quoted in support of the 
SEIU organising initiatives are significantly based on occupational groups, the targeting 
of which Unison has not undertaken to any significant degree.  
Unison is the largest public sector trade union in the UK with a membership of 
1,277,750 as of December 2013 (TUC 2014). It follows that given its size what Unison 
does and how it sees its role is of some significance for the future of UK trade unions. 
The increasingly deep-seated problems of inequality in the UK and continuing policies 
of austerity that both the government and opposition party’s support make Unison’s 
position, as both a representative of public sector workers and a champion of public 
services, crucial. It is also of interest as a body for research given historic doubts 
expressed around the ability of general unions to represent workers from across 
industry, occupation or sectors within the broader economy (see Chapter One). Trade 
union growth has also been connected to periods of worker militancy (Cronin 1984) 
and not any specific national organising or recruitment strategy, placing the 
importance of Unison’s strategies into relief. 
‘A’ Region was selected as the focus of the research for several reasons. At the time 
the research commenced it was a region of Unison with a reputation for being 
innovative often being the focus for trial exercises in the introduction of new systems 
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for staffing. It was also the most successful region for recruitment to Unison, a position 
it had often held. Given the relationship and emphasis placed on recruitment within 
union organising strategies it was a region of particular importance given it throws the 
aforementioned tensions around bureaucracy into sharp relief. If organising was failing 
to renew Unison in this region - or conversely the research was confirming its apparent 
successes - then either way it would be of some value to examine its approach to 
organising work.  It was also a region which presented itself as at the forefront of 
organising work more generally. Indeed shortly after collation of the primary data the 
region had linked up with a national community organising initiative for purposes of 
trialling organising techniques originating from work in the communities of Chicago 
USA. Although not a focus here such initiatives in themselves require attention as to 
how such approaches impact on union organising approaches and the implications for 
staffing. The initiatives also confirm the commitment of the Regional Management 
Team to innovation and open mindedness in approaches to building union 
organisation. 
Operationalisation 
The primary research involving interviews and focus groups was undertaken over an 
eighteen month period from October 2011 to March 2013. To reiterate, ‘A’ Region was 
chosen as at the time of planning the research was known for an innovative approach 
to organising work and was the highest recruiting region within Unison. Given the 
emergent issue of definitions of organising and recruitment becoming synonymous the 
Region was appropriate for examination. The original intention was to limit the 
research to the Unison FTO, the Regional Organiser (RO), formerly Regional Officer and 
Regional Managers within ‘A’ Region. However it became apparent that the strategy of 
Meeting the Organising Challenge (see Chapter Five) had increasing relevance and, 
given the emergent managerial responsibilities of the RO, Area Organisers and Local 
Organisers were also interviewed. In addition a number of experienced administrative 
staff, a much neglected group of trade union staff for research purposes, were 
interviewed having volunteered following a presentation made at an ‘A’ Region staff 
conference. Permission was obtained from the Regional Secretary for both the 
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presentation proceeding and the time for staff to volunteer to be interviewed for the 
research. The emphasis on volunteering was an important ethical consideration (see 
below). 
The presentation was an introduction to the research work which was titled ‘In 
defence of the full time union official’. The title was deliberately provocative in order 
to attract interest and I believe tapped into some of the concerns of Unison staff over 
the changes to staffing structures. The presentation introduced issues of sociological 
theory, the position of the FTO, potential sources of internal and external conflict and 
current debates around organising strategy. After a question and answer session a 
form was circulated to staff present to enter their details if they were prepared to be 
interviewed for the research and agreement was reached with twenty three staff at 
that time. In addition, seven staff including three ROs who were unable to attend the 
aforementioned staff conference, volunteered to become research participants on 
becoming aware of the work through receipt of the staff conference agenda. Staff 
were forewarned of the potential time commitment and that permission had been 
provided for attendance at interviews. 
In commencing interviews it was apparent that inconsistency in understanding of 
Unison’s organising strategy was prevalent. Furthermore, expectations around the role 
of the Unison RO, what was understood by the term organising and criticism of other 
constituent parts of the union, most notably branches and head office, were common. 
Consequently in order to obtain a comprehensive collation of data other constituent 
parts of the union were included in the primary research. Nationally interviews with 
lead officials past and present who had responsibility for developing Unison’s 
organising strategy were sought and readily granted: thus confirming the 
understanding of Unison being an organisation open to internal inquiry and 
examination. In relation to branch activists I originally sought to interview a number of 
activists in depth. However arranging these interviews proved problematic with a 
number of cancellations. Separate interviews with three branch activists who gave 
valuable insight into their work were undertaken. However in order to gain a more 
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complete insight from the Unison branch perspective access to activists was obtained 
through Unison steward’s Employment Relations Act  reaccreditation training on the 
premise of discussing Unison organising work as a contribution to a research project. 
Respective tutors of courses kindly agreed to two hour round table discussion subject 
to the agreement of course participants. This was also duly given with the session 
having some relevance and indeed complementing at least some of the subject matter 
within the respective training course. 
An emergent key issue related to the relevance of Unison national organising 
strategies. Whilst this may have more resonance at a local level, a focus group 
discussion with a national lay representative committee was also arranged. The 
function which the committee represented had experienced TUPE transfer to the 
private sector, subsequent restructuring and redundancy and the gaining of union 
recognition at new sites for the service in question (see Chapter Seven). These issues 
had emerged concurrently with Unison’s proclamations of being an organising union. 
The views of the national lay committee in question was therefore highly relevant to 
assessing this claim, the relevance of national strategy in a national dimension and 
how the RO role complemented the work of the lay committee. 
All semi structured interviews and focus group discussions were recorded. The 
interviewees were from a cross section expressing views and opinions which were 
from their own experience and formation of ideas.  Given my own lengthy experience 
of holding interviews, meetings and group discussions with union members, as 
individuals and in groups, the use of open and supplementary closed questioning was 
utilised in conducting the primary research covering the essential phases of the 
interviewers work.  
The interviews commenced with some open, general questions around interviewees 
own trade union experience and views on the current difficulties faced by Unison.  This 
was to set people at ease and to give some reassurance as to the subject matter. 
Specific questions in relation to roles and responsibilities of ROs, Unison’s organising 
strategy and relevance of the ‘Organising Model’ followed. Questions were then asked 
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about how the different components of the union, region, branches and the National 
Office fitted together leading to a broader question on the relevance of Unison 
structure. Relations with employers, union education, political relations and views of 
future prospects were then sought from the interviewees.  
Most ROs, other staff and lay activists, were more than ready to contribute and 
welcomed the opportunity the research presented for expression of their opinions and 
beliefs on their role and the deliberations of Unison. A small minority were more 
guarded, at least initially in the interview process. Indeed a number expressed some 
concern about giving their opinion in case of later identification: a level of paranoia 
which can be common when dealing with trade union officials and gave rise to an 
important ethical consideration (see below). Whilst the aforementioned caution was 
evident, once the process of interview or focus group discussion gathered momentum 
trade union people, whether staff or lay activists, commonly exhibited a passion about 
their work and the importance of trade unions for workers.  Reflecting on their 
experience two staff did seek reassurances around anonymity post interview 
prompted by their previous willingness to speak freely on matters of controversy given 
the production of criticism of senior management, union direction and general 
leadership.  
Respondents commonly expressed at the conclusion of the interviews how cathartic 
the process had been: staff and lay representatives welcomed, and indeed enjoyed the 
opportunity to voice their opinion on day to day matters and broader union strategy. 
The prevalent view was that room for such discussion within Unison is limited and 
constructive criticism of the union leadership not welcomed.  Concern for future 
career prospects was perceived by some, although not all staff, as having relevance.  
The lay activist contribution was given freely regardless of political position and with 
enthusiasm for Unison tempered by criticism and frustration at how policy and 






Compiling the data from interviews and focus groups was an ongoing iterative process 
in contrast to a single piece of work. The analysis was based on an inductive process of 
taking the particular data and applying that data to more general and abstract 
statements regarding union organiser relations and strategies. Of course it is 
acknowledged that given my own position, referred to later in the chapter, the 
researcher centred principle was of particular relevance (see Denscombe 2010:273). 
When interviewee and focus group discussions were completed transcription of the 
data collated was undertaken. The interviews and focus group discussions were 
conducted in such a way as to ensure a consistency in approach acknowledging that 
thought processes and discussion inevitably veered off into other areas which in some 
instances were not always relevant to the research. Nevertheless the participants 
contributed consistent and credible analyses of how they interpret their own reality of 
union work. Furthermore, the participants were able to respond to the questions 
posed in their own volition given the questions were open ended designed to elicit 
liberal response. Once transcription was completed a master document containing all 
the data from the primary research work was constructed. The data was backed up 
and catalogued and indexed based on sequence of interview and position of the 
participant within Unison. 
Once all interviews and discussions were typed the process of anonymising 
contributors and reordering data from individual sessions into structure based on topic 
coding identified by the interview questions was undertaken. Whilst this was a 
laborious process to undertake, it was one which enabled the development of a 
heightened awareness and familiarity of the data to be considered.  For this scale of 
research computer aided systems such as Nvivo (see Bazeley 2007) were seen as 
impracticable and more time consuming. The topic coding was undertaken as 
suggested by Morse and Richards (2002:112): 
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You will need to gather material by topic if you wish to reflect on all the 
different ways people discuss particular topics, to seek patterns in their 
responses, or to develop dimensions of that experience 
This grouping then enabled a further analytic level of coding through the expressed 
similar and differing views, opinions and evidence enabling a process of contrast and 
comparison to be undertaken.  A number of quotes used for both illustrative and 
representative meaning were then incorporated into the body of the chapters which 
present the general findings. Three main themes emerged which form the basis of the 
findings - the relevance of national organising strategies at the workplace, the 
increasing attempts at assertion of managerial prerogative both in relation to Unison 
staff, specifically ROs, and lay branch officers and finally the emergence of what has 
previously been identified as a false dichotomy of servicing and organising. On this 
latter point the identification of different orientations among ROs with the traditional 
associated with the former and the emerging prototypical RO with the latter. This in 
itself provided further coding of responses orientating to institutional priorities or in 
contrast workplace membership demands. It also allowed the research to ‘. . . 
appreciate the interpretations of their informants and to analyse the social contexts, 
constraints, and resources in which these informants act’ (Smith and Elger 2014:111). 
Ethical Position 
As an employee of Unison and also an RO I was conscious that my position would 
present both significant advantage and potential disadvantage when carrying out the 
research. White warns that, “whilst it is impossible for a researcher to have no impact 
at all on the course of a research project, it is important to be vigilant against the 
influence of your beliefs and preferences on the research process” (White 2009:5). As 
an employee of Unison this vigilance is of greater importance given the potential risk 
of obtaining opinions and views which could be used merely to reinforce my own 
relating to Unison’s approach to organising. This led me to seek out with greater 




Given this reality it was necessary to ensure that a balance was observed in identifying 
data and drawing conclusions. Importantly the process of volunteering, as opposed to 
identification of potential participants, contributed to a sense of balance free from 
solicitation on the researcher’s part. Although, given the ontological position adopted, 
it is acknowledged that ‘Critical realists usually assume that complete detachment 
from their research subjects is impossible’ (Ackroyd and Karlsson op cit:27). Brook and 
Darlington (2013: 233) go further by advocating an ‘organic public sociology of work in 
which the researcher is overtly partisan and active on the side of the marginalized and 
labour’, a position made more complicated when working on internal trade union 
relations.  
Nevertheless the advantages of research from an internal perspective enabled a part 
auto-ethnographic approach producing a layered account which placed my own 
experiences with data collected from staff and activists, abstract analysis and relevant 
literature (see Ellis et al. 2011). As Charmaz (1983) observes such an approach enables 
data collection and analysis to proceed simultaneously. Importantly it connects the 
‘micro’ with the ‘meta’ as the everyday life of the union FTO is linked to the broader 
political and strategic organisational agendas and practices. As Boyle and Parry (2007: 
186) contend this helps to ‘unearth and illuminate the tacit and subaltern aspects of 
relationships’. This approach adds to the credibility, validity and legitimacy of the 
research. 
Given the nature of the research there was a need to ensure no potential harm to 
participants. This objective was helped by having no line management or other 
authority over the members and officials interviewed. Nevertheless the question of 
confidentiality was paramount. This inevitably presented a challenge of gaining trust 
and confidence of participants. Trade unions from my own experience can be riddled 
with internal conflict and competition (see Carter 1991). Since working for Unison 
avoidance of identification with camps or partisanship to a political faction or party no 
doubt helped. This stance has been easier to achieve given there appears to be little 
evidence of factionalism within the employed ranks. 
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This is in contrast with MSF where there existed FTO camps based around ‘MSF for 
Labour’ and ‘Unity Left’ (see Carter ibid). In Unison I am not aware of any such similar 
unofficial groupings among the cadre of FTOs. That is not to say there remain no 
sensitivities given the questions covered and the questioning of senior management 
strategy. However all staff interviewed accepted the assurance that the interviews 
were being conducted under the ethics guide of the British Sociological Association 
and on that basis were felt able to contribute. For lay activists, whilst not employed, 
increasingly there are attempts to manage their role from the Region and that has 
brought some conflict between activists and staff.  A constant state of reflection in 
carrying out and analysing the research was important given social researchers are not 



















Chapter Five: Unison 
Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter Two, organising, as opposed to servicing, advocated as the 
solution to the crisis of western trade unionism, has flattered to deceive. Chapter 
Three turned to an examination of the nature of trade unions as institutions in order to 
question whether the explanation for the inability of unions to radically change lie in 
structural constraints and, in particular, the social relations that constitute a 
bureaucracy. This chapter attempts to utilise the insights from these earlier chapters in 
turning to the union that is the focus of the study, Unison. The chapter therefore 
begins a process of examination of the motivations for its formation and how Unison 
and its mode of operation has been conceptualised. The description of the national 
structure and policies developed by the union and how they affect the role and 
function of FTOs provide an essential background for the more focused and empirical 
study of a Unison region that follows. 
Unison came into being in 1993 following the decision of three public sector unions to 
merge, forming a so-called ‘super union’ for public sector workers (Willman and Cave 
1994). The new union brought together in membership workers from different 
occupations and backgrounds. Their common bond was that of working in public 
services: those services increasingly experiencing the consequences of neo liberalism. 
Their constituencies were described by McIlroy (1995:14): 
NALGO was an all grades union for white collar staff in local government 
but also recruited in the health service, gas, electricity, water, transport 
and higher education. The National Union of Public Employees was 
NALGO’S opposite number while the Confederation of Health Service 
Employees had aspired to be an industrial union for the NHS 
NUPE’s membership was largely blue collar workers in workplaces also 
recognising NALGO, while COHSE was spectacularly unsuccessful in its aspiration 
to be an industrial union. Following merger it has been claimed that Unison was 
not just a new union, the size of which alone gave it significance, but was also 
radically different both in its formation and characteristics from its predecessors 
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and other trade unions (Terry 2000:2). Its size and the claim to be different has 
stimulated much academic interest and, as Terry (2000:2) reminds us, Unison 
‘has been more studied and dissected than any other trade union’. 
The rationale for Unison 
NALGO, NUPE and COHSE had, to a degree, common motivations for merging. 
Most UK trade unions had experienced unprecedented losses in membership, 
influence and power due to multi-causal reasons. These included 
macroeconomics, changing workforce composition, management resistance to 
unionisation and state policy antithetical to trade unions (Mason and Bain 1993). 
In the public sector, where union membership remained relatively stable, the 
threats posed by neo-liberalism through the continuing electoral success of the 
Conservative Party were having some effect (see Terry 2000). According to Carter 
and Fairbrother (1999:10): 
A growing feeling that the public sector unions were unable to meet the 
challenges of a hostile government, new structures and a changed climate 
within local government was the principal reason for the creation of 
Unison 
Privatisations and competitive tendering of public services had exposed 
structural weakness in unions geared to national bargaining. Failures in strategic 
responses and uneven levels of union organisation had contributed to loss of 
membership and union recognition (see Foster and Scott 1997). These factors 
impacted, if unevenly, on local government and health, areas where the 
constituent unions of Unison had an important presence. Membership 
fragmentation and increasing local bargaining with a plurality of employers, 
many operating beyond the boundaries of the traditional public sector, 
presented significant organisational challenges for unions. The entry of private 
sector employers into the provision of public services questioned the rationale of 
union structures based on branches formed around large public sector 
employers. According to Waddington and Kerr (2000) in local government union 




There were also specific motivations for each constituent union entering into 
merger. Primarily affecting ancillary services in local government and the NHS, 
the competitive tendering process requirement had a demonstrative impact on 
NUPE. Between 1980 and 1992 NUPE lost 25% of its membership, 70% of which 
came after 1988 when competitive tendering legislation was enacted (Colling 
1995).  
For NALGO, the largest of the merger participants; the prime motivation for 
merger according to Undy (1999) was consolidation of a position that was 
relatively secure.  However whilst NALGO had continued to increase membership 
despite the “scoundrel times of Thatcher’s anti-union 1980s” (Fryer 2000:25), the 
emergence of new forms of public management influenced the politics of 
collective bargaining and arguably was principal in NALGO entering into 
negotiations with NUPE, and later COHSE on union merger (Waddington 1995).  
COHSE, like NUPE, had also suffered some loss of membership in the preceding 
years. Its main competitor for recruitment of registered nursing staff within the 
NHS, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), had been favoured by government 
policy throughout the 1980s. The attraction of strength in numbers in a public 
sector union with greater resources to meet those challenges was a prime 
motivation for COHSE’s interest in merger (Fryer 2000).COHSE and NUPE were 
rivals in the NHS and coming together would end the luxury of inter union 
competition and provide a more influential voice for NHS members in what is a 
highly political, if not politicised, service.  
Given the organisational problems stemming from competitive tendering, faced 
primarily by NUPE, deliberations around merger offered the new union an 
opportunity to develop a structure to address these challenges. By the time of 
merger and shortly after, with the later election of a New Labour government, 
the expanding threat under the banner of new public management, with 
privatisation and service outsourcing was joined by a plethora of private sector 
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management techniques including the introduction of performance targets in 
public services (see Mooney and Law 2007, Whitfield 2001, 2006). The 
consequence of which, Waddington and Kerr (2009) confirmed, was that “45.4 
per cent of Unison branches now deal with more than ten employers, of which 
seventeen per cent had fifty one or more employers”. As was argued by 
Fairbrother (1989, 1996, 2002), these changes presented potential opportunity 
for new trade union forms, more workplace focused, to emerge. With the 
devolution from national FTO dominated bargaining structures, which 
threatened existing union organisation (see Foster and Scott 1997), to local ones 
centred on issues emanating from their workplaces, the opportunity for greater 
involvement of union rank and file members was evident, as was the potential 
from adoption of the ‘organising model’.  
The formation of Unison presented an opportunity to establish structures which 
could address these consequences for existing union organisation, seeking to 
turn the threats posed from new public management into opportunities for 
building and strengthening workplace union organisation. In addition the 
fragmentation of services and the introduction of profit motivation saw the 
additional opportunity for the new union to emphasise a role as the champions 
of public service. Concentrating on the union role of the ‘sword of justice’ as 
opposed to that of a ‘vested interest’ (Flanders 1970), Unison could position 
itself as the defender of quality public services and agents of change and 
innovation (see Foster and Scott 1997, Terry 2000).  
Certainly the early proclamations of purpose for the new union were consistent 
with this agenda: 
It will provide a wide range of services and support to its members: it will 
encourage participation; it will be governed and controlled by its lay 
members; it will be based at partnership at all levels . . . it will influence 





However the new union, despite academic involvement and of some significance 
beyond internal structures, the management school at Cranfield University, 
failed to address these key issues during the merger negotiations (see Terry 
2000, Dempsey 2000). Within a short period Unison, according to Fairbrother et 
al. (1996:5) continued to organise ‘. . . as if these structural changes have not 
taken place’. At least part of the explanation for this rested in the different 
problems faced by the different constituencies within Unison. For NALGO the 
need for radical restructuring and the shifting of resources and focus from the 
centre to the local was limited given its position at the time of merger. 
Moreover, NALGO and NUPE differed in significant ways, with NALGO 
characterised as ‘member led’ and NUPE ‘officer led’. These differences were less 
important, however, than the strong central leaderships and powerful national 
executives that may have been reluctant to erode their own positions (Terry 
2000): a significant factor in consideration of attempts at union transformation 
post-merger.  
Consequently, questions of rebalancing resources of the new union from the 
centre to branches would always be difficult given vested interests, and, without 
any urgency for NALGO, was to remain one of a number of unresolved issues at 
the time of merger (Fryer 2000). In addition, whilst there was an increasing need 
for a union focus on the local, rather than national bargaining structures, 
fragmentation of services ‘entails a degree of centralisation of power within 
individual unions if resources are to be conserved, mobilised and targeted on 
priority issues’ (Kelly and Heery 1994:204). The Unison merger experience and 
subsequent union form confirmed that internal interests and differing concerns 
can override the importance of bargaining structures, despite their importance 
for union relevance.  
Unison more than a new union 
At the time of merger the new union claimed 1,486,984 members according to the 
Trade Union Certification Officer reports (quoted in McIlroy 1995:15); although later 
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membership reports of the new union suggest these figures were somewhat inflated. 
The merger was intended to be more than just conserving numbers. Terry (2000:2) 
asserts that whilst trade union mergers can sometimes be likened to “no more than 
the temporary relief, the sort a sick person gets from turning over in bed” the Unison 
merger was not solely a response to falling membership. What the founders aimed to 
achieve was to “stabilise and build on its public service base in the first instance” (Terry 
2000:3). More broadly the new union’s aims and values were enshrined in its rule book 
and included commitments to improve pay and conditions, ensure equality of 
treatment, fair representation and guaranteed minimum standards of service including 
workplace advice and representation (Wheeler 2000:70).  
Four key union functions and purposes for Unison were subsequently identified as 
negotiating, recruiting, representing and, as part of the same function, organising and 
servicing members (Wheeler 2000).This latter point is significant given it suggests that 
organisation and servicing are intertwined, a view to be refuted in subsequent 
approaches to organising. The objectives and principles would not be limited to terms 
and conditions of employment but wider campaigning, suggesting emphasis on the 
‘sword of justice’ face of trade unions. Unison was to be an outward looking union 
with a myriad of opportunities for participation in an exceptional internal democracy 
(Bickerstaffe 2000). Opportunity for membership participation was not just through 
traditional branch structures, but in service and self-organised groups, underpinned by 
principles of fair representation and proportionality which ensures that the policy 
conferences reflect the gender composition of the membership (Unison rule book 
2014).The self-organised groups originated from NALGO and were seen as the 
institutionalization of identity politics, in part as a response to historic discrimination of 
minority groups within official trade union structures (Humphrey 2000).  
The involvement of Cranfield University School of Management continued post-merger 
in supporting the new management structure within Unison. ‘Seven critical success 




1. Improving (managerial) communications within the union; 
2. Improving the motivation of all staff; 
3. Improving administrative coherence; 
4. Recognising the changing role of lay members; 
5. Making a reality of equal treatment, particularly for women; 
6. Developing the campaigning role, particularly within ‘community 
coalitions’; 
7. Delivering quality individual services. 
Dempsey 2000:60 
These factors were less about developing collective identity, raising levels of 
membership involvement and stimulating activity but primarily about the internal 
operation of the union - with the exception of the aspiration to link with community 
coalitions on campaigning issues. The consequence for organising and strategy will be 
discussed in the following chapters but strengthening management communication 
and responsibility, whilst providing for increased control and direction of staff to focus 
on national union objectives, served to limit both the traditional autonomy of full time 
officers and the organising objectives themselves. The Senior Management Team 
(SMT) supported at regional level by the Regional Management Team (RMT) had 
responsibility for delivery of strategy.  
The management of staff was seen as crucial to the success of the new union and 
systems and programmes became integral to the day to day operation of Unison (see 
Dempsey 2000, Wheeler 2000). Dempsey claims that “during and since its creation 
UNISON has worked to develop an understanding of the need for skilled and sensitive 
management” (Dempsey 2000:58). The introduction of training programmes, initially 
for Unison’s SMT, but extended to over 100 other National and Senior Regional 
Officers, the development of job descriptions for all staff and encouragement for 
training opportunities in staff development were significant responses to the challenge 
of becoming a good employer ( Dempsey 2000). The introduction of regular team 
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meetings, one to one meetings and personal development reviews would, it was 
claimed, take staff development and support to a new level (Wheeler 2000:73).  
Furthermore, there was anticipation that the adoption of an open policy on 
recruitment of staff would bring fresh and radical ideas to the union, a policy which 
followed that of the SEIU and other US unions already committed to organising. In 
pursuing such policy there was no recognition of the potential problems which would 
arise from the loss of industrial relations experience, the consequences of which are 
explored in Chapter Eight. Importance was placed on the achievement of Investors in 
People (IiP) accreditation that, together with the emphasis on developing women 
trade unionists, would combine to develop a new culture going beyond staff and into 
Unison’s structure.  
Unison structure and analysis 
Unison members are placed in branches established in accordance with union rules 
normally based around a single employer e.g. County and District Councils, privatised 
utilities, Universities and NHS Trusts. The Unison branch is required to establish a 
branch committee which consists of Branch Officers (Branch Secretary, Chair, 
Treasurer, etc.) and should also be minded of the rule to promote opportunities for 
specific groups of members through self-organised groups i.e. women members, black 
members, disabled members and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender members also 
young and retired members. Such groups have rights to representation on the branch 
committee. The Unison branch is located within a Regional structure of organisation of 
which the Regional Council is the key policy making body. The Regional Council 
consisting of branch delegates forms a Regional Committee establishing several sub 
committees to consider and input into specific areas of union work e.g. Welfare, 
International, and Equalities etc. The main service groups such as Health, Higher 
Education and Local Government also have service group structures at Regional and 
National level and hold annual service group conferences. The senior lay officers within 
the Region are involved in consultation on regional organising strategy and through 
the Membership, Organising, Recruitment and Education (MORE) committee 
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determine the recognition of good branch organising work through the annual regional 
awards night (see Chapter Seven). 
Self-organised groups also have a separate structure within Unison at local, regional 
and national levels. They have a right to send delegates to national conference, 
regional council and its sub committees and national self - organised groups.  Through 
traditional structures, self-organisation and rules of proportionality Unison presents 
itself as a union with robust democratic processes for lay control and officer 
accountability. However the structure may also provide for an inwardly focused 
committee based activism which extends bureaucratic processes into an embedded 
cultural form. Whilst claiming to be outward looking, Unison structure presented a 
potential for a focus on internal activism and all that entailed, with the opportunity for 
activists to attend as delegates to the various councils, committees and self-organised 
groups without restriction (UNISON 2014). An illustration of Unisons structure is set 
out overleaf in figure 5.1. The NEC has responsibility for the general management, 
prioritisation of, and execution of policy. It comprises elected representatives from 
regions, service groups and has reserved seats for four black members and a young 
member. The NEC has a number of standing sub committees with specific 
responsibility for policy areas and limited overview of staffing. The national delegate 
conference is the supreme body of authority and meets for four days annually. Its 
purpose is to develop policy, maintain the rules of the union and hold the executive to 
account (see Unison rule book 2014). In addition annual conferences are held 
specifically for women and self-organised groups. The structure encourages 
participation within Unison and branches are assessed on their compliance as part of a 
joint assessment (JABO) process (see Chapter Seven). The ability to adapt and change 
in order to confront the processes of decentralization of management decision making 






The merger into Unison saw the domination of lay structures by former NALGO white 
collar activists which marginalised former NUPE blue collar members (Bennett and 
Haunch 2001). Whilst manual workers were hit hardest by contracting out, their voice 
was marginalised within the new union (Colling and Claydon 2000). This domination of 
those more used to speaking was encapsulated in a quotation from a manual worker 
regarding proportionality ‘I don’t know about weighted voting, I think that they should 
have weighted fucking speaking’ (cited in Bennett and Haunch 2001:3). Furthermore 
the ensuing need to follow members into the private sector was also inhibited through 
the indifference of representatives who remained employed in the public sector (Bach 
and Givan 2008). Assessment of the relevance of Unison’s structures for the industrial 
challenges it faced would suggest that the merger outcome fell short of expectations 
of addressing the changing world of public services and commencing a process of 
renewal that gave voice to all workers.  
Identity politics were broadened through the advance of discrimination laws which 
extended protected characteristics and additionally through the establishment of 
young and retired members groups. However issues of proportionality and 
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representation failed to address the question of uneven experiences of white and blue 
collar workers access to the union’s organisation. As Hyman noted: 
It is essential to co-ordinate activity; to avoid divisive demands and 
strategies; to relate particular interests to broader class interests; to show 
special consideration for those . . . whose oppression by capital is matched 
by subordination within trade unionism itself 
Hyman 1989 quoted in Colling and Claydon 2000:95 
Such marginalisation of a significant membership constituency acutely affected by 
forms of new public management limits the consideration of broader union organising 
strategies to everyday workplace experience. This position may partly explain the 
disconnection between national organising strategies and local experiences identified 
in subsequent chapters. It did, however, have one immediate consequence: 
Senior officers argued that manual workers were leaving Unison and 
electing to join one of the general unions, particularly where white collar 
ex-NALGO branches dominated manual workers organisations in post-
merger structures 
Waddington and Kerr 1999:152 
Early into the merger Foster and Scott (1997) identified problems of structural 
disengagement between the functions of national and local levels within Unison.  
Analysis of the new union suggests a structural compromise based on competing 
interests and position as opposed to any industrial logic: 
. . . the outcome was a negotiated compromise, whereby the concerns of 
the three unions were incorporated in different ways. In practice, UNISON 
retained much of the ethos informing NALGO during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Underpinning this approach was the principle of representativeness 
(known as proportionality). This principle was predicated on the 
proposition that union members are differentiated and that recognition of 
this is central to the union’s future. This was complemented by an equally 
important principle that of participative and relatively autonomous 
branches, supported but not controlled by full-time officials 
Carter and Fairbrother 1999:11 
107 
 
The compromise of accommodating competing internal interests together with the 
inward focus of structural deliberations suggests considerable problems and obstacles 
for strategies aimed at union transformation. 
Organising strategy and full time officers 
Following merger the new union was faced with serious organisational challenges due 
to emergent financial difficulties. These challenges included increasing expenditure on 
legal costs as unions reverted to legal procedures, including the European Courts, to 
challenge decisions of government on transfers of undertakings, minimum standards 
at work and fighting large scale equal pay claims (Colling and Claydon 2000). The 
introduction of new rates of union subscription linked to earnings combined with the 
aforementioned atrophy of blue collar members impacted on income. The response 
included a reduction in staffing, including FTOs; from 1800 to 1200 with 400 jobs going 
in the first year post-merger (Waddington and Kerr 2000). Subsequent pressure on 
organisational support for members was to be met through the delegation of 
representative responsibilities from ROs to lay representatives, predating the adoption 
of the organising associated with the TUC’s ‘new unionism’ that promoted a similar 
shift in responsibilities. The requirement for well-resourced central structures, capable 
of coordinating activity, responses and initiatives was evident but that resources were 
also needed to address the reality that ‘relatively weak local organisation has been 
exposed by the decentralisation of managerial authority’ (Colling and Claydon 
2000:83).  
A crucial link between the national and local levels was played by Regional Officers. As 
Colling and Claydon noted: 
If public service unionism is to remain distinctive and appropriate to the 
context in which its members work, a greater degree of cohesion is 
required . . . Regional full time officers play an important part in achieving 
that 
          Colling and Claydon 2000:98 
The importance of FTOs and the weakness of local organisation cannot be 
overestimated. Surveys of Unison members found widespread dissatisfaction with 
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local union organisation, itself under pressure due to difficulties in recruiting 
workplace union representatives, obtaining time off for those who are recruited and 
reduced support of full time officers. In the latter case given their workloads had 
increased with a combination of staffing reduction and increases in the number of 
employers recognising Unison (Waddington and Kerr 1999). It was also the case that 
initial organising strategies in Unison were in reality focused on recruiting members 
into poorly organised workplaces rather than building union organisation (Waddington 
and Kerr ibid). 
Chapter Two illustrated the distinction between servicing and organising models of 
trade unions and how they orientate to working in ways which either encourage or 
discourage member participation in addressing workplace issues and grievances. 
Whilst Winning the Organised Workplace or WOW courses (see below) recognised and 
encouraged issue based organising, confusingly at its inception it was claimed that 
Unison had adopted both elements of servicing and organising models: 
From the outset Unison adopted elements of both the organising and 
servicing models, although it should be acknowledged that no explicit 
reference was made to the two approaches at the time 
Waddington and Kerr 2000:235  
Waddington and Kerr (the latter at the time of writing a senior official influential in the 
development of national strategy) later confirmed that, “the I995 Unison National 
Recruitment Plan (NRP) was a ‘traditional’ recruitment initiative in that it predated the 
introduction of organising techniques in Britain” (Waddington and Kerr 2009:31).  
Encouraging member participation, branch autonomy and with FTO roles to support 
and not control branches, an orientation to organising was not necessarily hostile to 
Unison’s developing culture. However, the definition of organising was understood, 
not as radically different ways of dealing with workplace issues, but simply, as it was in 
the case of MSF (see Chapter Two), in terms of  the same practices carried out at 




. . . ’support if I have a problem at work’ is the prime reason that underpins 
the unionism of most members. There is no evidence  . . . that members 
have a preference for support from full time officers, as is the objective of 
the servicing model, or from lay representatives, as intended by the 
organising model 
Waddington and Kerr 2000:256 
Further confusion was generated by the misunderstanding that the servicing model is 
restricted to ‘the provision of financial services’ (Waddington and Kerr 2000:249). This 
lack of clarity has implications for the role of FTOs and the nature and objectives of 
organising strategy. In addition the terms recruitment and organising have been 
interchangeable and generally have come to refer to recruitment activity.  
The announcement in 1995 of the National Recruitment Plan (NRP) targeting a 
membership increase from 1.2 million to 1.5 million members by 2000 was followed in 
1996 with the commencement of a strategic review within Unison (Unison1997) which 
found the organisation to be centralist, bureaucratic and perversely too reliant on the 
servicing of members by stewards. This latter point is at odds with the expressed 
objective of delegating representational work to branches and suggests a view abroad 
that servicing should not be undertaken at any level.  
Unison structures may promote an inward looking activist cadre exacerbating 
tendencies to a lay bureaucracy given “many self-organised groups have tended to 
focus their activities on regional and national level activities rather than those at 
workplace or branch level” (Waddington and Kerr 2009:43). Such structural features 
may detract from Unison’s ability to recruit workplace representatives if members 
interested in trade union activism are directed to internal structures which may inhibit 
opportunity for workplace organising and representational functions. Rather than 
address problems of capacity in regional support for branches, the strategic review 
recommended devolving finances from the centre to branches. In doing so each 
branch was required to establish branch development plans in partnership with the RO 
(Unison undated), encourage in-fill recruitment and introduce activist training around 
organising (Unison 1996). The NRP was replaced within two years by the National 
Organising and Recruitment Strategy (NORS) (Unison 2003). 
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A turn to organising 
NORS emerged from a 1997 Unison paper ‘building an organizing culture’. For full time 
officers the paper repeated the narrative that the ‘Regional Organizer has to change 
from a servicer to an organizer, and stewards have to play a greater role in supporting 
members’ (Unison1997). Again no evidence was provided confirming such assertions in 
relation to the FTO role in Unison. There were four key objectives to the NORS: 
. . . the recruitment and retention of members; the organisation and 
development of networks of lay representatives within all branches; the 
generation of higher levels of participation in branch life and more 
effective representation and negotiation within branches 
 Waddington and Kerr 2009: 33 
Despite repeated failure, a more ambitious target for increasing membership levels 
was announced, to 1.7million by 2007 and up to 2 million by 2010.   
Unison adopted the TUC national training course, lifted directly from the AFL-CIO 
Organising Institute. ‘Winning the Organised Workplace’ (‘WOW’) became the key 
training for organising staff, primarily at that time ROs. The literature promoting the 
course stated ‘get on a WOW course: become an effective organiser’ (Unison 2001a). 
In the course materials an attempt at explaining what organising means includes 
“workers organising themselves” (Unison 2001). Further the material states that 
“organising is about increasing the number of activists and participating members to as 
high a percentage as practical” (Unison 2001).  
The course included laudable statements regarding organising objectives but the 
reality of subsequent experience has demonstrated the difficulties of how to get to 
that position. The course materials were primarily a toolkit around how to map 
workplaces, have 1:1 meetings with workers and deal with issues in an organising as 
opposed to a servicing way. In parallel an associated course titled ‘Unison: the 
Organising Challenge’ was rolled out for staff in which it was claimed that ‘the situation 
facing unions in the US and Australia was similar to which we face today in the UK’ 
(Unison 2001b:11). Implying both direct comparison, but also that US and Australian 
unions had addressed their situations of crisis. 
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Developing the organising narrative, new and innovative training courses for lay 
representatives based on organising techniques were introduced. The ‘Bee Active’ 
courses for lay representatives were based on WOW courses but pointed 
representatives to the implementation of branch development and organising plans.  
Such plans were intended to provide a framework which linked organising work and 
techniques with constituent parts of the union. So targeting potential members may 
link with the work of a Unison self-organised group. Similarly workplace learning and 
the role of the Union Learning Representative (ULR) presented opportunities for 
recruitment.   
To support branches in developing branch development and organisation  plans 
(BDOP), each Unison region was to appoint five Branch Development Officers (BDOs) 
to work in conjunction with the RO on campaigning on local issues which were key to 
membership growth (Waddington and Kerr 2009). As part of the BDOP organising 
teams were to be established in branches whose work was to be monitored by a 
regional committee reporting to a national committee responsible for organising. That 
a national committee, through the regional committee, can overview and monitor a 
local branch in terms of its development in a union the size of Unison is highly 
improbable.  
The Unison RO was seen as central to promoting and monitoring the NORS. However, 
despite a reducing number of Unison representatives and with less ROs post-merger, 
the RO was expected to refocus their role to managing of workplace activism primarily 
on in-fill recruitment activity encouraging a similar reorientation of lay representatives 
in the process. This managed activism, adopting elements of new public management 
primarily through centralised target setting (recruitment) and local accountability, has 
led to claims by  Bach and Givan (2008:530) that: 
Unison has reinforced its emphasis on developing local organisation within 
an overarching framework of priority setting and performance targets. 
Unison has therefore adopted a hybrid approach to renewal, strengthening 




While the former claim is certainly the case, there is little evidence of reinvigorated 
workplace organisation. The problem of capacity to cover member’s demands for 
representation and support in the workplace became more acute as ROs now focused 
on recruitment coupled with a reduced number of workplace representatives who 
were also expected to shift their focus to recruitment. This issue should not be 
underestimated given: 
The demand for full time officer support was said to have grown following 
merger. NALGO branch organiser roles were phased out whilst ‘casework 
and negotiating activity continued to grow apace’ increasing the demand 
for full time officer support yet this support was in decline due to 
reductions in staffing budgets 
Colling and Claydon 2000:85 
As previously identified the reduction in FTOs is also confirmed by Waddington and 
Kerr (2000:243), a reduction that has occurred in a context of casework and 
negotiating issues that are more varied and complicated given the extension of 
individual employment rights coupled with the decentralisation of managerial decision 
making. For Unison Branch Secretaries bargaining and representation took priority 
over organising and membership gains were linked to the addressing of industrial 
issues at work such as pay disputes and campaigns against cuts (Waddington and Kerr 
2009). Furthermore a number of problems have been identified which militate against 
building local union organisation not least of which is recruiting lay members to take 
on roles as workplace representatives. Limited time off arrangements, more 
workplaces and work intensification combined to discourage workers volunteering to 
do union work. This weak local organisation is confirmed in the identification of 
widespread dissatisfaction among Unison members with the support received from 
the local Unison branch (see Waddington and Kerr 1999, 2000).  
A strategy of increased devolvement and reliance on branch lay representatives doing 
case work in these conditions seems questionable at best. Given ‘members primarily 
join the union for support should a problem arise at work’ (Waddington and Kerr 
2000:240, also see Waddington 2014a) the performance of Unison in addressing those 
needs whether through a servicing or organising orientation should be of concern. 
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Eventually the WOW course was phased out as organising training was to be integral 
to the Unison education programme for both staff and lay representatives. This 
integration was part of a broader revised strategy for building union organisation by 
switching resources from servicing to organising. However, as identified later, the 
integration of organising into lay representative training courses was accompanied by 
the dilution of how to represent members. Nevertheless the WOW courses and the 
introduction of branch development plans were seen by some as the adoption of the 
organising model in practice and that Unison was transformed into an organising union 
(Waddington and Kerr 2009).  
Voss and Sherman (2000) propose several key factors to suggest that a trade union can 
be described as an organising union.  Included is evidence of commitment to 
organising by senior union officials, investment in and redesigning of union training 
courses for staff and activists and the redirection of resources towards increasing the 
number of staff who work in supporting organising. On this latter point increasing 
external recruits who are committed to organising and higher levels of member 
participation in organising campaigns is seen as important. The adoption of the NORS 
for Waddington and Kerr suggest such transformation.  However further evidence of 
organising strategy being in reality mere recruitment campaigns is revealed in their 
admission that “Unison organizing campaigns are not about securing recognition from 
employers, but focus on in-fill recruitment” (Waddington and Kerr 2009:30). 
Consequently “the ‘classic’ organising campaign based on achieving recognition is thus 
not central to Unison” (Waddington and Kerr 2009:31). Given that part of the rationale 
for the formation of Unison was in response to the outsourcing of public services, the 
opportunities to organise beyond traditional public service boundaries are legion and 
have been strategically ignored. 
In reality the idea that local union representatives are able to orientate towards 
identifying recruitment targets as a priority is at best optimistic, at worst mistaken. In 
examining Unison organisation in Higher Education commitment to organising from 
stewards was limited due to an overload of servicing tasks (Byford 2011). Similarly, in 
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the NHS, the Unison organising strategy was seen as a top down process foisted on 
branches as additional to branch priorities which remained the issues members faced 
in the workplace. These workplace issues also dominated interactions between the 
Unison FTO and the Unison branch (De Turberville 2006). In the NHS union density had 
declined by 9% in the eight years following the formation of Unison (De Turberville 
2006).  
Whilst FTOs acknowledged the emphasis Unison placed on recruitment of new 
members the context in which they worked weakened their ability to prioritise 
appropriately as Colling and Claydon (2000:86) also point out: 
Organisers were aware of the need to prioritise recruitment but methods 
based on their direct involvement were seen as impracticable. Partly this 
was a matter of limited time but large scale recruitment exercises also 
provided diminishing returns . . . Better organised activists monitored their 
own membership data, responded to lists of joiners and leavers when 
these were offered by employers, and circulated regular newsletters, 
including membership application forms. However regular time 
commitments and face to face recruitment was few and far between 
Given the challenges and difficulties faced by Unison branches and FTOs it is 
unsurprising that ‘fewer than half of all branches had thus developed a plan to recruit 
non-members seven years after the adoption of the NORS’ (Waddington and Kerr 
2009:40). A review of strategic objectives may have seen this reality acknowledged. 
However such national strategies are devised away from and uninformed by those 
who are tasked with implementation at the workplace. What was evident was that 
despite the apparent emphasis on organising, recruitment objectives were never met. 
Meeting the Organising Challenge 
Regional support for branches was based on a structure in which the RO was the 






Unison Regional Support pre MtOC 
 
Figure 5.1 
However further revision of Unison’s organising strategy led to significant changes 
including a potentially radical restructure of staffing. Meeting the Organising Challenge 
(MtOC) had two key elements; transferring Unison staff resource into organising work 
and simultaneously providing a career path into regional management roles (Unison 
2007). The rationale for justification of the new staffing structure was that faced with 
increasing challenges to union organisation through globalisation and fragmentation of 
public services there was a need to refocus further Unison staff resources to organising 
work.  
In addition internal documents identified five issues arising from a review of Branch 
and Service Group structures, the need to continue recruiting in excess of 120,000 
members per annum to stand still; the changing nature, organisation and delivery of 
public services; the service demands from non-traditional membership sectors; 










of UNITE, from the merger of AMICUS and TGWU, was seen as a potential rival both in 
Unison core areas and newer public service provision (Unison 2007).  
The report stated that Unison could increase its membership by 2010 to 1.5 million 
members and in doing so increase membership participation in Unison structures. The 
emphasis was clearly on the need to develop more participatory orientations of Unison 
membership. Refocusing of staff from administrative tasks to organising work was 
seen as key to these objectives being met. The future vision was set out as follows: 
Regional Organisers are able to make building local organisation their                 
chief focus. 
Regional Organisers are able to practice proactive management of their 
areas of branch and employer responsibilities. They are accountable for 
local organisation and working in partnership with lay members, and their 
casework load is lightened to allow them to do this. 
We build workplace activism so there are more lay members able to 
organise and represent members. 
There is a clear career development structure for organising staff, leading 
them from a role primarily based on recruitment, through more senior 
responsibility for organising and branch development, right up to regional 
management level. 
Organising staff have training and development plans to equip them fully 
for their future roles, help them meet their potential and allow the union 
to develop future managers and leaders. 
Administrative posts are, over time, converted to organising roles, with as 
many current staff as possible being developed into new roles and future 
posts prioritised for organising. 
Our workforce more accurately reflects our membership’s diversity”. 
Unison 2007a  
The objectives of MtOC reiterated some of the original objectives in Unison 
whilst adding the managerial challenges of effective and efficient organisation: 
1. Recruiting, Organising and representing members 




3. Campaigning and promoting Unison on behalf of members 
4. Develop an effective and efficient union 
The revised staffing structure is illustrated in figure 5.2 
 
Unison Regional Support post MtOC 
Figure 5.2 
What Unison management believed was that this new staffing structure would 
also support a realisation that: 
UNISON must embed the emphasis on recruitment and organising into our 
union to allow us to develop branch and workplace organisation; build our 
activist base and help branches deal with a growing demand for casework 
and representation 
Unison 2007a 
This staffing plan was to gradually reduce the number of ROs, in doing so 







     AREA                            LOCAL 
ORGANISER                ORGANISER 





Managing a small team e.g. casework team, team of area and/or local 
organisers. Supervising the work of area organisers and local organisers 
when they are engaged in organising projects with the Regional Organiser’s 
branches 
Unison undated 
In practice the case work team did not materialise and given the emphasis on 
recruitment the support for casework and representation was to be diluted. 
Local and Area Organisers were primarily employed to support recruitment 
activity whilst the latter also had responsibility for low level representational 
work (Unison 2007). The further reduction proposed in the number of Unison 
FTOs would be compensated by significant increases in staffing resource for 
Unison organising work. This development had major implications for Unison 
ROs, their role, their position within Unison and their relations with branches. 
For the latter the potential for ROs to become more remote given reductions in 
numbers, their managerial responsibilities and the possibility for region/branch 
interface being with other grades of staff primarily focused on 
recruitment/organising was evident. The increase in organising staff also 
enhances the potential, given this focus, for Unison’s organisational ability to 
assert national and regional union priorities over those at branch level.  
Conclusion 
Whilst the rationale for the formation of Unison was partly in response to the 
compulsory competitive tendering of public services and forms of new public 
management, the subsequent structure which emerged failed to address the 
challenges of a changing industrial relations terrain. Since merger, problems in 
connection with support for branches continue. Given Unison’s own research has 
identified the prime reason for membership being ‘protection at work’ this rationale 
has not been central to strategy. The increasing complexity of workplace 
representation, the proliferation of workers individual rights and the increase in 
workplaces themselves presents major challenges for Unison. This is compounded by 
the lack of workplace organisation in many unionised workplaces that guarantees 
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individual issues continue to be conceptualised and dealt with as exactly that rather 
than as symptoms of issues that should be dealt with collectively.  Many issues such as 
performance targets, competency and discipline for sickness absence are a reflection 
of prevailing balances of power and are arguments for collective mobilisation.  
A focus on internal structures encouraging member participation and with it a robust 
lay democracy developed. Whilst strategic objectives were identified, with 
management systems and support for staff to achieve those objectives put in place, 
such objectives, primarily around levels of recruitment were never met. These 
repeated failures did not meet with any recognition that ambitions for a bottom up, 
outwardly focused trade union had not been met. Instead arbitrary targets, set top 
down and dispersed throughout an inwardly focused union prevailed. Top down 
initiatives attempting to invigorate membership activism may work against the 
interests of those in established positions whether paid or lay. An inherent 
conservatism within unions militates against organising and may explain why later, 
post - WOW, organising became synonymous with recruitment. The introduction of 
the ‘Organising Model’ through WOW training emphasising the building of union 
organisation around workplace issues was not sustained confirming a lack of a long 
term commitment to organising as proposed through the ‘organising model’. 
The organising model was introduced through WOW training and later diffused into 
core training of lay representatives, thereby reducing the time spent on training for 
representational work. This reduction was despite the stated objectives of delegating 
such work to branches and with pre-existing issues around quality of support for 
members at branch level. As found elsewhere (Carter 2000) it seems that confusion 
over understanding of approaches to trade union work hinders strategy with 
conflicting definitions of organising, the contrasting organising and servicing models 
being seen as alternative choices, with organising defined as when workers are 
represented by lay representatives and not FTOs. Crucially the option of orientation 
towards encouraging active as opposed to passive union membership as espoused 
through the ‘organising model’ is confused on two counts. Firstly through what seems 
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to be the relegation of the importance of representation (servicing) although 
workplace issues provide the opportunity to build union organisation, as promoted in 
the WOW course and secondly by defining union activism through participation in 
Unison’s own internal structures. The new staffing structure which emerged under the 
MtOC heading reduces support for representational work whilst increasing staff 
resources for recruitment/organising activity. The RO in MtOC has responsibility for 
both staff and branches to achieve nationally set recruitment targets consistent with a 
view that stronger management would lead to achievement of strategic objectives.  
Whilst transformation, as claimed by Waddington and Kerr (2009), has occurred, the 
suggestion that Unison is now an organising union requires further examination.  The 
nature and structure of Unison would require radical transformation for it to be 
described in such terms. Given internal interests prevailed at the time of merger and 
became embedded in the new union structure it is unlikely that such change will occur 
without an impending crisis. Vested interests at national and local level, the former 
focusing on recruitment while the latter stemming from internal routinisation, mean 
that without any serious dialogue and examples of victories based on mobilisation of 
members the prospect to become an organising union remains highly unlikely. 
Furthermore with the importance of workplace representation as the key reason for 
joining a union, dilution of representational capacity, could be a major strategic error. 
The following chapters present the primary research and will consider some of the 
consequences of such choice through the impact of Unison organising strategies on 
workplaces and the development of managerial controls which attempt to limit the 







Chapter Six: The Relevance of Unison Organising Strategies to Workplace Industrial 
Relations 
Introduction 
Chapter five identified the importance to Unison management, from inception, of 
having a national plan for increasing membership. The national recruitment plan was 
replaced by the national organising and recruitment strategy. However the main 
objective of the new organising strategy remained the same, to increase membership. 
Effectively organising strategy became limited to objectives of achieving nationally set 
recruitment targets. This chapter, in confirming these limitations, identifies 
widespread confusion in defining and applying union organising work.  
At a national level understandably the organising strategy is central in considerations, 
but the proposition that union leaderships/senior management can direct approaches 
and priorities for organising work effectively is questionable. In trade union organising 
terms size does matter and with a multitude of union recognised workplaces with 
different priorities at any given time, a national organising strategy is not a priority at 
the union workplace. There are common issues in workplaces which could make a 
national organising strategy relevant. This could be achieved through redirecting 
resources to buttress organising work which itself would be determined by workplace 
issues e.g. bullying in the NHS.  
Given union priorities are contested, the chapter considers how organising strategy 
relates to FTOs and impacts on industrial relations. What is revealed is as significant 
industrial issues arise, as well as in the more routine union work at branch and 
workplace level, national organising strategies have little relevance in subsequent 
union responses. Where they do impact is in influencing the nature of industrial 
relations and the level of support for branches in conducting those relations by 
focusing on recruitment and neglecting workplace and industrial issues. Illustration of 
this claim is through a critical incident that examines the outsourcing of a public 
service, the later restructure of that service and the experiences of lay activists within 
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the affected workplace. This critical incident confirms that the impact of organising 
and organising strategy in A-Region is consistent with other Unison regions.   
The potential for significant internal disconnection from the objectives set by Unison 
nationally with the priorities of lay representatives in branches and Unison ROs is 
apparent. The implications from this disconnection will be considered in the following 
chapter in the context of Unison management and efforts to both control and 
incorporate the RO into a role, more managerial in outlook. 
Unison organising strategy and objectives  
The development of national plans for Unison commenced with the National 
Recruitment Plan (NRP) announced in 1995. The main objective was increasing union 
membership from 1.2 million to 1.5 million by 2000 (Waddington and Kerr 2009). 
Whilst such an increase may enhance union power and influence and with it collective 
bargaining and other representational outcomes, without that stated intent the effect 
of such targets maybe viewed as merely enhancing and reinforcing the union’s 
institutional interest through increasing membership subscription income. With the 
apparent adoption of US and Australian organising methods, encouraged by the TUC, 
Unison reviewed the National Recruitment Plan (NRP).  This led to the development of 
the National Organising and Recruitment Strategy (NORS) in 1997. Recruitment targets 
remained a key objective but in addition the strategy was aimed at transforming the 
role of the Unison RO from that of a servicer to an organiser.  
A strategy based on a belief, which was not evidenced, is questionable at best. The 
stated objective of increasing membership by 2007 to 1.7 million members (an 
increase of 500,000) and by 2010 to the figure of 2 million was extremely optimistic 
and suggested a failure at a senior level to consider the nature of trade union 
organisation, the political economy and the climate of industrial relations. In effect 
such targets are meaningless when no explanation or detailed planning for how this is 
to be achieved is offered.  
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Such optimism may have been a product of the enthusiasm engendered through the 
perception given of US and Australian organising success and the adoption of WOW 
training courses. However this ignored both immediate experience in Unison where 
membership levels had fallen from 1.47 million in 1993 after merger, to 1.24 million by 
1998 (Unison internal data) and evidence from abroad where in the Australian 
experience, despite the election of a Labour government, union membership had 
continued to fall with liberalisation of the economy (Rigby et al 2004).  Nevertheless 
Unison regions were required to develop plans to support the national strategy.  
Unison identifies four main objectives in its organising work and these are represented 
in the strategic plan for ‘A’ Region: 
1. Recruiting, organising, representing and retaining members 
2. Negotiating and bargaining and promoting equality 
3. Campaigning and promoting Unison on behalf of its members 
4. Developing an efficient and effective union 
UNISON 2012 
The regional strategy is agreed and reviewed annually by the Regional Management 
Team (RMT) led by the Regional Secretary in conjunction with the leadership of the 
Regional lay democracy including the Regional Convenor and Deputy Convenors. In 
theory the lay democracy is representing the views of the membership. However with 
the emphasis on recruitment and the relegation of the importance of representation 
of members the disparity found in expectations of the RO role (see below and chapters 
seven and eight),suggests that senior lay representatives are themselves disconnected 
from branches and supporting theory of an emergent lay union bureaucracy (Hyman 
1989). Alternatively it may demonstrate not so much co-option of lay representatives 
as the dominance of union bureaucracy over them as described by Webb and Webb 
(1894) and Michels (1962). 
The broad objectives relate to all aspects of the RO role including representation, 
negotiation, recruitment and retention of members. In practice all aspects are 
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connected in that good representation and bargaining outcomes should lead to 
workers wanting to join or remain in Unison as Waddington and Kerr (2000) found. 
However when asked about the organising strategy at the workplace lay 
representatives perceive the strategy in more narrow and specific terms. According to 
one representative ‘recruit more members is the organising strategy’ (BA7); reiterated 
by another echoing the New Labour ‘education, education, education’ mantra; 
“recruit, recruit, recruit, I think they (the union) lose sight of other things such as 
representation as being important” (BA8).  
These views were consistent with those held by ROs who confirmed that recruitment 
was seen as the organising strategy. If the organising strategy went beyond mere 
recruitment this intention was unclear and incoherent. In addition the recruitment 
methodology undermined attempts to promote membership participation and 
activism as espoused through the ‘organising model’: 
I am not totally convinced Unison has an organising strategy. It is more a 
recruitment strategy and large sections of (Unison) management seem to 
understand recruitment as organising. . . I see organising as partly 
recruiting but around issues which is a more moral way to recruit. It is also 
a more effective way as if you are recruiting around an issue you tend to 
get people involved rather than just signing them up and your need for 
representatives becomes self-evident. 
RO2 
For this RO recruitment activity is primarily about attracting members by making the 
union relevant in the workplace. If this connection is made, the ability to build union 
organisation is evident with recruitment activity an inherent part of that process. The 
suggestion that such approaches have a morality to them implies that it is immoral to 
recruit merely for the purpose of recruitment. The importance of issue based 
organising was reiterated by other ROs, who also echoed the lack of clarity and vision 
within organising objectives:  
The members are the engine of the union and organising for me is to find 
out what the issues are, find people who are prepared to share in dealing 
with the issues, and supporting them in that process by training and  giving 
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confidence. It is not clear what we are organising for. Unison says it wants 
an organising union but I don’t think they know what that means. 
RO9 
In underlining this lack of clarity another RO speculated that the purpose of the 
organising strategy is to serve the institutional interest of the union: 
I don’t know what we are organising for . . . I do feel now that for the union 
as an organisation it is more about maintaining their ability to function and 
grow as an organisation. It is almost for their benefit . . . like a corporate 
interest. 
RO4 
This suggestion of corporate objectives within trade unions echoes the limited scope of 
US business unionism referred to in chapter two. There seems no evidence of any 
consideration by Unison management of organising as a vehicle for building workplace 
power. However it does offer an explanation for a purpose to a national organising 
strategy even if one of limited ambition. Whilst one RO believed that ‘we are 
organising for equality, decent pay and pensions and a fairer society. It is crucial for the 
union to have that wider outlook’ (RO3) there was little support for that view in 
practice. It reflected what should be, as opposed to the reality of the organising 
strategy. Indeed others thought such goals to improve working life were now 
secondary at the altar of recruitment: 
In a sense the ultimate judgement of success is focused on recruitment and 
not on whether in fact we have got good terms and conditions for our 
members as that has taken lesser importance. 
RO1 
This latter view suggests that union orientation is even more limited than conservative 
union forms such as business unionism and the face of the vested interest dominates.  
ROs are expected to champion recruitment activity, while representation and issue 
based organising work becomes of secondary importance. In this sense the connection 
between union objective and strategy with institutional interests is apparent. This 
relationship has created a sense of unease with Unison’s approach to organising work. 
Whilst identifying a connection between strategy and objectives, which is important as 
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without understanding of objectives the strategy fails, those objectives are seen as 
mistaken. The following sums up a frustration common among many staff and lay 
representatives interviewed who believed Unison had become increasingly inward 
looking and self-serving in its day to day operations: 
There are times when I worry that what Unison is organising for is its own 
existence . . . We go about setting up canteen stalls to recruit for the 
purpose of recruiting not addressing issues our members face. The right 
wing press say unions are self-serving organisation and I do think there 
may be an element of truth in that now . . . We should be about 
maintaining and protecting jobs, improving terms and conditions and it 
should be about influencing whatever government is in power to make 
society better. We have a wealth of experience among our members and 
we do not use it . . . We have a bigger role to play and we don’t play it. 
RO2 
The reference to canteen stall recruiting has wider significance. The respective 
organising teams within the Region, including the ROs, have dedicated weeks where 
working as a team they focus on a targeted county within the region and as many as 
fifteen staff position themselves with recruitment stands in prominent positions such 
as staff restaurants with the aim of recruiting new members and new activists. 
However the self-serving view of this recruitment activity within Unison is reinforced in 
one email exchange over the Regional Manager’s proposal to increase the number of 
such weeks. A recent recruit to the RO role responded that ‘we should do this extra 
week as it does work and we need to get more members if we are to keep our jobs’.  
Such admission of motivation for recruitment activity is not surprising when Unison 
management understandably highlights the impact of the Coalition government’s 
policies on jobs in the public sector and, how in turn, that affects union membership 
levels, union finances and the potential consequences for staffing levels (Unison 2012). 
However, when combined with the consequence of recruitment targets being the 
primary objective of the union, a climate of short -termism is created where staff are 
exhorted to increase membership by management through monthly reports on 
recruitment activity identifying Unison branches achieving or failing to meet targets. 
Inevitably the regular weekly recruitment events and the prominence given to 
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recruitment targets have implications for relations with constituent parts of the union 
and with employers whose cooperation is required. They ultimately become central to 
the nature and purpose of union organising work. 
The Unison Regional Organiser in the Unison organising strategy 
In general terms the FTO relationship with activists and members is one of dual 
purpose. On the one hand, the FTO has the role of the servant of the union 
membership. On the other hand, the status is as an authorised official of the union 
ensuring adherence to union rules, collective agreements and employment laws. To 
reiterate an earlier observation, FTOs entirely legitimately undertake actions that can 
control the members but simultaneously they remain employees or servants of that 
same membership (Hyman 1975).  Unison branch priorities will include the demands of 
members for representation, advice and support. Consequently national and regional 
issues are often secondary to the immediate workplace related priorities in branches 
whether from members, lay representatives or both.  
Traditionally FTOs have held sufficient autonomy for deciding work priorities at any 
given time, whether those priorities are membership or institutionally driven (Kelly and 
Heery 1994). However the increasing prominence to achieving recruitment targets 
constrained that traditional ability: 
We are put under pressure by Region to get the recruitment figures so 
when we meet with branches we need to talk about what the branch is 
doing about recruitment but the branches naturally want to talk about 
their issues. 
RO9 
If Unison was being transformed into an organising union, emphasizing the importance 
of building workplace organisation, then it would be evident that issues for branches 
would be prioritising union work and addressing priorities by organising members. Any 
recruitment activity would be undertaken in the context of addressing these issues of 
importance to the union membership. This approach presents the possibility for some 
synergy between the differing priorities of constituent parts of the union. However the 
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overarching priority of recruitment moves Unison away from both organising and 
servicing orientations: 
I don’t think branches embrace the Unison organising agenda as all they 
are asked to do is recruiting. Organisation is seen as coming on the back of 
recruitment when it should be the other way around. Branches and 
members still focus on the service they get when they need help. Now that 
service can turn into an organising and recruiting opportunity but without 
delivering the service all else is lost. What Unison does not recognise is we 
deliver a service for members that’s valued.  
RO4 
In this RO’s view once again the organising work of the union should develop around 
workplace issues and is consistent with an orientation of issue based organising 
espoused within the WOW course and the ‘organising model’. The RO echoed a 
frustration that what Unison management refers to as organising is recruiting. 
Consequently the recruitment focus debilitates any efforts at workplace organising. 
Further, what is seen as servicing by Regional Management is for this RO part of an 
organising process. One lay representative confirmed the success of this approach at a 
time when the branch was in crisis: 
We have built the branch by the scruff of the neck. There had been a fall 
out of officers and our current Regional Organiser was allocated to the 
branch about that time. Our original focus was trying to get activists, 
setting up some decent administration, and build a decent relationship 
with the employer. We changed the recognition agreement, we got extra 
facility time, we used a campaign to raise our profile . . . it was about 
building the branch up from the bottom. 
BA2 
However whilst the branch in question was recognised as a success by the measures of 
JABO (see Chapters Five and Seven) their modus operandi brought them into difficulty 
with what region saw as the priorities. Consequently the relationship between region 
and branches was increasingly being perceived as one of employer/employee. A 
number of lay representatives expressed some concern at this development given they 
were not employees of the union. One lay representative complained; “We are 
volunteers, don’t boss us around . . . encourage us” (BA3). This plea was directed more 
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at Regional Management than their own RO who was seen to be most supportive of 
the Branch. This support was reciprocated by the branch’s recognition of the demands 
placed on ROs under objectives set by the Regional Management: 
We know that targets for recruitment are set and that there is some 
pressure on the Regional Organiser to make sure we achieve our 
recruitment target and we have to note that and that our relationship is a 
bit of give and take over what we want and what Region wants. 
BA3 
This conclusion suggests that in organised branches the relationship between the RO 
and the branch is based on mutual agreement on priorities. Consequently some fusion 
of the servant of the union members’ position with that of the control or authority of 
the FTO emerges. What this fusion also implies however is that even with a productive 
relationship between the Unison branch and the RO the focus on workplace issues can 
be compromised by the target settings imposed by national Unison management. One 
branch summed up their resistance to recruitment focused activity by stating ‘we don’t 
do recruitment, we do representation’ (BA1). The recruitment was as a consequence 
of the representation.  
The requirement for ROs to become managers of branches was partly articulated 
through some members of the regional management team expressing the view at 
team meetings and staff conference that where lay representatives were provided 
with specific facility time for union work by the employer, that time was afforded on 
the basis of their Unison position and hence it was legitimate for the union to manage 
that resource. This failed to recognise the purpose of granting the facility time; given 
employers see this in the context of supporting constructive industrial relations at the 
specific workplace and not for the institutional benefit of Unison. 
Vertical and Horizontal disconnection 
The dominance of JABO priorities in the daily union work were implicated in a 
breakdown of communication both within Region and from National to Region. The 
failure to integrate national, regional and branch preoccupations resulted in branches 
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and ROs tending to operate within silos unaware of events elsewhere that could have 
relevance or consequence for their own issues. One Regional Manager confirmed that: 
We don’t know what is going on elsewhere. I got told by chance that there 
was a legal case going off in one Trust which has major implications for one 
of our Trusts. There is no proper coordination around the industrial work of 
the union: it is very fragmented at the minute. 
RM1 
Disconnections at a level suggest that core issues and membership interests receive an 
alarmingly low level of priority. Regional team meetings are dominated by discussions 
of recruitment levels and activity. Broader or specific industrial issues that have 
current relevance to the ROs in the team had little room for consideration. Sector 
matters at a national level were no longer considered appropriate for dissemination of 
information and discussion at team meetings although teams were structured around 
key sectors. As one RO (RO4) complained: 
Other than giving me specific targets or tasks region has very little 
relevance. I think the role of the RO has become far more isolated. I don’t 
have those discussions with colleagues about what is happening in their 
area of responsibility. How do we approach the same issues and have some 
common strategy? The team meetings don’t address the issues we are 
dealing with on a day to day basis. We no longer have service group 
meetings which I found very valuable because we discussed the issues 
which all of us were facing across the piece and allowed us to develop 
common strategies and approaches. There is a total disconnecting between 
National and Region, the practical experience of the RO being able to 
influence and guide policy has gone. 
A consequence of such isolation is that ROs can view the branches they deal with as 
their real team and not the Regional team, contrary to theory of FTO dislocation from 
the rank and file: 
I don’t think a lot is done about the isolation you can feel out there. You 
can put a barrier with branches so you don’t go native as it were. I feel the 
danger is you could become native they become your family as you are 




With some irony the increasing emphasis on teamwork in relation to recruitment 
activity has the counter effect of alienating some ROs within the team and encouraging 
their alignment with allocated branches. (The contrasting approach of other ROs will 
be considered in more detail in Chapter Seven when examining the developing 
emphasis on union management in Unison). Field notes covering regional and team 
meetings consistently record branches - themselves inundated with bureaucracy and 
run by gate keepers - being referred to by Regional Managers, and some ROs, as 
barriers to union recruitment efforts. In any focus on the failure of union organising 
strategies, it was not the strategy itself that was considered, but individuals within 
local branches. 
For branches a common complaint was that the turnover in ROs made it impossible to 
develop constructive relations with region. This turnover was seen to be the 
responsibility of the Regional Management and is summed up in the following 
contribution: 
The Regional Organiser patches are now too big and change too often. I 
would love to have the situation where in one county the health branches 
have had the same Regional Organiser for years and as Branch Secretaries 
we need Regional Organisers who will support us. I have to say the 
variation in standard between Regional Organisers is huge. 
BA1 
One of the consequences of MtOC was the increased scope of RO industrial 
responsibility, in addition to management of other Unison staff. The perception of 
significant variation in work standards of ROs is consistent with the view of ROs and 
Regional Management. The practice of recruiting staff without industrial experience 
was manifesting itself in the identification by lay representatives of inconsistent 
standards of industrial support. 
The impact of organising work on industrial relations  
In their analysis of the TUCs New Unionism Carter and Fairbrother (2000) identified 
TUC strategy as one of partnership with good employers and organising workers 
against bad employers. This suggests that the two strands of new unionism were 
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mutually exclusive. Unison has pursued an industrial agenda of partnership with 
employers whilst promoting organising within recognised workplaces. In the public 
sector trade union organisation and recognition has been a traditional feature. 
However contemporary advocates of closer collaboration with employers fail to 
acknowledge the ever increasing impact of marketization undermining the public 
service ethos and its impact on matters of workplace control and productivity (Carter 
et al 2012). This blind spot is illustrated in the view of a national senior manager: 
Employers have always been sympathetic to our aims and I think that in 
turn as we deliver public service we have a common interest with the 
employer to deliver high quality services to the community and so 
partnership in that context is based on the same objectives. So it is not like 
the private sector where the employer is trying to maximise profits at the 
expense of our members. So I am not opposed to partnership working in 
the public services because we have that common aim of providing high 
quality services. 
NM1 
In contrast to the perspective of collaboration, an organising union, given growing 
member participation in workplaces, would produce increasing challenge to 
managerial prerogative and greater potential for conflict within the workplace. 
However the results of Unisons ‘organising’ do not suggest that such conflict has 
emerged, supporting the contention that ‘organising’ is more rhetoric than reality. 
There has been minimal impact on union relations with employers: 
I don’t think employers would have noted much difference really. If so only 
in pockets where we are asking ‘can we walk around the workplace please 
because we are an organising union? Can we turn up to your new starters’ 
inductions? Occasionally they may have requests for us to go back and 
consult people. 
 RM3 
This view is reinforced at RO level (RO4): 
Over the years with major employers I have had to deal with I have built 
good relations and they have helped our organising work. Most employers 
will see the benefit of a good relation with the union and how the Regional 
Organiser approaches that relationship is key. 
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Organising work in trade unions has to consider the nature of industrial relations, the 
power relations between workers and employers and the issues of importance for 
workers, integral to a coherent practice. However there exists a distinct lack of 
appreciation of such matters in broader strategic consideration within Unison. The 
promotion of partnership working has in some workplaces undermined notions of 
building workplace union organisation, democracy and accountability. Whilst 
bemoaning gatekeepers at one level, (senior branch and staff side (joint union) officers 
who maintain their own position through obstruction of, and resistance to new union 
activists), partnership agreements were reinforcing the gatekeeper position of a 
minority of lay officers, entrenching lay bureaucracy and undermining limited 
workplace democracy. One member of the regional management team concluded: 
In relation to partnership agreements I think we should have a divorce. I 
think they have not benefited us at all. I think in the beginning the 
honeymoon period was nice. We got more facility time, nicer offices but 
then they really turned the tables on us. Some senior reps are in cahoots 
with senior managers, employed in HR positions in staff side positions. 
These were sold on facility time. In reaction I have had groups of members 
who have transferred to other unions and then took all their Unison facility 
time with them. People I know working against us with the employer are 
sitting in union posts and we cannot shift them. 
RM3 
This particular experience related to a specific NHS Trust where an arrangement was 
made whereby some Unison branch officers were seconded into the Human Resources 
department and had joint union/management roles as championing workplace 
representation, equality and partnership working. This arrangement was described by 
the RO who had inherited the situation: 
This was a partnership between senior Unison representatives and senior 
management that was not based on equal power but on how a clique of 
people on both sides came to a mutual win/win situation regardless of the 
impact on the union. I have never experienced a partnership agreement 




One RO confirmed Hymans (1989) identification of extended union bureaucracy by 
proposing that: 
The real union bureaucrat is the Branch Secretary who gets wrapped up 
with management in a cosy relationship. For me partnership agreements 
inhibit our organising work and this is not grasped by our (Unison) 
management. 
RO3 
The Regional Manager confirmed this partnership agreement enabling this 
problematic, incestuous relationship was made with the full knowledge of Unison 
regional management. This experience demonstrated a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of developments in and implications for contemporary industrial 
relations. The nature of recognition agreements and their connection to organising 
work seemed absent from consideration at reginal and national management levels.  
This issue exemplifies the importance of discussion within Unison teams on 
contemporary industrial issues. On partnership agreements the evidence indicated a 
tendency noted by Upchurch et al. (2012) for some lay activists to be seduced into 
internal meetings with employers, disengaging from the membership in the process: 
The Reps can get sucked into thinking that what being a trade union rep is 
about is going along to all these partnership forums and getting all these 
important papers from management, sometimes under non-disclosure 
terms. They can get into ‘we are all in this together mode’ managing the 
organisation. The union role is partly to manage the employee relations but 
we are there primarily to represent the members. Educate, agitate and 
organise, which predates, and will exist long after partnership agreements. 
We have to get back to talking to members about their issues and not just 
meeting with management on their issues. 
 RO2 
A healthy scepticism was displayed towards partnership by most long serving ROs. 
When difficult or conflicting decisions and positions are taken tensions with employers 
still emerged regardless of partnership agreements. However the view that, given 




The union is becoming less relevant because of declining density levels and 
one of the major issues for us in local government is the fact that we only 
survive in some places because of employer largesse. We have density 
levels that range from 20 to 40% but we still have recognition, we still have 
bargaining rights and the dangers we face for the next five years is that 
some employers may decide that we are no longer representative of the 
workforce and therefore why waste our time talking to us. 
NM1  
This admission that, despite national strategies, the workplace legitimacy of Unison 
has weakened during a period when workplace issues abound from pay levels, pension 
and retirement changes to job cuts and insecurity, all exacerbated by the austerity 
policies of the coalition government, is recognition of strategic failure.  
The research also identified the increasing risk to union organisation of the actions of 
Unison staff inexperienced in industrial relations. An AO, with no previous industrial 
relations experience (but now an RO) informed hospital staff of their impending 
redundancy on the basis of management confirming the need to make departmental 
savings. The purpose of the revelation was to motivate, or scare, staff into joining 
Unison as his account illustrates:  
Only last week I went in to a large hospital where there is to be job losses 
due to financial cuts. We called an emergency members meeting in one 
department and then afterwards the Branch Secretary phones in a flap 
because the Human Resources Director is alleging I have been going 
around telling people they are going to be made redundant and yes I am 
saying that. The employer is getting wound up because they don’t want to 
pay redundancy. So I am agitating getting people organised and the 
employer is getting very cross about it. 
AO4 
Paid staff of Unison engaged in scaremongering prior to any announcements would 
probably not reflect well on the union both in terms of relations with members and the 
employer. Nevertheless what is of greater concern is that there is no recognition of the 
faux pas committed.  
Unison national organising strategy is a recruitment strategy disconnected from 
members workplace priorities. Furthermore dealing with workplace issues is 
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undertaken within individual branches without the room for consideration of broader 
issues with implications beyond the specific branch. The work of individual ROs are 
disconnected from each other within the region, the national union and in some 
instances the branch, given the priority to manage facility time and recruitment 
activity. There has been a failure to link the nature of workplace industrial relations to 
organising work. Some of the newer organising staff are significantly inexperienced in 
industrial relations questioning union legitimacy to employers and the risk of losing 
confidence and support of local representatives and members. The demographic 
profile of ROs in Unison ‘A’ Region only heightens these concerns. The critical incident 
below both reinforces these findings and confirms these issues are not limited to ‘A’ 
Region but are symptoms of wider concern for Unison. 
‘A’ Region is the location for a national industrial responsibility relating to a public 
sector supply chain service. In 2006 this service, (PSSC), was outsourced to a well-
known private sector European distribution company anonymised here as EDC. The 
national committee for EDC is located in A-region with representatives from several 
other Unison regions participating enabling some comparison and assessment as to 
the commonality of issues raised in the research in Unison more broadly. In addition 
EDC presents an opportunity for broader assessment of national strategy beyond a 
specific region. The EDC national lay negotiating committee agreed to undertake a 
focus group discussion on their experience pre and post privatisation and the effect of 
Unisons organising strategy on their work for Unison members. 
Critical Incident 1 European Distribution Company (EDC) 
Background 
EDC was awarded a ten year contract to supply a wide range of goods from basic 
foodstuffs to sophisticated medical equipment to the NHS. The transfer was not 
without controversy with a New Labour government privatising jobs in the NHS 
affecting members of the largest public sector union in the UK, itself a Labour Party 
affiliate. Through this affiliation the local union branches within PSSC, located at sites 
across five Unison regions in England, combined to lobby local Labour MPs leading to a 
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number of meetings with ministers in the Department of Health. In internal Unison 
notes it is recorded that the lay representatives supported by their national FTO (an RO 
in ‘A’ Region) raised a number of concerns including the lack of transparency in 
decision making. The National Organising and Recruitment (NORS) strategy was in 
place as the campaign to oppose this privatisation gathered momentum.  
The campaign involved union members as well as lay representatives, supported by 
respective ROs for the workplace sites, the National Office Health team, and the 
National legal team and utilised the affiliated political fund structures within Unison. 
Although the campaign had involvement across the union, the NORS was not 
considered when devising strategy, developing the campaign and determining 
objectives.  
Following the confirmation of the decision to outsource to EDC, Unison members 
voted in favour of strike action. Issues which emerged around the strike ballot 
highlighted the constraints in which trade unions continue to operate in the UK. The 
revised statutory definition of a trade dispute was to make problematic the principle of 
opposing privatisation. Whilst the service was historically part of the NHS, and there 
was sympathy from other Unison members, support was limited to cash donations 
with secondary or solidarity actions ruled out by employment law. As confirmed by the 
current Unison representative group on the joint national negotiating and consultation 
committee (NJCF) of EDC the objection to the transfer was primarily threefold; concern 
for future terms and conditions, job security and significantly the change from public 
servant to worker for a private sector organisation: “Life in the NHS was not perfect by 
any means but we had some security and we identified strongly with the NHS” (NA4). 
The subsequent transfer provides some evidence to support, with qualification, the 
notion of union renewal through decentralisation of public services. It also illustrates 
the irrelevance of Unison’s national organising strategy even where national units of 





From the NHS to EDC  
Industrial relations issues in PSSC prior to transfer manifested mainly in large numbers 
of disciplinary cases as part of attempts by PSSC management to assert their 
prerogative over the workforce: 
We had a lot of disciplinary cases in the NHS mainly around sickness 
absence. There was often conflict with the General Managers who were in 
charge of each site. We won a number of cases at Employment Tribunal, 
including reinstatements which we know are rare. This had the effect of 
many cases being settled.  
NA2  
On the collective front, while part of the NHS, local negotiations on pay and other 
terms and conditions of employment, did not arise as the members were part of the 
much broader constituency of NHS workers covered by the NHS ancillary staffs 
bargaining mechanisms; ‘we were part of a Whitley Council and did not get involved in 
negotiations over our pay’ (NA3). In terms of pay offers ‘we were part of the general 
pay ballot for the NHS’ (NA4).  
Union representatives at PSSC did get involved in some negotiations around terms and 
conditions at a local level but these were limited in scope and eventually removed with 
the implementation of the NHS ‘Agenda for Change’ which replaced the Whitley 
council system with a unified NHS Staff Council: 
We were all on NHS pay rates but we had some local agreements around 
overtime and such when asked in at the last minute, this all went with 
Agenda for Change. 
NA4 
There was however a mechanism for workplace consultations but this was limited in 
scope: ‘We had a national committee covering the warehouses. The agenda for 
meetings was about reorganisation as the small warehouses were consolidated into 
larger sites’ (NA2). 
In discussion on the subsequent transfer to EDC it was interesting to note the 
dynamics between those who had been involved in the consultations around the 
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transfer and those who became members of the NJCF post transfer but at the time 
were not union office holders. There were differences in perspective and how effective 
were the adoption of oppositional tactics. Those who had been involved in 
negotiations found themselves having to defend some of the decisions taken and their 
timing. These matters emphasise the importance of experienced industrial support for 
members at times of significant conflict and threats to job security. The lack of 
relevance of Unison national organising strategy at these times is evident.  
PSSC lay representatives raised the profile of the proposed privatisation within Unison, 
with politicians and in national media outlets. A number of meetings were held with 
ministers at the Department of Health, initially a junior Health Minister, Jane Kennedy, 
then later two secretaries of state, Patricia Hewitt and Andy Burnham, with the latter 
supportive to the concerns of Unison representatives. The decision to transfer was 
signed off by Patricia Hewitt with Andy Burnham inheriting responsibility for 
implementation, ‘Hewitt signed off the deal. We then had meetings with Burnham 
were we got some concessions around no two tier workforce etc.’ (NA2) and: 
We also got concession from Andy Burnham that NHS Trusts would be 
expected to use us and not seek alternatives as this was a real concern. 
There was a demonstration at the Unison conference in Liverpool from our 
depot and a fringe meeting about the future employment by EDC. 
NA5 
In addition the question of this privatisation was taken to the Labour Party conference: 
 . . . which forced a statement from Tony Blair to commit to protect us from 
what EDC had wanted to do to staffing which included the use of zero 
hours contracts. 
NA2 
Although achieving these concessions the decision was taken to hold a strike ballot 
across PSSC which produced a ‘yes’ vote in protest at the decision to transfer 
employment to EDC. Strike days were held across PSSC but failed to persuade the 
government to change its stance. The timing of the strike caused some frustration 
among some activists: 
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Many members wanted to do the action when it was announced in 2004 




Our members thought that Unison had turned their backs on our 
membership because we wanted to go out earlier and send a message to 
the government. 
NA5 
This view was expressed in the knowledge that Unison was following the alternative 
strategy of applying for a judicial review of the decision to outsource PSSC. As it 
happened ‘the judicial review was withdrawn due to issues around the legality of the 
application’ (NA2). One activist summed up the feelings by stating that ‘industrial 
action was a token gesture as it had already been sold off’ (NA1).  
Nevertheless the industrial action was broadly supported across PSSC illustrated by an 
overall increase in membership despite some existing members resigning from the 
union. These resignations inevitably caused some animosity, and given the industrial 
action failed to prevent the transfer, some negativity among activists. However 
commitments on job security, TUPE protections and guarantees around zero hour’s 
contracts acknowledged the significant influence of the union on the process. As one 
lay representative explained, ‘there was good press coverage at the time and we got 
commitment from (EDC) that they would not close any depot’ (NA2). With the decision 
to take industrial action, a message was sent to the new employer, EDC, as one activist 
explained: ‘It was a very strong message to our new employer that our members are 
prepared to put up if necessary’ (NA3).  
Early days post-transfer were not without their problems due to management failings 
and a belief held by some managers that the transfer to the private sector would 




I think after we were transferred some managers tried to stamp their 
authority over us in that they were from EDC by the ever increasing use of 
disciplinary procedures and bullying. However we constantly challenged 
these decisions through the procedure and our efforts eventually led to a 
greater reluctance to undertake disciplinary procedures. They have now 
backed off and it is rare to get vindictive bullying cases now if it’s a 
disciplinary there is a genuine reason. 
NA6 
This view was supported by other representatives who now acknowledged that in fact 
‘since EDC became the employer the disciplinary cases have gone down’ (NA2). This 
was seen to in part be due to Unison representations: 
We have complained about training for managers in the past, they are now 
being better supported and they don’t go onto disciplinary procedures 
without being prepared, so there are fewer cases. 
NA4 
It was not only in relation to procedural matters where the Unison representatives 
have been able to deliver better working outcomes. Union representatives were now 
directly involved in collective bargaining on pay and other terms and conditions of 
employment.  
With some irony being in the private sector has taken the membership to a degree 
outside of the influence of austerity policies that has resulted in significant real terms 
pay decreases for public sector workers: 
The terms and conditions which were TUPE’d under have not altered and 
in terms of pay we have actually done far better than if we were still in the 
NHS, as the public sector pay freeze would have hit us. So that’s to the 
credit of this committee that we have involved members in the pay claims 
and the threat of industrial action has helped deliver pay settlements 
which were acceptable, although we are still behind were we would like to 
be. 
NA3 
These key issues have been addressed through traditional methods of union organising 
regardless of organising strategy. In doing so Unison has recognised the achievements 
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of the ‘A’ Region located branch in EDC with it being identified in the JABO process as 
the best organised branch in the region.  
Traditional trade union issues around job security and protection of terms and 
conditions had, through established industrial relations processes, delivered significant 
protections for members, building union organisation and collective strength at the 
workplace. The important role of experienced ROs was acknowledged and that 
experience coupled with that of the lay committee was to stand union organisation in 
good stead post privatisation. Consequently union strategy which downplays such 
importance by recruiting staff without industrial experience and focusing on 
recruitment at the expense of important industrial issues is questionable. 
The transfer to EDC saw the enhancement of the role of union representatives with a 
new collective agreement establishing the NJCF with terms of reference that included 
negotiations on all pay and terms and conditions of employment, in addition to 
consultations on business performance and human resource policies: ‘the NJCF with 
EDC has broadened, we are a bigger group and we now negotiate our own pay and are 
consulted more regularly’ (NA4).   
Union organising at EDC 
The transfer to the private sector and the consequences for bringing key bargaining 
issues closer to the union representatives and union members at PSSC suggests 
evidence to support the proposition that decentralisation of decision making and 
collective bargaining can lead to union renewal as proposed by Fairbrother (1989, 
1996) and others. It was the view of the Unison representatives at EDC that union 
organisation had improved and their own abilities and competencies as union 
representatives had been enhanced. One newer representative stated that ‘personally 
I think union organisation has improved’ (NA6). A view endorsed by others (NA3): 
I think it has improved as we have got more experience at negotiating and 
dealing with issues such as pay, redundancies and industrial action. We 
have had good support from our Regional Organisers over the years but 




This appreciation of RO support is contrasted with the national objectives and 
strategies of the union: 
Our workplace branches always have had good involvement from members 
and support from Regional Organisers. There are national strategies and 
regional strategies but they don’t do anything to assist. 
NA2 
Given the major issues this group of Unison representatives have faced their view of 
Unison’s organising strategy should be a cause of concern. The strategy had no 
relevance to workplace issues but was seen to be impinging on support in addressing 
those issues: 
Don’t you think the strategy or strategies have one aim only it begins with r 
and that is recruitment? I don’t say that is not important but our issues at 
the workplace become secondary to recruitment. I bring issues up at region 
(not ‘A’ Region) and they don’t seem interested it’s all ‘we will get 
someone along to help you recruit.’ When I want support on particular 
issues which have cropped at a local level I don’t want a conversation 
about recruitment. 
NA1 
Furthermore the consequences of MtOC had created confusion: 
I do find that we now have staff whether it is Regional Organisers, Area 
Organisers or Local Organisers and it is like a revolving door as they are 
changing all the time. You try to contact them and you are contacting the 
wrong person they have moved on and that’s frustrating. I feel like that 
Unison are looking to recruit bright young things who can sell the union like 
an insurance policy. 
NA4  
What was quite striking in the views expressed by the Unison lay representatives at 
EDC was that although they had been able to significantly influence industrial relations 
outcomes they had not had the opportunity to reflect on their achievements, their 
own development and experience as activists. How they had harnessed different parts 
of Unison, with the assistance of respective ROs, to win concessions and gains for their 
members had not been acknowledged. Furthermore whilst appreciative in the past, 
these activists were increasingly questioning the validity and appropriateness of 
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Unison support. It was that support coupled with a willingness of members to become 
active in defending terms and conditions post privatisation that had enabled Unison to 
maintain its position across the sites of EDC. It should not be underestimated that the 
union faced significant challenge however and decentralisation in itself was not a 
panacea for a renewal of workplace trade unionism. 
Conclusion 
The evidence collated confirms that organising strategy in Unison is perceived by ROs 
and branch lay representatives as limited to recruitment. Whilst such strategy is given 
importance and priority at levels of Unison beyond the branch, at branch level the 
priority remains workplace issues relevant to Unison members. Nevertheless attempts 
at imposing institutional priorities relating to recruitment activity over those of the 
membership prevail. Despite the strategic failure to build union organisation around 
issues of crucial importance for workers, neglecting issue based organising approaches 
in the process, persistence with prioritising recruitment activity in a vacuum suggests 
an organisation in denial. This has implications for the role of the RO and relations with 
different constituent parts of Unison. 
The lack of priority of workplace issues has produced working environments where 
ROs can be isolated, unable to approach such issues consistently, and where 
appropriate, strategically. Furthermore for some ROs the Unison branch becomes the 
source of support and solace. More widely the failure to connect strategy to workplace 
issues results in partnership agreements with employers that have produced relations 
which undermined union organisation, embedded a lay bureaucracy, and removed 
elected representatives’ accountability to union members in the worst traditions of 
business unionism. In contrast experience at EDC post privatisation saw a 
strengthening of the role of the Unison stewards within the EDC national bargaining 
arrangements and an enhancement of Unison influence: achieved through traditional 
organising work and a combination of approaches from industrial militancy to critical 
engagement with the new employer.  
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These differing experiences highlight the problems which face unions when there 
exists a lack of reflective analysis, a disconnection in union work across constituencies, 
both vertical and horizontal and where exclusion of experienced ROs from developing 
industrial relations strategy is commonplace. An understanding of how the nature of 
union recognition agreements shape industrial relations and either facilitates or 
obstructs union building should be a priority for Unison managers, organising staff and 
lay representatives. The tendency for experienced ROs to align with branches has been 
confronted by the latest organising initiatives that in effect attempt to control the 
work of the RO so it becomes more attuned to national and not branch priorities. The 

















Chapter Seven: Managing Organising 
Introduction 
Chapter three confirmed the inherent tendencies within trade unions to develop 
oligarchic forms of leadership from within internal bureaucracy. Such tendencies have 
largely been ignored in analyses of union organising yet have some significance for 
explaining motivations and implementation of union strategy: as are considerations of 
the tensions which emerge from competing and often conflicting internal interests 
including those of representative and represented, the short and long term and 
sectional as opposed to wider union interests. Development of managerial systems 
within unions inevitably raises questions as in whose interests are they designed to 
underpin or assert. The promise of reinvigorating rank and file union participation and 
democracy held out by emphasising grassroots organising strategies has not 
materialised. Yet the persistence in promoting a narrative of union organising 
continues. This may suggest there is an unswerving messianic view or belief that 
eventually such strategy will lead to union renewal. Alternatively such narratives 
produce opportunities for greater assertion of oligarchic interest and control. This 
chapter may offer some support for the former but evidence that managerial control 
of union work has increased as a consequence of organising strategy looks 
overwhelming.  
Unison employs around 1200 staff and claims 1.2 million members (TUC 2014). The 
inevitable plurality of interests which emerge from such constituencies, with often 
competing industrial and political priorities, can create significant organisational 
challenges not least around the efficient use of resources. A degree of managerial 
control and responsibility is inevitable to ensure employer obligations to staff are met. 
This chapter illustrates how such control goes well beyond previous practice with the 
organising strategy used by Unison management to restrict the autonomy and extend 
managerial responsibilities of and to ROs. In this sense the consequence of organising 
strategy is to alter the role of the RO from one of primarily industrial support for union 
branches to that of a manager of branches and new grades of staff. 
147 
 
The chapter refers to expectations of regional support from Unison lay representatives 
and how they sit badly with the evolving role of the Unison RO. Different approaches 
to the FTO role have been characterised as a manager of discontent (Watson 1988) or 
workers’ advocate (Beynon 1975). The findings here confirm contrasting approaches 
prevail and are identified through differing orientations amongst ROs. The previous 
chapter gave insight into the traditional RO approach to union branch support and 
industrial work. This chapter reveals a contrasting view on relations between the 
Unison branch and the RO expressed by Unison management and newer prototype 
Regional Organisers. The former RO type tends to approach union work through the 
demands and issues emerging from the union branches to which they have industrial 
responsibility. Whilst the latter are more directed by Unison management priorities 
and preferred approach to union organising work. Inevitably resistance to the latter 
approach is evident as well as a healthy scepticism as to the merits of a more 
managerial approach. Similar to the experience of MSF (Carter 1991), a commitment 
to building union organisation among traditional FTOs may not fit with the institution’s 
approach to organising work. In contrast, the prototype approach, for entirely 
plausible reasons, such as future career prospects and employment security, are more 
compliant with the institutional approach and are consequently often viewed as ‘good 
organisers’.  
This notion of what is a ‘good organiser’ fits with management expectations for Unison 
RO roles emanating from the objectives in the MtOC strategy. How MtOC has 
impacted on FTO roles, relations with branches and what this means for future branch 
support and RO roles is examined in this chapter. The relevance of the Joint 
Assessment of Branch Organisation (JABO), the link with the regional annual awards 
night and the implications for control of RO work is considered. The attempts to assert 
management control of ROs is illustrated through the second critical incident 
‘Operation Workplace’. Chapter five referred to Unison being a member led union, 
suggesting a ‘bottom up’ approach to organising work. Given that characterisation the 
chapter initially considers views of what lay representatives require by way of regional 
support. Lay representatives in this sense are senior or experienced lay activists who 
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may also hold branch office positions such as Branch Secretary or Branch Chairperson. 
All lay representatives who contributed were involved in the industrial work of the 
union through representing members both on individual and collective bases. 
Union support: Branch expectations  
The following quotation from a branch officer of an apparently well organised large 
Unison branch (5000 plus members) represents a common view of the RO role and 
how that translates into support for Unison branches: 
I think the role of the Regional Organiser varies dependant on who they are 
working with, depending on the experience in the branch e.g. setting up 
new recognition agreements,  negotiating committees, support the branch 
in terms of recruitment and campaigning, advice on complex case all those 
things. I guess now the Regional Organiser supports complex cases; actually 
he does whatever we tell him (laughter): that is not quite true. 
BA2  
The support offered by ROs is dependent on a number of variables and requires some 
flexibility and adaptability on the RO’s part. A good understanding of employment law, 
industrial relations procedures, significant experience of collective bargaining and an 
ability to contribute to recruiting and campaigning work are either implied or 
expressed. Absent from such consideration is an understanding of national organising 
strategies or a need for management of branches. One lay representative summed up 
their branch expectations of the RO role as ‘support, guidance and advice is what we 
need’ (BA12).  
Industrial relations expertise and knowledge of employment law was crucial to the 
method of support for branches through the branch surgery. Held regularly this is a 
dedicated day or session where the RO meets the Branch Secretary, union members 
and workplace representatives to consider current industrial, organisational and 
individual issues This will include giving advice, planning, review of cases and strategy: 
‘I think surgeries held by ROs are brilliant, the expertise available can be used very 
effectively, that is a good facility’ (BA 6). However not all representatives were familiar 
with the surgery facility and doubts were raised of the ability of some ROs to 
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undertake such work. Complaints regarding the availability of support, the nature of 
that support and at times the undermining of their position by the RO were made by 
some: 
I do have problems getting hold of the Regional Organiser. I have to leave 
messages repeatedly. Sometimes they jump in without letting me know 
such as lodging grievances. This undermines me with the employer and 
eventually we fell out over it. 
BA17 
Another representative on a specific workplace issue of crucial importance confirmed a 
common perception expressed that for Unison the priority is recruitment and this 
overrides issues requiring representational support: 
Our branch feels we have had no support from region at the time of the 
TUPE transfer. We were very disappointed and since the privatisation there 
has been some more presence but what they focus on is organising which 
consists of workplace meetings to recruit and not support for us in cases 
and dealings with our new employer. 
BA20 
This tension over conflicting priorities of recruitment and representation 
produce a lack of clarity over roles and compounds relational issues when 
expectations are unclear: 
I am not sure what the role of the Regional Organiser is. By that what I 
mean is I can end up dealing with disputes, consultations and  
redundancies but I am not sure where my boundary is where is the 
demarcation between branch and region. 
BA15 
This confusion over expectation of the RO role and blurred lines of demarcation of 
responsibility extends beyond activists to staff constituencies as confirmed in the 
evidence of administrative staff (AS1): 
Members can phone Region with an issue or for some advice and instead 
of what used to happen where a Regional Organiser would provide that 
advice some now just say refer them to the branch. The problem with that 
is they may have been trying to contact the branch. 
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The introduction of Unison Direct - the 24 hour telephone helpline for members - 
has added to the potential for passing members with issues around the 
organisation instead of responding to the issue or query. Furthermore whilst one 
Regional Manager complained at a staff conference that when a member phones 
Region for advice ‘in the whole building there can be no organising staff 
prepared to take the call’. However, those ROs who are prepared to intervene 
and respond to members are perceived to be ‘not the right type’ (AS1) i.e. the 
approach adopted was more traditional.  
The above evidence contrasts with more positive experiences: ‘Our RO gives us lots of 
support she picks up cases when we cannot deal with them, or are overburdened or in 
private nursing homes’ (BA19). In discussion with a group of representatives at a 
recruitment event one lay representative, again confirming the readiness of some ROs 
to support industrial work valued the input from the RO as ‘sometimes I feel like a 
Sheriff with a badge but no gun’. What is apparent, given the differing tendencies in 
approaching union work, experience and capability, is that the availability and 
suitability of RO support for members and branches is a lottery. These variations would 
have been to a degree addressed in the past through team discussion of industrial 
issues but, as the previous chapter confirmed, those discussions no longer occur. 
Full time officer orientations: ‘traditional ‘and ‘prototype’ approaches 
This absence of communication on matters of industrial importance coupled with 
contrasting approaches from ROs to industrial work explains the increasingly wide 
variance in support for Unison branches. The contrasting tendencies to union work by 
ROs emphasising ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ priorities exacerbated existing differences 
in style and approach to such work. As with lay representatives, high level advice on 
matters of employment law and representation is seen as of paramount importance by 
traditional ROs as typified by the following descriptions: 
. . . the key responsibilities is still the traditional stuff which varies from 
branch  to branch; there is still the expectation from branches that you will 
be available to give high level advice on negotiations and employment law 
situations. Most branches still expect you to become directly involved in 
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high level negotiations and perhaps leading on them. The amount of case 
work you do varies enormously depending on the branch in terms of 
activist experience and ability. 
RO2 
And:  
. . . for me it is working at the coalface with branches; developing activists; 
dealing with the employers; that is where we have gained by bringing 
people on getting them trained up and getting them aware of their 
responsibilities as union representatives. The members still need advice 
and representation and sometimes there are occasions when we have to 
step in and deal with this. My priorities tend to be dictated by what’s on 
my desk, high level case work, and getting claims to the Employment 
Tribunal at the last minute will take priority. 
RO5 
The emphasis here is on how support given to the branch stems from the needs of 
members and lay representatives, consistent with the ‘bottom up’ approach espoused. 
In contrast the following observation of a prototype RO (RO8) views the role as that of 
a manager as reflected in the terminology utilised: 
The Regional Organiser is the key support for the branch. The role is to 
ensure they are running smoothly, to get systems in place so the branch 
can stand independently and is well organised and to support by meeting 
weekly with the Branch Secretary. If they have staff in the branch helping 
manage staff properly so that the resource is used efficiently…….. My main 
contact is with the Branch Secretary. I also make sure there are good office 
systems in place and more generally good management of the Branch 
office. This includes recruitment support and a representative database so 
cases, training, and facility time reports are easily available. It is important 
that the branch knows what cases are live. Once all the systems are in 
place then eventually the Regional Organiser can step back and 
concentrate on other things. 
Whilst there remains the emphasis on the RO as essentially a supporting role for 
branches, the nature of that support is more around administrative systems and 
general office management. A discourse of efficient use of resources exemplifies 
the thinking of the prototype RO. It is not based on the need for expertise in 
matters of industrial relations, employment law and associated issues. Nor is 
there any requirement to undertake representation or similar industrial work. 
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‘Management speak’ about systems and resources have been alien to union 
branches and are not within common narratives of union work among the 
traditional ROs. Yet this perception of the RO role reflects an emerging view 
typical of prototypical ROs and underpinned by Unison management thinking at 
National and Regional levels. ROs should no longer provide a ‘hands on’ 
industrial relations role but instead manage branches to meet recruitment 
targets. Respective examples were: 
I think the key responsibilities is that the RO says what do we need to do 
with this particular branch given all the circumstances, what do they need 
to become stronger as a branch, better at recruiting, more systematic in 
recruiting and how the branch is organised, it is the RO who needs to lead 
that work. 
NM2  
I think the new role of the Regional Organiser is one of management. They 
are expected to manage a patch. The distinction has to be drawn from 
going in to a workplace, doing lots of casework and leading odd pockets of 
successful negotiations.  Their job is to manage four or five branches trying 
to make sure that organising and organisation is improving. So they are 
getting more members and more stewards.  My monthly one to ones with 
Regional Organisers is about how we turn branches to meet their 
recruitment targets. It is not just about recruitment activity if a branch is 
good at individual representation and is campaigning on issues then it will 
grow. 
RM3 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of representation, the union objective is 
dominated by the need ‘to grow’. The type of RO required is one who not only 
supports branches in attaining targets but does so through a specific managerial 
approach. A management bias against the traditional approach to RO work was 
evident. One Regional Manager in interview voluntarily identified who were seen to be 
the good organisers in the Region all of whom were more recent recruits to organising 
grades and could be categorised as prototypical in their approach to RO work. This 
contrasted with views expressed by lay representatives who, in referring to good 
organisers, voluntarily identified those who had a more traditional approach. The 
different management perceptions of worth are determined by the extent to which 
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ROs accept or identify with the perceived institutional interest of the union to 
concentrate on recruitment and increased membership. The shift from workers’ 
advocate towards a managerial role was engineered through the introduction of the 
Meeting the Organising Challenge (MtOC). 
Changing the full time officer role: reinforcing the bureaucracy 
As indicated above, MtOC introduced below ROs, new layers of full time staff with 
branch organising/recruitment roles. The gradual implementation of MtOC within ‘A’ 
Region elicited mixed views among ROs with some welcoming aspects of their 
changing role but also identifying consequential concerns. Working with other grades 
was viewed positively and for some ended an isolationist way of working: 
MtOC has changed the Regional Organiser role. Traditionally I looked after 
branches on my own like a lone ranger approach; it is quite hard work and 
stressful . . . now there have been teams established and different grades 
contributing to the organising work . . . we have to take charge of some of 
the staff so are less hands on with branches and more directing traffic, 
however there are less of us as well which is a shame. 
RO3 
Some ROs were now managing small teams of staff consisting of a Local and Area 
Organiser. The LO role was limited to matters of supporting branches in recruitment 
activity while the AO in addition to recruitment work was expected to undertake low 
level casework and support branches in dealings with employers. Branches themselves 
had not expressed a requirement for such level of representational support. Given ROs 
were expected to be more managerial with wider remits; a void appeared in terms of 
Unison’s ability to support members in high level casework. It was expected that more 
lay representatives would step into this void.  
The more managerial approach to branches inevitably changes the relationship 
between branch and region from being based on mutual agreement on work priorities 
to attempted regional control of the branch. The senior management view, again 
revealing a bias against the traditional RO was: 
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We are going through a transition period at the moment and that’s the 
problem because prior to the AO and LO appointments the role of Regional 
Organiser has changed. They used to be Regional Officers but the title 
change is significant. I suspect some of the older ones would not be happy 
with the change but the younger ones, newer organisers are much more 
willing to take up the new role. 
NM1 
A reluctance to embrace the managerial aspects of MtOC and assert themselves as 
managers of union branches was indeed present:  
I think being a union organiser is about working with people and I think it’s 
unfortunate that we use terminology like we are managing branches and 
we are managers that should not be what we are about. I think 
undoubtedly we are becoming more like managers as Unison has set itself 
down this path of delegating responsibilities . . .  Regional Organisers are to 
be managers of staff and branches. It alters the relations with branches. I 
am not sure this is the right way. 
RO5 
These sentiments did find support at a senior level in Unison which only adds to an 
increasing sense of confusion in role expectations for the new type RO: 
I don’t think Regional Organisers should be expected to manage lay 
activists. I use the term supervise because management has too many 
connotations and local activists are volunteers, we do not have any 
management say over them. What we as full time staff are trying to do is 
coax more out of lay activists, trying to get more people to be active and 
not just passive members, and that’s not management. I do think that as 
soon as you start throwing in the word management I think it pisses off a 
lot of ROs because they did not come into the union to be managers they 
came in to be representatives of members having formally probably been 
activists themselves.  
NM2 
However, whether as managers or supervisors, a significant element of control is 
expected. Ultimately the changes envisaged in the RO role by Unison management 
have produced a degree of scepticism and suggests an inherent resistance to change 
given the inevitabilities and realities of demands placed on ROs at branch level: 
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I don’t think the key responsibilities of the Regional Organiser have 
changed. The intention is to change the role but I fundamentally believe 
the role of the RO is to support the lay activists within branch structures, 
through advice, training or whatever and to help them to organise. I don’t 
see that is changing very much; being a lead, a focal point for advice, lead 
negotiator with employers I think that is fairly crucial. However I think 
these parts of the role are not what is expected from the organisation.  I 
think it’s what branches expect . . . I think now there is a real disparity 
between what the activist want from their RO and what the organisation 
wants to be doing. I think they (the national union) have broken away. 
RO4  
The suggestion here is that the RO will increasingly become at loggerheads with either 
the union branch, in the case of the prototypical approach, or union management, if 
the traditional type. The consequence of national union strategy both erodes 
traditional industrial support to branches whilst introducing a new level of support 
which branches do not necessarily require. For ROs the conflicting expectations of 
their role is exacerbated by increasingly demanding workloads due to new 
management responsibility and expanding the number of branches to cover as one 
traditional RO (RO1) explained: 
I think that if you are to be on top of your game doing negotiations and 
representation it is very hard then to do the other bits as well. That’s 
where the potential for confusion in the role arises because there is a lot of 
work involved in negotiating with employers and being on top of situations. 
So the management type role becomes a distraction especially when there 
are more branches to support. 
Another traditional RO compared MtOC staffing structures with social work and 
teaching where front line staff found themselves managing support staff reducing time 
for their central function, “I think there is a danger it is mirroring assistants in teaching 
and social work and that it won’t work” (RO5). Furthermore the changing nature of 
management support in Unison was seen as detrimental to the industrial work of the 
union that no longer held prime importance: 
I would say that management has changed, you see less of them . . . you 
had more direct contact with your manager about what was going on in 
the workplace. Now it is more bureaucratic, administrative, one to ones 
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and targets that sort of thing. They don’t look to . . . get involved in our 
work with branches. 
RO4 
The lack of support for ROs industrial work was evident regardless of characterisation. 
A prototypical RO, in acknowledging that the reality of dealing with branches still 
produced requirements for industrial support contrasting with Unison management 
expectations, expressed concern about the lack of support from a manager totally 
focused on ‘organising/recruitment’: 
The new manager wanted to look purely at an organising agenda, but it 
was frustrating when you wanted advice on cases and the response was go 
to the solicitors, give them a call, but they have no experience in dealing 
directly in the workplace. 
RO8 
The problems of support for branches with ‘rookie’ ROs are compounded with similar 
inexperience among management which at one level is consistent with the 
downgrading of representation and other industrial work by Unison managers. Unison 
manager’s positive perception of prototypical ROs will inevitably lead to the 
colonisation of Unison staffing structures at all levels with individuals without 
experience and/or regard for the importance of Unison’s industrial work. The decline 
in industrial expertise can only result in reduced standards of representation at all 
levels within Unison. The consequences for retention of existing and new members are 
apparent in the suggestion that referral to the Union solicitors: the proposed solution 
negates the benefit of representation and offers no more to workers than any other 
legal service.   
To compound the difficulties emerging from MtOC, Regional Management claims that 
the MtOC structure was responding to a reduction in workplace union representatives 
was a failure to acknowledge the mismatch in resource identification with Unison 
member’s workplace demands of their union: 
. . . if we have not got lay people on the ground doing the organising, and 
by that I mean talking to members and non-members, listening to what 
their issues are, feeding that back, helping to identify potential reps, 
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recruiting them, getting them on the training courses, if we did not have 
staff doing that we would be in an even worse position than currently as 
our activist base has been shrinking. 
RM2 
Approaching two decades of claiming to be an organising union, this admission of a 
serious absence of representatives suggests such claims are dubious at best: the reality 
is one of strategic failure to build union workplace organisation. Moreover, additional 
staff resources may address recruitment work or institutional priorities but fail to 
address the representational demands from union members. More staff in branch 
support roles raised issues of appropriate staffing structures and skill mix: 
. . . there are less ROs but more organising staff in terms of AO and LOs. We 
are converting administrative posts and we are not replacing ROs. You 
can’t do that forever we have to have a baseline of RO staff but we don’t 
know what that is. 
RM1 
One lay representative had significant dealings with AO and LO staff and welcomed the 
increase in regional staff support for branches. However this response was on an 
assumption of such regional staff undertaking representational work within the private 
and voluntary sector, a problem area for the branch given the absence of facility time 
for representing members outside of the branch core employer: 
MtOC it is about getting more staff into supporting organising and changing 
the RO role. I could see how the benefits of LO and AO may fill the gaps in 
the branch. I can see the potential for problems but I think it is good 
overall. It’s about skill mix and support for the branch; an LO doing say 
email distribution lists; an AO doing Private and Voluntary sector 
representations.  
BA1 
This positive view of MtOC was based on the premise that the representational work in 
the private and voluntary sectors was something envisaged by Unison management as 
appropriate mainstream organising work but it was not management’s conception of 
what organising work entailed (see RM2 quote above). Another lay representative 
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appreciated the increased support from region in terms of contributing to a local 
campaign: 
What has been going on in our workplace is we have been having a real 
battle with a nasty Tory council and we have had two people assigned to 
our branch from Region and they have been brilliant. They are doing a 
great job and the general consensus is very positive.  
BA4 
The ability of Unison to provide this support was linked to a strategy of reducing 
individual labour costs so as to employ more staff in the field: 
I think MtOC is ok but for some others I know they think it is a bag of shit 
which has not worked. I am not without sympathy for that point of view. I 
think we have created some lower paid jobs which are about getting into 
workplaces and I think that is a good thing. . .  I think the RM job is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant or should be if MTOC worked. So you have 
got a chance to employ more people being in the workplace. I like that. I 
think it is a good thing the more people we employ the more chance we 
have of building the union. 
RM3 
Building union organisation requires more staff paid to do ‘organising work’ but this is 
distinct from representation and negotiations. What is evident is that organising work 
continues to be understood differently both in Unison management and among ROs. 
Given this tension there has been a gradual process of attempting to define what basic 
organising work should be and encouraging organising staff to promote such work as a 
priority within branches. Organising work became defined in the Joint Assessment of 
Branch Organisation (JABO) which although aimed at directing branch objectives and 
priorities by implication increased control of RO work as confirmed by a member of 
Regional Management 
The Joint Assessment of Branch Organisation in practice 
JABO required the RO and the Branch Secretary/Executive to agree objectives for the 
coming year for purposes of improving branch organisation (Unison 2010). Those 
objectives were to be monitored through ongoing review between the RO and the 
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branch. For Regional Management JABO was essential to building union organisation 
through focusing on a range of clearly defined organising objectives: 
JABO: I think it has helped us enormously to refocus what we do and the 
things that matter. I don’t think it was particularly clear before when 
people joined the union and later became stewards. It was a bit like the RO 
role in that you were appointed given a patch and left to get on with it. The 
RO would approach the job based on their own whim and fancy and that is 
how we approached branch organisation as well in that branches were left 
to get on with it. 
RM2  
And: 
I think the JABO has brought us from a low base to a medium base. It has 
brought us on a notch. It has been key to be honest. When I was a Branch 
Secretary nobody told me what to do and if I had been given these goals I 
think it would have made things easier; that bit of guidance helps. For 
organising staff and speaking as a manager we just let them get on with it; 
but now everybody knows that at some point they have to do the JABO.  
RM1 
The view that ROs previously had a level of control over what they decided to do at 
work is not supported by either ROs or Unison branches. Nevertheless it is a view 
genuinely held and consistent with previously mentioned negative perceptions of 
union FTOs within the narrative that they were culpable to a degree for the decline in 
trade unionism. The reference to a previous role as Branch Secretary does not 
acknowledge the demands placed on that position by members and suggests that 
Unison Branch Secretaries are somehow awaiting instruction on how to undertake 
their work. What is revealing is that the objective, to give greater control to Regional 
Management over the work of the RO, was not stated openly in the JABO process. This 
view is reinforced by a second member of the RMT: 
Some organisers did things one way, some didn’t, some did things quite 
different and so I think JABO helped us focus on the basic things people 




Despite the prevalent view of management that Unison ROs were left to get on with 
what they wanted to do, no evidence to support this view emerged. Unison branches 
did complain about regional support when it was framed through the prism of 
recruitment objectives and not their own representational priorities. Nevertheless if 
ROs ploughed their own furrow then the introduction of JABO would go some way to 
introducing uniformity in approach albeit on terms preferred by Regional Management 
given JABO emphasises specific objectives for branches and ROs signed off by the RMT.  
Although it focused the work of ROs some acknowledged the benefits of the JABO 
process: ‘it’s positive in the sense that it is useful to have some clear objectives around 
recruitment and communication’ (RO11) and ‘JABO can portray what an organised 
branch should look like’ (RO3). Further endorsement is offered with ‘JABO I personally 
feel in some areas it has helped improve how some branches function’ (RO6). These 
endorsements of the process focus purely on the potential outcome for branch 
organisation.  An alternative view of JABO expressed by other ROs is less than 
complimentary and includes some scathing critique: 
JABO I think it’s a farce. I think it measures the wrong things. It tries to hold 
branches to account when we have not got any sanctions anyway. I don’t 
think it focuses on what the members see as important. Some branches are 
actively looking at not participating in the future and these are well 
organised branches; partly because they do not see that Region is a two 
way assessment. It is a one way assessment all on the branch. . .  I think 
equally this links to how the organisation is very much top down, where 
instructions are handed down and we are not left to interpret and 
implement things in the best way as we see it. 
RO4  
Another RO underlined the importance of good representation as crucial to any 
organising strategy, yet this was absent from the JABO process: 
I think we can’t overlook how well we represent people as being a 
barometer to how good the union is. If we save someone’s job in a 
workplace that is something which is noticed not just by the member but 
by the employer, who might think twice about how they do things in the 
future, and by the wider membership. So we cannot overlook 
representation in a retention strategy. If the report back about us is that 
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we are useless when it comes to the crunch that’s going to have a very 
negative impact and therefore spending time properly representing people 
should be part of any organising strategy and it should not be seen simply 
as servicing. 
RO1 
This concern of relegating the key function of representation to a secondary status in 
union work has not gone unnoticed with lay representatives: ‘I also get the impression 
that casework is not a priority at region, it is very much about recruitment; although 
they couch it as organising’ (BA3). JABO over- emphasised recruitment, which was 
identified as organising, and representation of members was not a priority seemed to 
be the growing perception. Attempts at top down direction which assessed the wrong 
indicators and excluded consideration of representational work were significant 
critiques. For others whilst JABO covered the relevant indicators, the process was 
viewed as either unnecessary or a tick-box exercise: 
For me it is another form the management have asked me to fill in, my 
branches tend to meet all the objectives in JABO because we focus on 
traditional trade union work and having a good reputation for 
representation in the workplace. 
RO7 
It is just a ticking the box exercise which I try to get it on the branch agenda 
so everybody is aware of what’s going on and required. 
RO9 
The differing opinion of ROs was reflected by lay representatives. Some lay 
representatives saw some benefit in the process: 
I have found it useful to sit down with my Regional Organiser and review 
how well we have done and what we need to do next year as a Branch. 
 BA 14  
Others had mixed opinion from how to improve the process to outright concerns:  
JABO is a tool. I don’t think it should be used in isolation. If used properly it 
does break down a lot of the key elements of our work. We in our branch 
don’t think it goes far enough. We went further and introduced mentorship 
of stewards linked to the duty of care a branch has to their stewards. We 
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developed a risk assessment for each steward, about how much casework 
capacity they had to deal with, what facility time was needed, relations 
with managers, and these sorts of things. 
BA1 
This branch embraced the management approach and built on what was viewed as a 
helpful process by acknowledging the importance of representation. However this 
view was in a minority with some branches expressing outright condemnation: 
I am not comfortable with the union setting the branch targets and in 
effect putting us up in competition against each other; that is why we don’t 
have much to do with it. 
BA 18 
it reminds me of New Labour target setting in the public sector, it is not 
about representing people, it’s about following a sheet of paper which tells 
you what you should be doing regardless of what your members want. It’s 
wrong it’s not about why we should organise. 
 BA12 
I feel it distracts from doing the job of representing members to the best of 
our ability. 
BA 19 
Other branches as indicated earlier bemoaned the lack of reciprocal assessment of the 
Region, ‘I think what would be good is if the branches were interviewed about how 
well the region have supported the branch’ (BA15). In addition the focus of JABO was 
predominantly about recruitment levels into the union and not trying to organise in 
the face of restructure and outsourcing of public services:  
Recently I tried to get something going on a schools forum given all the 
changes that are happening. I went to see a Regional Manager about this 
and his reaction was you are doing alright as a branch, you are recruiting 
and that seemed the only focus. It does not matter what I want to do, the 
response is always,well everything seems alright your recruitment figures 
are going up. Actually we could be doing a damn sight better if he stopped 





A similar complaint was echoed by an NHS activist: 
I am familiar with the requirements of JABO and what it entails. I have my 
JABO assessment with the Regional Organiser. It seems to be more about 
recruitment as opposed to how the branch is run. I struggle because I have 
a full time job in the NHS and little things in which I could do with help I 
don’t get. All it is concentrating on how many people the branch has 
recruited rather than how well we actually represent members. If we 
represent members well then our reputation gets better and people will 
join the union. 
BA 17 
Others expressed similar views criticising the emphasis on recruitment at the expense 
of how effective the union is in the workplace: ‘JABO seems more focused on how 
many members we recruit rather than how the branch performs in its dealings with 
our employer’ (BA19). The target setting suggests a process of monitoring and review 
in light of subsequent experience but as another RO confirms most targets are ignored 
with the exception of recruitment reinforcing the concern of lay representatives: 
These assessments into objectives are there at the time of the annual 
review, but only one is observed during the year and at team meetings and 
that is recruitment.  Which branch is doing what: it is a bit of a farce. You 
have to identify three objectives for the upcoming year, it is all tick box 
stuff it needs to be managed if it is serious but it’s just another 
bureaucratic exercise set up by the management. 
RO8 
The legitimacy of the JABO process is questioned by a majority of ROs and lay 
representatives. It also presents a major piece of bureaucratic work for administrative 
staff who also question its validity in the process: 
We have to arrange dozens of JABO meetings which is not always easy 
given constraints on availability and for what purpose is for me unclear it 
seems a waste of everyone’s time. If it was scrapped it would make no 
difference to the union. 
AS1 
One supportive comment of JABO unwittingly confirms the prototypical ROs approach 
to JABO, supported by the RMT: ‘Branches were left to get on with it for too long and 
now we have to go in and tell them what to do’ (AO6).  This managerialism does not sit 
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comfortably with ideas of grassroots issue based organising and confirms the view 
abroad that institutional control of organising staff and union branches is the real 
objective of JABO. This attempt at control is demonstrated graphically at the annual 
awards night and it is to this annual event that opinion was also sought. 
Branch Awards 
The setting of recruitment targets has inevitably produced league tables with branches 
in ‘A’ Region categorised into three groups based on the level of recruitment of 
members: branches that were growing; holding their own; and losing members (in 
effect failing branches). These categorisations, together with recruitment data for all 
branches, are circulated monthly across the Region. Determined purely by recruitment 
figures, categorisation ignores the difficult circumstances branches may face with state 
austerity policies producing large scale redundancies, service reorganisation and 
outsourcing: alternatively high levels of existing membership density limits recruitment 
opportunities. 
Recruitment figures were the main factor used by the Regional Manager and 
Committee Chair to recommend Branches within the service group for nomination for 
awards to the Regional MORE (Member, Organisation, Recruitment and Education) 
committee. The winners were announced at the annual awards night. All branches in 
the Region are invited to attend this event joining the RMT, members of the MORE 
committee and staff who had worked with the nominated branches. The awards are 
presented by union dignitaries and have included the Union President and General 
Secretary. 
Branch awards were viewed by some with disdain while others saw an opportunity for 
a social get together. For management (RM3) the awards night is an opportunity for 
communicating best practice and highlighting success: 
I like the awards they celebrate peoples success, they give us the chance to 
point out what is success. There may be better ways of doing that but until 




Another Regional Manager believed it was popular with branches: 
Most branches love it; they all want to be nominated and are all 
clamouring to be there. They want to be the ones to meet the President. 
Some branches do think it’s a load of nonsense but it’s just a party and a 
thank you to branches. It is a reward and something to aim for: to be 
honest it’s a bit of icing on the cake for branches. 
RM1 
This view is endorsed with one lay representative confirming: ‘It is an enjoyable night, 
a bottle of wine, free meal and a hug from the union President’ (BA17). However 
others expressed concerns in more considered terms whilst acknowledging the 
importance of identifying and sharing good practice: 
I think from a trade union perspective I am uncomfortable with the awards 
night type event because it’s almost like best supporting actor and all that 
kind of stuff. It is giving to a culture which may exist among employers and 
I question how comradely these things are if that’s the right term. I just 
don’t quite know if people want to come away wanting to emulate others 
and this is the best way of sharing good practice. 
RO1 
Another staff member went further in criticism by describing the event as an 
embarrassment: 
I don’t think the awards are a good idea, it’s embarrassing. When you walk 
in with the branch and they are told they might be in for an award. I think 
it’s quite patronising and misses the point because most branches feel it 
does not matter. Members are not ringing up branches to say I hope you 
win an award. They ring up to say they may lose their job and they need 
help. 
AO1 
 An alternative interpretation was that the awards were: 
. . . about creating sub divisional competition between branches and I think 
we should have some issues about that as we do elsewhere in for example 
education. I think it’s very much leaning on or taking from the employer 





Instilling competition between branches, and by implication organising staff, 
encourages a workplace culture of competition and rivalry in contrast to building 
collectivism and cooperation. It suggests the triumph of a popular mainstream 
individualist culture over traditional notions of solidarity and togetherness to the 
extent that the societal organisations which promoted such ideas, trade unions, have 
themselves succumbed to such cultural forms.  
The downgrading of the importance of representation and traditional industrial work, 
coupled with the introduction of assessments to control both ROs and branches focus 
on priorities of the union bureaucracy is evident. If JABO, as far as ROs were 
concerned, was a subtle methodology for such purposes the later introduction of a 
management direction to control their daily work priorities was overt. The mask had 
slipped and a perverse and contradictory attempt at preventing industrial work by 
focusing on meetings to recruit new stewards and members was introduced. 
Critical Incident two: Unison managerial prerogative, Operation Workplace  
Unison regional management teams were required by the SMT to develop strategies 
for addressing loss of membership and subscription income that primarily stemmed 
from the coalition’s cuts in public services. The union General Secretariat issued 
managers with guidance on prioritising work issues for the duration of 2013 stating: 
The union’s number one priority remains the protection of members’ jobs, 
terms and conditions and the campaign for quality public services linked to 
an alternative economic strategy. 
Unison 2013 
In practice this meant a concentration on increasing recruitment levels indicated by “A 
key objective in delivering this priority must be the maximisation of recruitment 
opportunities and improvements to our organising base” (Unison 2013). There was 




Wherever possible, the conventional work of Organisers should be 
restricted to strategic negotiating meetings to protect jobs and conditions 
and major disciplinary cases where a member’s job is at risk. 
Unison 2013 
This latter injunction was contrary to the previous emphasis on ROs ceding this work to 
branches and reinforced the importance and relevance of the ‘traditional’ RO. 
However the centrality of institutional protection was never far from the surface. One 
Regional Secretary from a neighbouring region described his role as: 
I do not see myself as the traditional Regional Secretary of a trade union 
more a Regional Director of a Corporation and the business of the 
Corporation is about recruitment and subscription levels. So if the 
membership is falling then I have a duty to inform staff of the potential 
consequences and to look at ways of addressing the shortfall so that we 
are not in a position where we have to make redundancies. 
In ‘A’ Region the RMT response was the introduction at a regular staff conference of a 
plan called ‘Operation Workplace’ designed to address falling membership levels.  Staff 
were shown a flip chart sheet with one word written in bold, ‘LISTEN’ and then 
informed that it was the job of all organising staff to go into workplaces and listen to 
workers answers to the question of what it was like to work in that hospital, local 
authority, university etc. All organising staff would be required to visit three 
workplaces a day for this purpose. Consequently the union would be more visible and 
available, workers would be more readily able to join the union and potential lay 
representatives would be identified. Absent from this programme was any 
acknowledgement of the role of branches and what they deemed necessary in terms 
of support from region. In fact neither staff nor branches had been consulted on the 
plan. 
The objective of Operation Workplace was to get Unison organising staff into 
workplaces, talking to members and non-members, the primary objectives being to 
identify potential workplace ‘leaders’ and of course recruit. Follow up one to one 
meetings with those identified as those leaders would be arranged to commence the 
building of a relation with staff borrowing from relational organising approaches (Tapia 
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2013 ). All organising staff were required to complete a specifically designed form 
identifying each workplace visit, the number of workers listened to, the number of 
new recruits and new or potential representatives. These forms were then to be 
collated, analysed and submitted to Head Office as evidence of the delivery of the 
regional strategy in response to falling membership levels. Monthly returns data would 
also be used by team managers for use in one-to-ones and team meetings. 
Experienced ROs immediately identified that the whole plan was completely 
impractical for a host of reasons. Its analysis of the role of ROs was severely limited. 
The requirement to undertake three workplace visits a day clashed with stated 
aforementioned national priorities of attending negotiating meetings to protect jobs 
and undertaking representational work at important or complex disciplinary hearings: 
workplace visits on this scale removed the ROs from such meetings. Workers moreover 
had no statutory right to attend union ‘listening’ meetings. The proposed scheduling 
took no account of the ROs inevitable work commitments arising from members 
raising issues, or that time was required for planning and arrangements.  
It was essential to have the branch supporting such initiatives. In short a top down, 
highly bureaucratic and impractical proposal was tabled which undermined the 
requirement placed on national priority meetings, severely limited the ability of ROs to 
respond positively to requests for support from branches: yet was accepted at a 
national level as the regions response to national direction that ‘something must be 
done’ to halt the fall in membership.  
The irony of the situation was not lost on some ROs, one stated in post meeting 
discussion: 
It’s alright doing three workplace visits a day I would love to but when do 
we deal with the issues these three visits identify, when do we do the 
support work the branches want, when do we manage the staff and when 
do we have time to think. 
‘Operation Workplace’ , or as an RO with a dissident view put it at the time ‘Operation 
Workload’, was introduced without staff consultation, consideration of the workload 
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implications and no health and safety risk assessment. In consequence, the response 
was to turn it in to a further exercise in form filling. It was subsequently reported to 
staff that in the six month period to the year end of 2013 regional management had 
recorded staff having visited 757 workplaces, recruited 353 new members during these 
visits, held over 7000 conversations and identified 116 new or potential workplace 
leaders (‘A’ Region report 2013)!   
Such data might suggest that the ‘Operation Workplace’ initiative was a resounding 
success. However the legitimacy of the returns is questionable. One of the 
administrative staff recognised that the form filling was merely a pointless exercise in 
which organising staff were recording both their normal activity and that of lay 
representatives. The subsequent take up of Unison steward training did not show any 
marked increase. Indeed there were no plans put in place for anticipating increased 
demand for steward training. ‘Operation Workplace’ was modified in light of 
experience and at a review session much debate ensued. The debate however was 
limited to the detail on the report form with a small minority offering critical 
assessment of the approach, demonstrating the lack of belief of ROs that on major 
issues they had little voice. 
Limiting the review to questions of improving the plan and not questioning its 
rationale restricted legitimate criticism. One RO in conversation stating: 
What is the point when you fundamentally disagree with the management 
telling the management that they are wrong, they have to be seen to be 
doing something. Form filling is a godsend for union bureaucracies; as long 
as they have forms to look at then they are all happy. 
Whilst an exaggeration, given the genuine belief that here was a way of working to 
build the union, the criticism illustrates a consistent frustration arising from the belief 
that the views of experience were discounted and a ‘management knows best’ 
mentality prevailed. The review concluded that the work needed to be more strategic 
focusing on larger workplaces at the expense of smaller ones. The importance of the 
need for branch support for ‘Operation Workplace’ was belatedly recognised given 
staff had initiated workplace visits in some instances without prior agreement with the 
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Unison branch. The subsequent negative impact in branch/region relationship was 
acknowledged: 
This resulted in problems from both perspectives e.g. branch activists 
feeling undermined or guilty or resentful of regional staff undertaking visits 
in “their” workplace without their knowledge and/or regional organising 
staff feeling annoyed or frustrated by lay activists not engaging in the 
planning or undertaking of visits in their own workplace or branch.   
Unison ‘A’ Region management report 2013 
However given aforementioned issues this was not easily forthcoming given other 
work pressures on lay representatives and the lack of conviction or belief in the 
process. One NHS branch secretary stated that: 
I don’t know what the fucks going on at Region. We are dealing with 
redundancies, restructures, bullying, short staffing and they (hospital 
management) are trying to attack our terms and conditions and Region 
wants us to organise meetings to find out what is going on. 
Regional management believed they knew best as to how to retain and build 
membership and organisation through their own internal deliberations indicated by 
their eventually issuing best practice guidance for branches encouraging the adoption 
of a process of appreciative inquiry. There was some irony to this proposal with  one 
traditional RO pointing out that the most successful branches in terms of recruiting 
and winning awards ‘don’t tend to do what the management want them to do’.  
Conclusion 
Examination of internal union structures underpinned by sociological theories of trade 
unions encourages the importance of considering whose interest union strategy 
serves. Unison embraced concepts of managerialism from inception and the 
development of the union organising agenda strengthened such approaches through 
target setting etc. Despite professing to be an organising union, undergoing 
transformation in the process, there remains a lack of clarity in how union organising is 
defined. Different levels of Unison management at different times contradict 
expectations of the role of the RO and how it relates to the Unison branch. An RO can 
be a manager, a supervisor or a supporter of branches. This confusion stands in spite 
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of attempts to embed ROs work within national union priorities through the 
introduction of MtOC suggesting a lack of clarity and understanding of the grounded 
expectations of ROs by senior levels within Unison.  
For Unison branches their requirement from Region is for organisational and industrial 
support. The ability of Region to provide this support is questionable given problems of 
capacity, conflicting priorities and industrial inexperience. Increasingly ROs are under 
pressure due to attempts to override branch workplace issues with national and 
regional priorities. With new responsibilities of management Unison ROs find 
themselves with less support for industrial work themselves, increasingly constrained 
in their ability to balance competing interests of the branch and region by attempts to 
introduce more uniform approaches to relations with branches. The tension which 
emerges stems from MtOC impacting on the ability of the RO to exercise judgement 
and discretion.  
Organising work becomes a conduit through which national and regional management 
control the work and priorities of the RO. Rather than encouraging an orientation to 
organising when dealing with workplace issues, those issues were downgraded in 
importance with national recruitment targets now taking priority. The union 
institution, or more accurately, senior paid leadership, had overriding importance over 
the Unison branch. Resistance to these developments by ROs was interpreted as 
adding evidence to the narrative of the FTO being part of the problem and not the 
solution for union renewal. The response from ROs was mixed. It is apparent that FTOs 
did not act as a homogenous entity. The development of relations with branches, and 
their recognition of the importance of industrial support as the priority, did not 
confirm theories of bureaucracy in which there is a simple division between oligarchy 
and rank and file. 
Cuts to public services impact both on Unison’s membership levels and workplace 
priorities. Given this significant threat that the union leadership sought to acquire 
greater control and direction over key staff resources was understandable. Unison 
increased its staffing resources through MtOC but this only addressed the need to try 
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and increase recruitment levels. The subsequent attempts to control RO work, 
indirectly through JABO or directly through ill thought out management initiatives 
disconnected Unison from its core industrial work. As unions have the ability to 
undertake strategic reforms internally those reforms can have the potential for 
negative as well as positive consequences. Introducing ‘New Labour’ style targets and 
internal competition under the guise of organising has led to the introduction of 
bureaucratic systems which were meaningless for many branches and ROs. Identifying 
bureaucratic priorities helps to illustrate the disconnection with members at the 
workplace, with the failure to acknowledge the level of demand for representation 
from members, the reduction in workplace representatives and the deliberate 
reduction in staffing resources for undertaking workplace representation. Adding to an 
emerging crisis in this crucial area of union work, some ROs, with the support of 
management no longer involved themselves in direct representational work. What 
emerged was a dislocation between the union bureaucracy and the branch lay 
representative to the extent that the branch was in danger of losing the regional 













Chapter 8 Recruitment and Representation 
Introduction 
In their examination of UK union FTOs under the heading ‘organising’ Kelly and Heery 
(1994) focus on union recruitment work. Despite the passage of time and the advent of 
the organising approach the conflation has continued. Union organising is still defined 
as recruitment activity.  This chapter considers how this confusion or limitation 
defining organising work has become embedded: for organising read recruitment. 
Furthermore a significant consequence has been the downgrading of representation of 
union members to organising work given representation is defined as a servicing 
function. Initially the chapter considers how organising based on the ‘organising 
model’ was introduced into Unison and will include views from FTOs who attended 
and delivered the organising training for both other FTOs and lay representatives. How 
organising was positioned in relation to servicing is discussed in the context of the 
consequential effect on the key function of member representation. The confusion 
around questions related to defining organising work, the claim that Unison has been 
transformed into an organising union and the position of representation of members 
are all considered and then illustrated in the third critical incident, the 2013 national 
recruitment campaign titled ‘essential cover at work’. 
The Organising Model in Unison 
The ‘organising’ element of ‘new unionism’ was introduced in Unison primarily by way 
of a training course for staff, and specifically ROs, called ‘Winning the Organised 
Workplace’ (WOW). The course was designed around the Russo and Banks (1996) 
Organising Model. Course content contrasted servicing and organising approaches to 
dealing with workplace issues and training materials included direct lifts from the 
Australian trade union confederation, ACTU, on organising work and how that differed 
from a servicing union (Unison 2001a). Crucially the course identified and connected 




Gradually the presentation of alternative models of trade unionism within the WOW 
courses became problematic on at least three counts. First was the reinforcement of 
the idea that organising and servicing were separate functions of union work distilled 
into identifiable and discrete tasks. Second, that somehow a simple strategic choice for 
unions existed between servicing and organising. Third it followed that servicing work 
was downgraded in importance and that organising work, whatever that meant, 
became the priority. An analysis by a member of the RMT highlighted some of the 
difficulty, confusion and lack of clarity in the organising message which emerged: 
The Organising Model I am familiar with from WOW in the comparison 
between organising and servicing. There was a move towards the 
Organising Model. In contrast the Servicing Model about representation 
and case work were downgraded. However I think it has swung back to the 
middle as there is recognition that you cannot make that shift overnight to 
the Organising Model; we don’t do representation, we do organising, sort 
your problems out yourself. 
RM2 
Confirming an understanding that somehow organising and servicing are separate, as 
opposed to alternative ways of addressing members/workers issues, Unison 
commenced on a journey to encourage workplace self-organisation at a time when lay 
representatives were decreasing in number and requiring more not less industrial 
support. The view that representation and individual member case work are separate 
to union organising work and should be devolved to branch level became dominant. 
This can radically alter the nature of RO work, relations between the RO and the 
Unison branch and more broadly the branch with the institution of Unison. These 
consequences were also understood by ROs to be the direction of travel for Unison 
inviting some strong criticism in the process (RO2): 
There was this idea that you did not need to do servicing because members 
became self-organised, a syndicalist approach almost: which is nonsense as 
you need some way to crossing that transitional gap. The idea that you are 
suddenly going to organise a load of non-members and then not do any 
servicing at all strikes me as a nonsense as one of the main reasons why 
they become members is either because they have big issues which require 
negotiation, research type support or in some environments there may be 
a lot of individual issues. 
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Whilst most Unison members are employed in union recognised workplaces with 
procedural arrangements and facilities for union representation and activity, the focus 
on recruitment was neglecting the utilisation of such facilities for linking union 
representational work which gave unions legitimacy in the workplace. Furthermore 
that this strategy could produce a different type of unionism was doubtful given the 
objective was limited to increasing membership. Whilst syndicalist influence is referred 
to, that UK trade unions with more moderate traditions of orientation would adopt a 
deliberate strategy of union organising based on late 19th century radical anti-
capitalist forms is unlikely in the extreme (see Carter et al 2000).  
For some, WOW training, confirmed some relevance of the Russo and Banks organising 
model to their work, but nevertheless they questioned the suitability of an approach to 
union organising based on a different social culture, traditions and systems of 
industrial relations: 
The Organising Model I am familiar with- as it was in the WOW course- I 
actually ran it. They used the American example and used videos. I found it 
difficult as they did not reflect the type of society Britain is. I think we have 
moved away from that model although we put a lot of resources in for a 
short period. 
RO5 
The WOW course was where we were shown films of people 
disenfranchised in the United States with no rights whatsoever taking their 
employer to task in particular ways that was kind of put to us as a model 
which we should adopt in the UK. I think there were some reservations 
around that because clearly our starting position was very different. Where 
we have recognition with employers, facilities time for representatives and 
procedures for dealing with workplace issues I would question how well a 
very aggressive organising strategy sits within that scenario. I think that 
probably at the time the organising model as advocated did not fit with UK 
circumstances. 
RO1 




To be fair the Organising Model was of use. When I ran a WOW course you 
could see the light bulbs coming on among activists in relation to some of 
the thinking that came out of the course. 
          RO5 
The introduction of WOW training was seen by some ROs as reinforcing existing 
approaches to union work supporting Kelly and Heery’s (1994) contention that union 
full time officers were inherently enablers. Unison ROs also connected the building of 
union organisation to workplace issues: 
I was a WOW Tutor. The principles of the Organising model were good but 
it was just reinforcing what a good Regional Organiser would be doing 
anyway. The thinking is here’s an issue how I use that to strengthen the 
union whether recruiting, identifying stewards, negotiating agreements. It 
was second nature in many respects. I agree the organising model is really 
a way of working and approaching workplace issue by getting members 
involved in dealing with their own issues and not taking it from them and 
sorting it out. 
RO4 
Such evidence suggests a lack of understanding and awareness of ROs’ approach to 
union work by national and indeed, regional management levels. The explanation may 
lie in the failure of the TUC and individual affiliates such as Unison to embark on any 
critical analysis of US and Australian organising strategies and how they would impact 
on UK trade union work. Consequently the narrative of the US business agent and the 
Australian procedural expert were applied to UK FTOs. Unlike their counterparts, UK 
FTOs were less remote from workplaces and supported the view that their role was to 
develop and enable workplace activism (Kelly and Heery 1994). Their role was not 
understood and a strategy based on such misunderstandings was prone to failure, 
worsening the position of trade unions in the process. 
Representation and organising 
Surveys of union members repeatedly illustrate the importance of representation to 
union membership. The following quote by a member of the RMT reflects the 
importance of that fundamental role for trade unions to represent workers. However 
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whilst recognising the basic role of trade unions subsequent strategy does not reflect 
this reality: 
McDonalds makes money by selling burgers, Tesco’s makes money by 
selling everything, Unisons job is to represent people through individual or 
collective representations, that is what we are about, that is what we are 
there for. 
RM3 
Given the acknowledgement of the centrality of representation of workers that this 
has become so contentious for Unison illustrates the problem with its organising 
strategy and the subsequent dilemma for FTOs. The shift to organising created a 
perception or belief that servicing of members is unimportant when unions are faced 
with the strategic choice, service or organise, which became represent or recruit. The 
choice of prioritising recruitment had two consequences. Firstly, with the delegation of 
representational work to branch level and secondly, given ROs were to emphasise 
organising and not servicing in their work, the requirement for industrial relations 
expertise for newly appointed ROs was no longer essential. 
Customarily RO roles had often been central to representation outcomes whether 
through direct involvement in collective negotiations, individual casework or in guiding 
lay representatives through the procedural necessities. In addition ROs had 
responsibility for delivery of training on representation and often had experience of 
employment tribunal case work. Despite the acknowledgement of the centrality of 
representation to union work it was the view of regional management that this work 
should be undertaken by (an ever dwindling number of) workplace representatives 
with varying levels of competence: 
Regional Organisers are more comfortable doing representation because 
that is what most of them do. I think everybody works in a certain way and 
we just have to try and change that. People who do cases and committees 
have the skills to go round workplaces consulting and involving people. 
Levels of high recruitment can be an indicator of good representation and 
our job as a union is to represent. The more reps we have got who are well 
trained the better. There are going to be more and more people wanting 
representation and there is therefore a need for more people in each 
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workplace who are going to do a good job of it. Regional Organisers cannot 
manage a staff, deliver a healthy branch etc. and be the best 
representative in the world. 
RM3 
The above view highlights a number of issues. Firstly that there remained a prejudicial 
view that ROs in Unison were stuck in a comfort zone of servicing as opposed to the 
reality of using representational issues to build workplace union organisation: so they 
needed to change. Secondly it suggests that organising was limited to talking and/or 
listening to members. Thirdly that whilst acknowledging the relationship between 
good representation and levels of union recruitment that the representation of 
members should be undertaken by representatives at the workplace who had received 
appropriate training for that purpose. This of course ignores the evidence that fewer 
union members were prepared to volunteer for representational duties. Given regional 
support for representation was now diluted, the problem of retaining lay 
representatives was exacerbated. Finally in acknowledging some of the issues 
presented by the staffing restructure, ‘Meeting the Organising Challenge’, the future 
emphasis on the role of Unison ROs was on managing staff and branches and not the 
centrality of representational union work. 
This thinking on RO roles was flawed in its understanding of what they do and failed to 
acknowledge the reality of increasing complexity of workplace legal rights and falling 
numbers of workplace representatives as confirmed by a senior member of the 
national organising team:  
The quality of representation is absolutely central to Unison survival. I have 
evidence which suggests that the number of representatives has declined 
over the last 10 years from 60% coverage of the workplace to 46%. The 
evidence is there that one out of two workplaces does not have a Unison 
representative. 
NM1  
The removal of ROs from direct representation of members to managers of staff and 
branches inevitably increased problems of achieving high quality representation for 
members and using those representational opportunities to build union workplace 
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organisation. It would suggest that ‘Meeting the Organising Challenge’ had an 
unintended consequence of exacerbating problems in undertaking the key basic 
function of a trade union to represent workers. The consequence of failure to provide 
quality representation was acknowledged by another senior national official: 
Representation is an important factor in terms of organising because the 
link is - are you organised enough to ensure that people are able to be 
represented in the workplace? If not the reputation of the union takes a 
nosedive. We can meet that challenge through the number of activists we 
have but that has decreased so we must build that back up. 
NM2 
Nevertheless, as in MSF, some FTOs saw the corollary of organising work in delegation 
of representational work to branches. For some the idea of withdrawal from servicing 
work was attractive in that it took away a lot of the difficult industrial relations work. A 
former Branch Secretary, now an Area Organiser (AO2), confirmed how industrial 
support for branches was on the wane: 
Organising presented an opportunity to delegate and for Regional 
Organisers to avoid responsibility. When I was in the Branch I found there 
are Regional Organisers who you took a problem to and they batted it 
straight back to the branch regardless. This is alright if the person has the 
confidence and the capability to deal with the issue. However I really think 
we need to be careful that in passing things back we might be in jeopardy 
of say bad representation, missing (employment tribunal) time limits etc. 
Others also confirmed this to be the case and that in some instances this shift was 
given impetus by new appointees to the RO role who did not possess the industrial 
expertise, knowledge of employment law or the confidence to provide branches with 
the traditional support expected: 
I remember the appointment of a Regional Organiser who had never run 
an individual case in her life. How that person was supposed to advise lay 
representatives and members on issues was amazing given that person had 
no industrial relations experience at any level. I used to meet with her to 
discuss cases because she did not know how to deal with them and I would 




One experienced Branch Secretary confirmed that in her time in that role: 
I have seen the extremes of full time officers from those who are very 
supportive in terms of representing members and dealing with employers 
to those now who won’t touch representation and are only interested in 
recruitment. 
BA1 
These views are not lost on traditional ROs: 
The union has to do representation and one thing we have to be careful of 
is the support and advice to people. If you are not doing any 
representation yourself it becomes a bit difficult to advise others who have 
to do it. I think we see that already in some areas. I would say that the 
average knowledge of employment law among ROs has dropped steadily. 
RO2 
Another RO with a similar perspective reinforced the importance of the intrinsic link 
between representation and organising: 
I do not believe representation is separate from organising. I think it’s a 
different aspect of organising. It is important we do it to a good standard. 
We have to so we can advise based on our own experience. Representation 
is vital it is central to what we do. That is what members expect.  
RO4  
The emphasis on delegating representation to lay activists confirmed that organising in 
Unison was more about using staffing resources to boost recruitment and the priority 
of the FTO became the management of that activity. It was evident from lay 
representatives and FTOs interviewed that in Unison for ‘organising’ read 
‘recruitment’. Furthermore the pending crisis in representation was compounded by 
the view that training for representation purposes was inadequate as articulated by 
RO2: 
I think there is now a fundamental problem which is compounded by the 
way we train representatives and that is the five day course because there 
is a problem in branches in getting five consecutive days off in facility time 
for training and also the content of the training has changed over the years 
and you now have to do about 10 days training before you get in a position 
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where you are equipped to a basic level of competency and be confident to 
represent people. 
The blocks of training, initially for five days, were becoming problematic for new 
representatives in obtaining time-off from their employer. In addition the basic new 
stewards five day course formally accredited stewards as competent under the 
requirements of the ERA but did not provide for the level of training to achieve a 
competent standard. The concern over competency levels was raised by others: 
I think the training in reality does not produce the level of competency 
required . . . we give people a certificate of attendance but that does not 
mean  that they have done a damn thing on the course. I think the focus 
has to come back to competency and away from just sheer attendance on 
courses. I would be looking for continuing education like CPD. 
RO3 
For some the training course content contributes to the problem: 
When I run courses I tend to ignore some of the activities. When we look at 
cases it’s not presented in a way which is interesting . . .  I incorporate 
change of contract into the training. I have often rewritten the courses to 
what is relevant to the representative.  
RO4 
The lack of input into the course design from experienced ROs only adds to the 
problems of accrediting members as representatives who may not be competent to 
undertake such important duties: 
I think there are concerns with our training that we accredited people 
without actually taking them through disciplinaries we confirmed them as 
competent people without full training on grievance and disciplinaries and 
that is a fundamental flaw and it is probable that the people who designed 
the course did not actually have a great deal of workplace experience.  
RO1 
A strategy for union renewal which includes delegating representation to branches is 
flawed not only in failing to acknowledge the reduction in workplace representatives 
and complexity of casework but in failing to provide appropriate training and systems 
which ensure those who are accredited for such purposes are competent to do so. 
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Even then views persist among Unison managers that supporting people at work is 
undertaken as a form of resistance to Unison and not as a central trade union function: 
I do think it has swung back not least because of resistance, because 
activists often want to help people. It is instinctively what they do - help 
people with their problems. Also there is a lot of hard evidence from our 
own membership surveys which shows that what the members want and 
why they join at the top of the list is representation in the workplace. 
RM2 
Confirmation that Unison has attempted to move away from representational work 
despite opposition from lay representatives suggests that those same representatives’ 
views, and that of ROs, should be given more consideration in developing strategy and 
that top down approaches are flawed. The reason why workers join unions was not 
acknowledged as fundamental to the organising strategy. Furthermore the split 
between organising and servicing, whilst acknowledged as problematic at a national 
level, still suggests a continuation of this approach to organising work: 
I think that part of the problem with the organising debate over the years is 
that it has been presented as an either/or thing you are either a servicing 
union or an organising union and actually you need to be both. It is the 
balance between the two which is the most important thing. Members 
demand a service from us. They demand to be represented when they are 
in trouble. However we also need to build strong workplace organisation 
so that some of the things that these managers are increasingly trying to 
do to our members on the ground are countered by building strong 
organisation so you have to do both. It is not either/or it is both and the 
presentation of the debate is wrong. 
NM2 
This analysis still identifies servicing and organising as separate functions and is an 
illustration of the mixed messages and different understandings of Unison strategy 
within and between levels of Unison management. 
Strategic confusion  
At a national level confusion over Unison’s organising strategy is acknowledged, but at 
the same time the bases for misunderstanding is compounded: 
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We have always had a multi-track strategy so it’s been a misconception 
that all we have expected branches and organisers to do is operate the 
organising model which was primarily issue based organising. I always 
recognised that we had a multi-track strategy which would also involve 
individual servicing. You would also have I would describe it as day to day 
organising and that is something I don’t think we are very good at. That is 
walking round the workplace talking to staff, talking to our members and 
non-members about the union and its activities and encouraging them to 
become part of the union. The whole purpose of this approach is to listen 
to the staff to find out what their issues are and not what our issues are.  
NM1 
There are a number of points identified which require some comment. Firstly the role 
of unions is to represent working people in the workplace and beyond and this can be 
through encouraging activism and building union organisation or, alternatively utilising 
the business agent or procedural expert approach as in Australia and the United 
States. The organising model encouraged an orientation to the former as opposed to 
the latter. In the above quotation the view is that individual servicing is taken out of 
the orientation for organising and therefore unions can be both organising and 
servicing unions at different times. Further that consulting with members is a separate 
function from organising and finally that the issues which unions should address 
should originate from the workplace and not the institution. The implementation of 
recruitment strategies which ignore workplace membership issues undermines union 
organising work by making such work irrelevant if not embracing member’s issues.  
In ‘A’ region on entering the regional office an eight foot high thermometer on a 
cardboard background greets visitors. The thermometer level was in red marked to a 
point that represents the level of recruitment to Unison so far within that calendar 
year. The annual target is at the boiling point position. Unison staff received regular 
monthly updates from regional management on recruitment activity in the context of 
monthly targets with a commentary highlighting the top recruiting branches and 
conversely those that were not achieving that target. There was no contextual 
background provided for significant gains or losses in membership and obvious socio-
economic conditions such as major redundancies through cuts in services were mainly 
ignored: as previously identified branches were identified as growing, staying the same 
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or losing members. The categories reflected  a type of league table borrowed from 
New Labour performance management of public sector service provision, which 
Unison had opposed elsewhere (see Mooney et al 2007). 
The lack of clarity in defining and understanding union organising, the connection 
between representation and organising, the position of representation as secondary in 
union strategy but primary for union members, all pointed to incoherence and a 
disconnection between constituent union parts. These criticisms were illustrated most 
starkly in the messages that Unison promotes in its recruitment literature. Whilst 
union organisers were encouraged to build activism, albeit in a way which itself 
divorces organising from workplace issues, Unison produces materials which militate 
against that work with  the consistent message that Unison is ‘a friend at work’: 
Your friend at work is often on our recruitment literature isn’t it? So I don’t 
know what type of statement that is about activism it implies you come to 
us rather than you sort your problems out collectively; we are the third 
party a friend at work.  
RO1 
Unison’s recruitment material reinforced the view that it is a third party in the 
workplace, there if you have problems at work, promoting a passive union 
membership. In observation and participation on recruitment exercises 
encouragement to join Unison was not through identifying the relevance of union 
membership to the specific workplace but through marketing ploys such as free raffles 
for an IPad or television; free sweets and lollipops and at Easter time free chocolate 
eggs: 
We reinforce the servicing aspect of the union when we recruit. We don’t 
talk about trade unionism; we spend too much time just focusing on 
getting the recruitment numbers. 
AO1  
 This view was also shared by lay representatives: 
The culture is ‘join the union’ we have a service but nobody has a 
conversation that you are joining a collective organisation. The 
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consciousness of what a union member has is alarming there is low trade 
union consciousness even the training for activists reinforce that. 
BA2 
Whilst recruitment was readily identified as being crucial to the trade union, with 
survival dependent on membership income, the nature of how recruitment was 
undertaken had consequences. If Unison was about encouraging workers to join 
Unison and become active then the message transmitted to the workers should have 
been consistent with that key objective. How the union can make things better in the 
workplace through collective action and good representation and not by way of a 
message of join us and we will look after you, strongly implying a passive rather than 
active membership commitment. It was unsustainable to discuss recruitment into the 
union based on gimmicks which detracted from the importance of trade unions for 
workers in the workplace and beyond. A key opportunity to discuss the work of trade 
unions was lost. 
What could be viewed as an internal struggle or debate around how members were 
viewed as passive recipients of union services or in contrast as potential contributors 
to building union organisation has been evident throughout the period in which 
organising was said to be embraced. In recent times Unison has undertaken national 
recruitment campaigns through advertising based on projecting the collective strength 
offered by trade unionism in contrast to the isolation and weakness of the lone 
worker. So in 2007 the UK saw the Polar Bear and the Ant campaign which offered the 
slogan ‘If you want to be heard speak in Unison’ (Unison 2007b). In 2009 a similar 
message was conveyed in an advertisement with the message ‘one is the loneliest 
number: with 1.3 million members behind you join us in Unison’ reinforcing the being 
heard in the workplace theme (Unison 2009). In both adverts collective strength was 
illustrated through projecting a message that union activism by the membership gets 
results. In addition a short video giving ten good reasons for joining Unison was 
produced which included, more pay, tackling discrimination, better training and safer 
workplaces. Promoting the membership of the union by way of collective strength and 
identifying how that strength has consequence for relevant workplace issues implied 
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the need for collective organisation at work. However the view that members should 
be an inherent part of organising work seemed to be lost when without any 
consultation with regions a new Unison recruitment campaign appeared. In 2013 the 
new national recruitment campaign represented a departure from that collective 
organisation gets results approach. 
Critical Incident three: “Essential Cover at Work” 
On 11th March 2013 Unison embarked on a national recruitment campaign across TV 
and other media outlets including online and social media sites. In a press release to 
launch the 2013 recruitment campaign across a range of media outlets, from national 
television and newspapers to local media and new social messaging networks, the 
Unison General Secretary stated the objective was ‘to represent the tens of thousands 
of workers (in Unison recognised workplaces) who are currently non-members and, as 
such, have no defence against the government's attack on their jobs’ (Unison 2013).   
The message to workers was that if workers were worried about their job Unison were 
offering ‘essential cover if you work in public services (from £1.30 a month)’ (Unison 
2013). The message of the campaign was framed in the classic language of ‘business 
unionism’ promoting a servicing union, with a passive membership, no encouragement 
to become active in the union and which placed expectations on the depleted number 
of workplace representatives backed by a regional staff discouraged from undertaking 
representational work: 
We need to get the message across to members and potential members 
that we can provide them with the essential cover they need to help them 
through these tough and uncertain times. Unions came into being in tough 
times and it is good for people to know that they have somewhere to turn 
when they face losing their jobs, getting into debt, in need of legal help or 
just want a cheaper insurance deal.  Our members have had their pay 
frozen for three years and any way the union can to help to save their 
families money is appreciated. 
Unison 2013 
This message was in keeping with general Unison communication to members through 
the Unison members’ magazine ‘U’ (UNISON 2013d). It was dominated by services 
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provided to union members including, home insurance and life assurance products, 
health products and health care, discounted car purchase and shopping discounts. 
Whilst offering genuine discount and advantage for members the prominence of such 
services within the communication, five of the first seven pages were regularly 
advertisements for services, reinforced the idea of the union as a provider of servicers 
and not of a collective social organisation encouraging grassroots organisation and 
workplace activism. The autumn 2013 front cover reinforced the message that in hard 
financial time Unison could assist its members. Notably absent from the 68 pages of 
the magazine was any promotion of Unison workplace activism with just a few pages 
dedicated to workplace issues. 
The message relayed to staff about the national recruitment campaign from the 
General Secretary was ‘we’re going to go out and recruit like we have never recruited 
before’ (Unison 2013b). This was in response to what was described as "the most 
traumatic time in the union's history" (Unison 2013b). With an acknowledgement to 
previous organising claims the press release quoted an Assistant General Secretary 
‘What's essential is that activists lead this campaign’. However the campaign was 
devised and developed without activist involvement and as the press release also 
confirmed was as ‘a consequence of extensive independent research as well as in-
depth focus groups and mosaic profiling to explore what attracts or would attract 
people to join Unison’(Unison ibid). A union which claims for the past two decades to 
be transformed into an organising union apparently had to contract independent 
pollsters to find out what its membership requires. The failure of organising could not 
be more starkly illustrated. 
“Essential Cover at work” was a message projecting the union as an insurance type 
organisation, reinforcing concerns of some staff and activists about the direction of the 
union. The union message identified a number of key services; ‘advice, support and 
help at work; a helpline that is open until midnight; legal help for you at work and your 
family at home; plus a wide range of exclusive member discounts’ (Unison ibid). The 
Assistant General Secretary was then quoted as saying "It's a tough environment for 
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unions at the moment,", but "we can go out and build our union, despite the 
problems" (Unison ibid). The problem was that the message was not about building 
the union but projecting a service for individual workers. In the staff briefings 
comparison was made with union subscriptions of other unions which demonstrated 
that at certain income levels being a member of Unison was significantly cheaper 
which in these times of austerity could have significance in choice of union: the strong 
inference was the potential for poaching of other union members. Nor was this 
message a sudden departure from the position of the union, rather it confirmed a 
direction about which a number of lay representatives had expressed previous 
concern: 
I have a problem with the way we recruit. In the past few years they 
(Unison) have wanted us to become more like insurance salesmen. 
Sometimes I feel we are just to sell the insurance policy of the union or 
getting members to join on the basis of a free holiday in Devon. This is not 
how I see it should be. I would like people to join our union because they 
see we are a proper union who represent and talk to the gaffers 
negotiating on members behalf. Workers should be running to find us 
wanting to join because they have heard that we are fantastic and it’s how 
we promote ourselves getting people to join us by the example we set and 
the way we represent. 
BA5 
This lay representative clearly identified that not only was recruitment crucial to 
Unison, given survival is dependent on membership income, but the nature of how 
recruitment is undertaken has consequences. If Unison was about encouraging 
workers to join and become active then the message which was transmitted to the 
workers should be consistent with that key objective. It should be about how the union 
can make things better in the workplace through collective action and good 
representation not a message of ‘join us and we will look after you’ strongly implying a 
passivity rather than active membership commitment. One Unison Branch Secretary 
reported coming into some criticism from another union lay representative, who 
comparing the national campaign with Unison’s more robust organisation and 
challenging of management at a local level stated, ‘Is Unison now just an Insurance 
Company for workers if they have problems at work?; That’s not how you work in this 
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hospital’. Yet not all senior officials subscribed to the recruitment is organising 
position: 
I have discussions with lots of people about what is organising. At a recent 
senior meeting of the union you can have a big table of people and ask that 
very question  . . .  and everybody around the table will give you a different 
answer. My view about what an organising union is that every single part 
of the union and every single member of staff, regardless of whether you 
have got organising in your title, should be able to play some role in 
supporting our branches to build strong organisation on the ground and all 
of this is different to recruitment. 
NM2 
Unison also identified as a new initiative was the introduction of a specific legal 
helpline for Unison activists: 
UNISON is launching a legal helpline to assist hard-pressed activists 
needing urgent legal advice. The helpline will launch on 1 May and has 
been set up in response to feedback from UNISON activists. It aims to 
provide urgent initial legal help on employment matters.  Launching the 
helpline, General Secretary Dave Prentis said: ‘Our activists are working 
hard to look after our members and this government is set on making their 
lives harder. Activists told us they needed access to quick legal advice and 
this is what the helpline aims to provide’. The helpline will be monitored 
and reviewed to make sure the service it is providing is an effective and 
efficient service. 
Unison 2013c 
This initiative was introduced without any consultation with staff and from an RO 
perspective was viewed as further evidence of an undermining of their position. The 
helpline had developed as a response to criticism from lay representatives over 
reduction in FTO support at a time when such support was increasingly required in 
response to the consequences of government austerity measures. A press release as 
part of the campaign referred to public services being under unprecedented attack 
from Government.  The General Secretary is quoted as saying “It is a tragedy that in 
2011 270,000 jobs were axed in the public sector and that figure is predicted to rise to 
1.2m by 2017/18” (Unison 2013). In bypassing ROs, and abstracting legal issues from 
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the wider relations at the workplace, it was quite possible that organising 
opportunities were overlooked.  
The initial results of the campaign were deemed to be a success with record levels of 
recruitment. Unison staff were required to vacate their day jobs to be allocated into 
supporting workplace recruitment events and in doing so reinforced the servicing 
message of the essential cover programme. The General Secretary reinforced the 
dominant and limited aim of the initiative when stating: 
It’s been a great two weeks . . . I'm so proud of all our members, activists 
and staff who have been out there telling non-members about the 
essential cover UNISON provides . . . the more members we have, the 
stronger our voice becomes. So it's vital that we carry on recruiting . . . A 
massive thanks to you all for helping to make our spring recruitment drive 
such a great success. . . Our membership records show that in the first 
week of the campaign (from 11 March); we recruited 4,202 members – a 
63 per cent increase compared to the same week last year. . . In the second 
week (from 18 March), we recruited 3,456 members – up 36 per cent on 
the same week last year . . . This is a fantastic tribute to all your hard work. 
I believe it shows that we can recruit – even in these hard times. And I 
know that we must, if we are to build a strong union that can support all 
our members . . . . This won’t be a one-off campaign. Let’s keep on building 
our union. 
Unison 2013 
Given that organising teams were required to dedicate several weeks in the year to 
team recruitment sessions, the additional national recruitment weeks reinforced the 
perception that with ongoing cuts to public services and the consequential impact on 
union membership levels, the rationale for recruitment was for protecting the 
institution. Theories of oligarchy and bureaucracy are of particular relevance for 
understanding this perspective and at times of crisis oligarchic and bureaucratic 
interests become more prominent. This prominence was manifested by the staff 
member who saw the purpose of recruitment as keeping staff in jobs. The pursuit of 
the interests of the representatives over those of the represented explicitly expressed 
the idea of the legitimacy of institutional domination over the lay membership despite 
the espousal of democracy within the union rule book (e.g. see Webb and Webb 1894, 
Michels 1962). This position was also reflected at a staff conference on Unison finances 
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at which a member of head office announced that Unison were considering that future 
strategic approaches could be determined by their contributions to income 
generation. However, countering this finance driven approach, the ‘A’ Region RMT 
recognising the level of complaints over standards of representation was reaching 
unacceptable levels acknowledged that action needed to be taken to address the 
position. The predictable representational crisis emerging resulted in the request for a 
small team of traditional ROs to review the position and make recommendations. 
Conclusion  
Trade union organising strategies have resulted in the representation of members 
being downgraded as recruitment of new members in existing workplaces becomes 
the priority. Given this approach the idea that trade unions are still ‘circling the 
wagons’ in defensive mode is apparent. Unison initially embraced the approach to 
union work espoused through the ‘organising model’ of using organising orientation to 
address workplace issues and grievances. However, over time, as elsewhere, 
organising and servicing became defined as separate functions raising questions of 
strategic choice for Unison. Representational work became seen as a function primarily 
the remit of lay representatives and not ROs. 
The ‘organising model’ ceased to influence Unison practice to any great degree. This 
despite the fact that ROs confirmed that, whilst elements of the approach were not 
appropriate to the different systems and culture of the UK, the orientation to 
organising around workplace based issues had some relevance to their own approach 
to union work. Although the centrality of representation of members was 
acknowledged by national and regional Unison management, it was displaced as a 
priority of ROs by that of recruitment targets. Industrial support for branches has been 
weakened, through MtOC structures, appointments to the RO posts of candidates with 
limited industrial experience, and faced with new managerial responsibilities and 
demands for dedicated recruitment focused activity. Furthermore the challenges of 
delegation of representational work to lay representatives have not been addressed 
with criticism that Unison training is inadequate. Workers join unions primarily for 
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protection at work and the choices taken by Unison undermine the union’s ability to 
provide that protection either through skilled representation or the power of a 
strongly organised workplace collective. 
Claims that Unison has been transformed have some legitimacy. However the promise 
of union transformation through the radical direction of building workplace activism 
and collective power espoused within the ‘organising model’ has failed to materialise. 
With performance management targets based on recruitment levels, the promotion of 
Unison as a third party in the workplace and general recruitment activity which has an 
absence of any narrative around power and solidarity principles, the type of trade 
unionism promoted is reminiscent of 1980’s ‘new realism’ and a limited form of 
business unionism.  
Not only did the recruitment strategy fail, the neglect of support for workplace 
representation has led to increased complaints by union members and evident 
dissatisfaction with regional support at branch level. Whilst ‘A’ region to its credit 
recognised these issues it was at a national level that some acknowledgement was 
required to alter a direction of travel that looked increasingly ill-suited for the 













Chapter Nine: Analysis 
Introduction 
Previous chapters centred on Unison threw up a number of issues regarding its 
practice. Interviews with ROs, Unison managers and branch activists revealed a 
disconnection between organising strategies and the priorities for Unison members 
and branches. Those strategies were formed in isolation from activists, detached from 
day to day problems and enforced by managerialism. Consequently recruitment 
targets gained prominence over the representational demands of members with 
significant implications both for the RO role and Unison more generally. These findings 
were reinforced and extended by the case studies of critical incidents that highlighted 
three areas of concern: i) organising strategies were largely irrelevant to industrial 
work; ii) Unison management had nevertheless introduced systems of objective setting 
and monitoring to prioritise organising over representational work; iii) despite 
proclamations of being an organising union Unison was still promoting Unison 
membership as one of buying trade union services. In this chapter these issues and 
concerns are examined within the context of ‘new unionism’ as set out in chapter two 
and the reality of trade unions  as social institutions with competing interests as 
referred to in chapter three.  
As indicated earlier, FTOs are defined as much by what they do as their employment 
titles. In trade union analyses (see chapter three), FTOs were variously characterised 
as: flexible pragmatists balancing the immediate interests of the membership against  
longer term institutional interests and the maintenance of orderly industrial relations; 
intermediaries between capital and labour, although employed by the latter; agents of 
capital, incorporated into the capitalist class through their position.  Michels (1962), on 
the other hand, maintained that they inevitably became part of a powerful oligarchy 
whose interest were separate to that of the union membership, exercising control over 
that membership as part of a wider bureaucracy. It is these dimensions of the FTO role, 




This chapter commences by revisiting the role of the FTO in the context of Unisons 
organising strategy and objectives and their relevance to the workplace. Consideration 
of the role of Unison management, in a context of consistent failure to meet organising 
objectives, is made. One of the consequences of such failure is the attempt to control 
the work of Unison ROs. Resistance to such control and how this relates to theories of 
rank and filism, bureaucracy and oligarchy is discussed. The implications for strategy, 
the role of the Unison full time officer and the evident structural disconnection 
between organising and industrial work is considered. The chapter also revisits debates 
around the merits of servicing and organising and how, in the context of contesting 
changing roles and priorities of ROs, elements of a pending crisis in union 
representation emerged. A related consideration is the decentralisation of public 
services, in theory presenting opportunities for union renewal through decision making 
being closer or at the workplace, in reality decentralisation presented major challenges 
to public sector unions. Finally the chapter will examine the claim that Unison 
organising strategy has resulted in a transformed union.  
The Regional Organiser and Unison’s organising strategy 
Since Unison’s inception senior managers and national committees pronounced on 
recruitment targets assuming it would automatically follow that national objectives 
become the priority throughout Unison. However such deliberations were made 
without membership or activist engagement (Waddington and Kerr 2000). The failure 
to achieve recruitment targets of 1.5 million set in the NRP and the 2 million in NORS 
questions both the realism of the targets and relevance of the strategy. From the 
outset Unison’s organising strategy was framed by a paper exercise around branch 
development plans monitored through regional and national committees (see 
Waddington and Kerr ibid). Their relevance can be measured by the belief of some ROs 
that the abandonment of such plans would have no impact on recruitment levels or 
the ability to represent members effectively and would not impact on the strength of 
union workplace organisation. It would however question the rationale for significant 
elements of work of some regional and national Unison committees.  
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Unisons national recruitment strategy was revised and developed in the context of the 
organising element of the TUC New Unionism relaunch. At that time Unison’s main 
organising sector of Local Government had experienced a significant fall in 
membership density, from 78% density in 1979 to 46% by 1995.This is only partly 
explained through an exodus of blue collar membership where local dominance of 
white collar activists in the new union’s structures emerged (see Waddington and Kerr 
1999). The decline points to a level of union ineffectiveness pre and post Unison 
formation in which lessons went unheeded. This fall in density figures illustrates that it 
is not just structural factors but how unions respond to them that is important. 
The embracing of the organising model through WOW and Bee Active courses for staff 
and lay representatives, which encouraged addressing workplace issues in an 
‘organising way,’ was abandoned over time with the emergence of a position 
influenced by the narrative that unions had a strategic choice, either service or 
organise members (itself interpreted as a limited and simplistic recruitment sense). 
This position borrowed from US and Australian trade union confederations assumed 
workplace representation would be covered to a similar standard by training lay 
representatives to undertake work formerly the remit of FTOs. This view of organising 
fitted with the attempt at delegation of representational responsibilities to lay 
representatives at branch level following the reduction in FTO posts after merger 
(Waddington and Kerr 1999). Organising became partly defined by the level at which 
union representation was undertaken. It was servicing when a RO represents a 
member whilst the same function was organising when undertaken by a lay 
representative (Waddington and Kerr 2000). This transition was also consistent with 
the narrative of the need for ROs to change from servicers to organisers of the union 
membership. 
Earlier research into FTOs (see Chapter Two) identified their main responsibilities as 
collective and individual representation through workplace negotiations, defending 
union members at disciplinary hearings and supporting grievances through internal 
employer procedures. The development of organising strategies has seen this work 
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become defined as servicing. Other responsibilities included recruitment of new 
members and developing lay representatives in their union work and are now 
considered organising work. Traditional Unison ROs confirmed their practice had been 
to support and enable lay representatives and members to greater self-reliance 
through improving workplace organisation on the back of workplace issues, consistent 
with Kelly and Heery’s (1994) findings. However these same ROs were viewed as the 
wrong type by Unison management given they did not operate in the expected 
organisational way of managing branches, delegating representational work and 
prioritising recruitment activities. 
The introduction of MtOC staffing structures developing from Unisons organising 
strategy extended managerial responsibilities by consolidating the RO into a new layer 
of Unison management primarily engaged in managing other staff to work towards 
achieving nationally set recruitment targets, the key priority of Unison. The expansion 
in organising staff through AO and LO grades led to a reduction in the number of ROs 
who now had increased areas of industrial responsibility, in addition to their 
managerial duties. Whilst regional staff resource for branch support was increased that 
support was geared to national union priorities and not those of Unison branches.  
Some ROs viewed organising, as introduced  and defined through WOW training, as 
building on existing practice suggesting some confirmation of previous findings of Kelly 
and Heery (1994) that generally trade union officers in the UK were enablers. It follows 
that unfavourably comparing UK full time union officers contribution to the work of 
the union with that of their US and Australian equivalents was mistaken (Unison 
2001b)). The subsequent organising strategy based on an incorrect assessment of the 
key role of the FTO, was flawed. In Unison however the narrative of the FTO being part 
of the problem gave an added impetus to support for an open recruitment policy of 
new ROs. 
The view that outsiders were required for invigorating new ideas and ways of working 
demonstrates the influence of US unions and specifically the SEIU (see chapter two). 
This recruitment, coupled with a staff career development path to organising work, has 
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produced a collective deterioration in industrial relations experience among ROs 
creating problems of legitimacy with both members and employers. Conversely the 
traditional autonomy of ROs was constrained through requirements to focus on 
general recruitment activity which became the organising strategy. ROs were expected 
to manage both staff and branch lay representatives fixed facility time for Unison, 
transforming them from workers advocate to union manager/agent.  
The changing nature of the RO role and the recruitment of staff with minimal industrial 
experience, but apparently more attune to the national union strategy and the 
managerial responsibility now associated with the RO role, further reduced industrial 
support for lay representatives, while potentially enhancing capacity for 
organising/recruitment. These shifts in staff composition and priorities led to problems 
in both capacity and ability to perform union representational work. Traditional ROs 
acknowledged resistance to such changes and highlighted the continued importance of 
dealing competently with branch workplace issues for the vitality and effectiveness of 
Unison: a contention supported by recent research by the ETUC that confirmed 
retention of union membership is largely due to the role played by union 
representatives at the workplace (Waddington 2014). 
Furthermore with the Australian experience, where by 2000, after seven years of 
delegating representation, the effect on union membership was to create more non-
unionists than unionists in public sector workplace suggests such strategy is 
questionable (see Bowden 2009). However no critical assessment of why Unison 
embraced US and Australian organising approaches has been made.  Nor has there 
been any fundamental review of the impact on Unison at the workplace in terms of 
power and influence. The ‘cover at work’ campaign (see Chapter Eight) identifies a 
possible change in strategic direction, albeit a reversal to the failed consumer unionism 
strategy as a workplace service provider.  
Where union organising has been successful it is through comprehensive and 
concerted adoption of organising orientations and techniques (see Bronfenbrenner et 
al 1998). Unison, similar to unions in the US and Australia, has not been prepared to 
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adopt such approaches This reluctance suggests that even were evidence of organising 
success can be identified, internal resistance to radical change prevails. 
Comprehensive organising approaches entail switching of resources from the centre, 
decentralising power, strategic targeting of sectors or occupational groups and using 
workplace issues to build union organisation. Such steps can be seen as a threat to 
existing union positions at a national and local level and in constituencies traditionally 
separated by definition as bureaucracy and rank and file. 
Unison management, control and resistance 
During merger talks the partner unions involved Cranfield School of Management in 
their deliberations on how the new union would operate. This relationship was to 
develop in subsequent years (Dempsey 2000). Managerial thinking was influential and 
led to the identification of several critical success factors for the new union. Within this 
context an aspiration for greater managerial control of staff was identified 
(Dempsey2000). Given the size of the then new union, expressions of clarity in relation 
to organisational focus, purpose and consistency was understandable. However there 
was an inbuilt assumption that such objectives set at a national level would coincide 
with membership priorities.  
A difficulty which any large general union faces comes from the size of its membership 
with its range across sectors and occupations. In any case trade union structures are 
built upon a number of component parts with varied interests and priorities and are 
often resistant to change. The ensuing challenge to gain support for change requires 
consultation, explanation and consideration of potential opposition. Such steps were 
of particular relevance with the organising model approach. Carter (2000:133) notes ‘A 
model which is premised on debate and involvement cannot be successfully 
introduced without discussion, over the heads of members, representatives and 
officers’. This referred to MSF but could have readily applied to Unison and is 
consistent with experience in SEIU (see McAlevey 2012).  
The potential for opposition to emerge is exacerbated when top down directive in a 
‘member-led’ union, which included criticism of FTOs, is exercised. The introduction of 
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the organising model undermined the principles it promoted. Carter (2000) examining 
how organising came to MSF observed that ‘bureaucratically initiated change has 
definite limitations, especially where change is designed to increase participation’. In 
Unison the promotion of participation is in democratic structures which are 
increasingly characterised by internal bureaucratic tendencies. 
Where a national strategy could work is through identifying broader issues, common 
across workplace and occupational sectors, and a focus on union orientation where 
regardless of the varied issues of the day, addressing them is undertaken around 
principles of encouraging workplace activism. Despite the promise of the development 
of such grassroots based unionism through various pronouncements and the 
introduction of WOW training it was recruitment targets that became the objective 
and recruitment activity the strategy. To realise this strategy the need to establish 
control of union work, and specifically that of the RO was required.  
Control was achieved either through the acquiescence of ROs or constraining others 
through a combination of the structures of MtOC, the methodology of JABO and other 
managerial initiatives. Within MtOC RO industrial support was diluted in two ways, 
firstly through an increase in the number of branch responsibilities and secondly in the 
additional responsibility of managing a small team of Area and Local Organisers. JABO 
attempted to hone the work of the RO and prioritise the work of Unison Branch 
Committees to the objectives set within JABO. However whilst this also contributes to 
the internal bureaucratic proceedings of Unison it did not have any significance in the 
day to day activity of the Unison branch.  The introduction of ‘Operation Workplace’ 
suggested the heightening of attempts at workplace control through a system of 
micro-management.  
ROs were also directed to support regional and national recruitment weeks. On five 
occasions a year organising staff blocked out diaries to undertake a whole week of 
recruitment within a specific geographical area. A three line whip operated and ROs 
were discouraged from dealing with issues within their specific area of branch 
responsibility. The ensuing problems around  supporting their branches were 
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aggravated with national recruitment campaigns such as ‘Essential Cover at Work’ 
which required two additional weeks of similar recruitment focus in total reducing 
capacity for ROs to support branches by as much as 20% within a year.  
Where a Unison branch required an RO to undertake representation a national 
instruction required the branch to make application to the relevant Regional Manager 
for permission to do so, removing the autonomy of the RO in such decision making, 
and in the process, reducing their authority before the lay membership. Involvement in 
case work was discouraged as it was seen as an obstacle to developing union 
organisation. Consequently there was no analysis as to the merits of or opportunities 
for improving union organisation through specific case work development. ROs who 
were ready to undertake case work were viewed as not prioritising work appropriately 
and were therefore not good organisers. This perspective on union work encouraged 
some ROs to, in effect, abdicate from representational responsibilities. This fitted 
comfortably with some newer appointments to the RO role who were able to focus on 
the one objective of meeting recruitment targets, an approach supported by Unison 
management.  
Regardless of the approach of their allocated RO Unison branches still required 
support and advice on matters of industrial representation. When the inexperienced 
RO was called upon to provide that support the consequences could be negative for 
the RO, the member or members involved and the reputation of the union. The 
increasing lack of expertise was compounded in two ways. Firstly the absence of 
opportunities within management systems for ROs to discuss the industrial issues of 
the day restricted the chances of less experienced staff to learn from their experienced 
peers. Secondly the issue of lack of industrial experience was replicated further up the 
line. Traditionally ROs could defer to their own line manager for advice on problematic 
industrial issues or organisational quandaries. Unison management were themselves 
increasingly less experienced or knowledgeable in such matters.  
Regional Managers are appointed without appropriate consideration for their 
industrial experience and expertise. For staff recruited for campaigning as opposed to 
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industrial experience lack of knowledge of more senior staff on industrial issues 
exacerbated the problem of providing support to branches. Traditional ROs focusing 
on supporting lay representatives and members in dealing with their priorities were 
welcomed by the Unison branch. However as this support was outside of national 
objectives and in effect were acts of resistance to management direction, such ROs 
were deemed to be not of the right type. 
Bureaucratic disconnection 
Problems of industrial support and representational capacity were exacerbated by 
Unison’s structure. Attempts to encourage membership participation through its range 
of internal committees and self-organised groups distracted from the workplace and 
offered a union activism embedded in a culture of internally focused lay bureaucracy. 
Senior lay representatives legitimised national plans, strategies and targets and readily 
acquiesced in the JABO assessment process by attending JABO interviews with 
branches, accompanying the relevant regional manager. In doing so becoming 
embedded in the bureaucracy of JABO assessment in the process and positioning 
themselves contrary to the dominant view of other lay representatives. Unison’s own 
internal structures provided for a career path in a particular kind of trade union 
activism adding texture to Hymans (1989) contention that there is a tendency for lay 
union representatives to themselves become bureaucratised. 
For many lay representatives and ROs JABO was a tick box bureaucratic exercise 
disconnected from the industrial work in the branch. Yet regional management viewed 
JABO as central to the unions organising work. Lay representatives also criticised JABO 
for mimicking techniques of new public management and New Labour target setting 
with league tables for recruitment putting branches in competition with each other. 
This perspective was reinforced through the awards night which, whilst claiming to be 
an opportunity to share best practice, branches were set apart from each other 
through the process of nomination for, and allocation of, awards. 
As for the view portrayed of the FTO as the union bureaucrat, evidence from Unison 
questions such theory that union structures both create and preserve a uniform, 
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conservative full time officer bureaucracy prompting in return challenges from a more 
radical lay rank and file membership (see Pearce 1959, Cohen 2006) on two counts. 
Firstly, the support of some lay representatives for institutional priorities of Unison 
and managerial initiatives to control and manage both their peers and Regional 
Organisers, confirmed an unintended consequence of one of the founding objectives 
of Unison, establishing an exceptional trade union democracy, had in effect created a 
robust bureaucracy. Whilst opportunities for rank and file union members to 
participate in Unison were plentiful, the grasping of those opportunities can convert 
the new activist into the lay bureaucrat focusing on the institutional mechanisms of 
the union organisation as opposed to building union power at the workplace. Secondly 
resistance to a way of working which emphasised national and regional priorities over 
those of the grassroots membership came as much from ROs themselves recognising 
the folly of such strategy.   
Whilst this strategy gave Unison branches greater responsibility for matters of 
representation the impetus to undertake recruitment work also increased. Regional 
management encouraged ROs to see the resource of employer granted fixed facility 
time for lay representatives as an opportunity for management of lay representative’s 
facility time. However freed from normal workplace management controls with the 
attraction of union representative roles, it was unlikely that representatives would 
allow subjugation to control of their time by Unison Region. The view that fixed facility 
time was for Unison to manage was disconnected from the reality of facility time being 
provided at the employer’s behest in order to improve or maintain effective industrial 
relations. 
Disconnection from the grassroots membership was manifested in other ways. The 
promotion of employer partnership agreements saw a trade-off with employers which 
in obtaining enhanced facility time for participation in Unison resulted in lay 
representatives becoming junior partners in change management agendas, as 
observed elsewhere by McIlroy (2000). This in itself created a position in which ROs 
acquiesced with or challenged these arrangements. The latter option was made more 
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difficult given such arrangements were supported by Unison management. This was a 
feature in which, more broadly, branches reported positive relationships with ROs, but 
made a distinction between those ROs and the Unison region. In addition some 
branches complained that whilst they were being assessed by region there was no 
reciprocal arrangement for branches to assess regional support given a significant 
variation in RO standards and approach to industrial support.  
Several lay representatives complained that ROs ignored branch requests for advice 
and support on matters of representation, were generally difficult to contact on these 
issues but were more ready to get involved in recruitment activity. This created a 
disconnection both in agreeing priorities and crucially industrial support for Unison 
branches. This contrasted with the position of traditional ROs and branches were the 
readiness to take on difficult casework, or work in the private and voluntary sector 
where there was no union recognition and consequently no lay representatives 
cemented good relations between branch and the RO.  
Implications for the quality and consistency of representation of members are 
apparent with lay representatives, and ROs, questioning the ability of some in the 
newer intake to provide appropriate support, let alone undertake representation. 
Consequently branches, and more crucially members, were faced with a lottery in 
terms of RO allocation. For branches this was more acute when a frequent turnover in 
branch allocation of ROs was experienced; although this only heightened awareness of 
inconsistencies in standards and approach to industrial work. The introduction of a 
legal helpline for Unison representatives suggested the disconnection in industrial 
support was acknowledged at a national level. However in bypassing the RO and 
undermining their traditional industrial role in the process Unison was also providing a 
further potential disconnection of workplace organising issues from organising staff. 
This disconnection is reflected in recruitment activity undertaken isolated from 
workplace issues and questions of rebalancing power relations at the workplace. As 
such organising strategy in Unison falls into the narrative of opponents of trade 
unionism who not only maintain that trade unions are limited in the sectional interest 
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of their members but are primarily concerned with the organisations own self-interest 
(Michels 1962). This contrasts with the commitment of ROs focused on supporting 
members and lay representatives on their real issues continuing to work in a modus 
operandus recognisable as the enabling full time officer.  
Representation an emergent crisis  
Trade Unions depend on workers joining, paying membership subscriptions for their 
survival; simply put - no members, no union. Representation of workers is the business 
of the union, undertaken at levels within the workplace and beyond through civil 
courts, employment tribunals and as an interest group for working people within a 
pluralist democracy. On this latter point trade unions make representations to and can 
be sought their view from governments, employers, NGO’s and other quasi-official 
bodies. For organising strategies to be effective there has to be a link between why 
trade unions exist and trade union activity at the workplace. This crucial point seemed 
to have been lost in Unison’s organising strategy.  
Grassroots workplace organising was introduced in Unison through focusing on 
addressing workplace issues consistent with the ‘organising model’. However Chapter 
Six identified that later a shift in the meaning of ‘organising’ became apparent. The 
workplace issues focus was abandoned as organising became defined almost 
exclusively as recruitment, downgrading the importance of representation in the 
process. Recruitment and representation became separate functions of trade union 
work. This division occurred in the face of a trend in workplaces from the 1970s 
onwards for the increased use of procedures to resolve disputes and the growth in 
individual employment rights. With constraints on collective action a workplace culture 
was created giving prominence to individual rights increasing demand from workers 
for trade union representation on an individual basis. The challenge for trade unions 
was not only in defending and/or asserting those individual rights but in developing 
collective responses to the workplace issues which manifest themselves as individual 
grievances; in doing so, developing consciousness beyond the individual to the 
collective: a step to more critical thinking about power relations in the workplace and 
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society more generally. With the separation of representation from organising work, 
however defined, it is apparent that Unison, and other trade unions, have not 
considered this reality in their development of strategies for union renewal.  
Yet workplace representation presents opportunities for developing trade union work 
through an organising as opposed to a servicing orientation. In other words workers 
have issues at work, the trade union exists to represent workers in connection with 
those issues and the representation can be undertaken in a way which builds union 
workplace organisation. With a perspective that unions had a strategic choice between 
organising or servicing members, Unison denied the possibility of integrating both. If 
the objective of national strategy was to build union organisation and renew then 
recruitment is one of the key tactics towards that objective. However the objective 
would appear to have been supplanted by one of the tactics and representing workers 
was increasingly marginalised within both the narrative of what is important and in the 
priority of ROs work.  Furthermore some ROs, either chose, or were not required, to 
engage with members and lay representatives on matters of representation. 
Organising work became a means in itself, as a separate function of trade union staff, 
disconnected from workplace issues. Dealing with workplace issues is prominent in 
both servicing and organising models yet Unison’s practice downgraded its importance 
regardless of orientation.  
The shift from organising collectively to individual recruitment was reflected in 
national recruitment strategies. Previously these had emphasised the importance of a 
collective voice in the workplace, integral to organising principles. However this 
approach was jettisoned in favour of an unashamedly service based recruitment 
message to workers. The ‘essential cover at work’ campaign emphasized the servicing 
function of Unison reinforcing the view of the union members as passive, not active, 
and the union as a third party there to look after its members in the workplace. This 
message is not only received by potential new members but longstanding existing 
Unison members also.  The theme completely contradicts organising work, 
undermining efforts of both staff and lay representatives attempting to foster a 
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collective mentality among members and building union organisation on that basis.  
Yet whilst the campaign emphasised the importance of workplace support, Unisons 
own strategy was diluting that same workplace support and failing to address existing 
workplace demands.  
For traditional ROs representation at work was crucial to the vitality of the union. It 
complemented organising work by building a good reputation at the workplace based 
on the positive outcomes of representation, both individual and collective. The debate 
around level of representation misses the point on two counts; firstly whoever 
undertakes the representation that function needs to have legitimacy and secondly the 
approach to representation needs to be based not only on resolving the issue(s) 
satisfactorily but also improving union workplace organisation. The acceptance by 
Unison management that R representation was servicing and branch representation 
was organising puts definitions and debates about organising in a perverse position.  
Whilst conceding that union reputation was enhanced through effective 
representation of member’s, boosting recruitment in the process, Unison’s strategy of 
downgrading the importance of representation and devolving it to branches 
contradicted this stance by insisting that ROs undertook new duties of managing staff 
and working towards recruitment targets.  
Such thinking ignored the reality that workplace procedures for consultation and 
dispute resolution remain a feature of contemporary industrial relations with 
increased individual and collective rights for workers. The number of competent 
workplace Unison representatives has decreased (Darlington 2010) consistent with 
reported shrinkage in workplace representatives across the UK.  This is evidence of the 
broader failure of new unionism to instil and reinvigorate workplace union activism. 
The reduction in lay workplace representatives, the intensification of their work and 
reported limitations on facility time, would suggest that increases in staffing at 
regional levels should be made to address these challenging developments. However 
Unison strategy dilutes industrial support from the region and simultaneously 
delegates more responsibility to the Unison branch. Unsurprisingly this strategy failed 
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with an explosion of complaints over both failures and standards of individual and 
collective representation (Unison 2015). 
The downgrading of representation subverted by the priority of meeting recruitment 
targets provides evidence of the immediate institutional interest overriding that of the 
union membership. With the failure to link organising work to workplace issues 
organising work became an isolated process, divorced from the reality of workplace 
conflict and struggle. In such circumstances the prospects of using workplace issues to 
build union organisation and encourage membership activism was remote. Moreover, 
for some the overt purpose of recruiting new members – the preserving staff jobs 
within Unison - becomes an acceptable rationale, illustrating how the interest of the 
representatives usurp those of the represented, as Michels (1962) and Webb and 
Webb (1894) cautioned. This stance contrasts with the approach of ROs who saw a 
morality in union recruitment aimed at the addressing of workplace issues and terms 
and conditions of employment and their attendant inequity and injustice. It is this 
latter position which provides for a glint of optimism that a refocus on the importance 
of representation at all levels is possible to reverse the ongoing tide of decline. 
Union transformation  
Examination of union bureaucracy helps explain how a strategy with radical potential 
becomes distorted and a vehicle for conservative goals. Transformation to an 
organising union requires clarity in objective, understood and supported by union 
constituent parts.  Imposing a top-down organising strategy without clear objectives 
and failing to link workplace organising to broader industrial and political objectives 
dooms that strategy to failure. The question of union objectives posed by Simms and 
Holgate (2010) is highly relevant given the lack of discussion, debate and projection of 
a future union vision. Early proclamations of building workers power seem over 
optimistic at best. Limiting the subsequent focus to workplaces further lowered the 
likelihood of success by ignoring the need for a broader coherent political and 
industrial strategy. Union objectives became limited to increasing recruitment rates. 
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Yet the embracing of organising by US unions led to claims that such unions were in a 
process of transformation from business unionism to social movement unionism.  
Internal to unions, several developments pointed to such transformation. These 
included strategic targeting of organising campaigns, shifting finances and staff 
resources to organising, redesigning representative training courses, decentralising 
union internal decision making, developing a coherent and consistent message 
through union communications and the adoption of comprehensive organising 
techniques (see chapter two). The dominant narrative that trade unions spent too 
much time and resources on servicing members and that FTOs needed to change their 
focus, essential if unions were to transform, prevailed. In the case of Unison, according 
to Waddington and Kerr (2009), transformation to an organising union was achieved. 
However general recruitment campaigns, labelled organising, do not justify such 
claims. Rather than decentralising, the movement was to a more centralised 
organisation, controlling staff and lay representatives to ensure their working towards 
recruitment targets.  
Assessment of the extent of transformation can also be assessed by degree of 
structural change, industrial relations approaches, and union objectives and 
orientation. Unison’s structure remained focused on single employers in local 
authorities, NHS Trusts and Universities. The problems associated with the failure to 
address internal structures at the time of merger remained.  The motivation for 
merger - the aspiration to meet the challenges of privatisation, outsourcing and forms 
of new public management in general - seemed to have been set aside and replaced by 
a priority of consolidating membership in traditional employers, despite findings in one 
survey that 10% of membership leaving Unison did so due to loss of recognition 
(Waddington and Kerr 2000). This traditional focus may have had some merit in the 
sense of concentrating building union organisation where some form of union 
influence existed. Nevertheless it abandoned members going to privatised workplaces 
as a secondary consideration and failed to convert threats of privatisation into 
organising opportunities.  Whilst some ROs confirmed the position outlined by Bowden 
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(2009) that union organisation comes from the ability to regulate occupational labour 
markets, in certain conditions, such as EDC (see Chapter Six), the privatisation threat 
can be turned into an opportunity for union building. 
The structural disengagement from the realities of union workplaces identified by 
Foster and Scott (1997), and referred to in Chapter Five, was heightened in the 
experience of long standing ROs and lay representatives. Attempts at increasing 
managerial control of RO work responsibilities reinforced perceptions of 
disengagement. Promoting union organising through the encouragement of member 
activism by the introduction of the national recruitment campaign ‘essential cover at 
work’ was a glaring contradiction, inconsistent with claims to be an organising union. 
This latter recruitment campaign was consistent with the persistent message to new 
members that Unison was ‘the friend at work’. 
Union transformation through a significant shift in resources and orientation did not 
occur and the proposition that new public management more generally leads to union 
renewal was not supported. The simple logic prevails that the bigger the workplace the 
greater the propensity for collectivism. The experience of ROs confirmed that the 
breakup of existing services producing a growing multiplicity of providers of public 
services presented a considerable challenge for Unison, one which was not sufficiently 
met. If organisational fragmentation and decentralisation of employer decision-making 
was an opportunity for union renewal, in contrast to centralised bargaining removed 
from the workplace, lack of capacity and industrial relations experience within the 
membership limited the potential organising opportunities which such developments 
may present. Furthermore given an embedded union culture of encouraging either 
passivity at the workplace or a form of activism restricted to participation in internal 
structures, the prospect of a new cadre of union activists emerging in response to the 
challenges presented by privatisation was optimistic at best. Without significant 
structural change and resource allocation, the experience of Unison suggests, rather 
than renewed workplace trade unionism, an atrophy of members with union 
organisation withering on the vine. 
210 
 
An increase in organising staff with an expectation that they be managed or supervised 
by ROs and the employment of Regional Organisers with limited industrial experience 
did not equip Unison to respond to the industrial relations challenges from new public 
management. In PSSC (chapter six) Unison’s organising strategy had no relevance in 
dealing with the major issues which were presented to the Unison membership. Union 
organisation at PSSC, and later EDC, did however remain robust and active through 
traditional trade union approaches to pay, other terms and conditions of employment 
and job security supported by experienced ROs.  
If Unison has been transformed it was not into an organisation driven by the 
grassroots membership, with a renewed ‘bottom up’ democracy, increasingly 
decentralised but with a coherent approach to organising work. The transformation 
was to one of directing workplace activism through attempts at closer control and 
management of staff and the fixed facility time of Unison lay representatives. 
Consequently Unison became increasingly centralised, limiting the traditional 
autonomy of ROs and attempting to impose institutional priorities over those of the 
membership.  
Earlier analyses of UK trade unions claims of transformation from servicing to 
organising showed that for FTOs organising became an additional responsibility to 
existing representational work (Carter and Cooper 2002). In Unison recruitment has 
replaced representational work as the key function for organising staff. However 
specific recruitment targets and vague notions of growth and organising are not 
evidence of transformation. For Unison branches organising work remained an 
additional responsibility separate from workplace generated issues, not an organic 
method of union work (see Byford 2011, De Turberville2006). The challenge for Unison 
at all levels remained embedding organising and recruitment more organically within 
representational work.  
The promise of a shift to grassroots organising, creating the potential for more radical 
union forms, was dissipated through strategic limitations and disconnection from 
industrial issues. Furthermore the promotion of employer partnerships confirmed the 
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operation of a form of micro-corporatism (see Carter et al 2003). McIlroy (2013:140) 
points out that what appeared as ‘a radical methodology of union renewal was 
motivated and driven by otherwise conventional leaders’. Trade unionism at times of 
crisis often adopted the cloak of militancy but essentially remained conservative. Ideas 
of building union organisation can unite union bureaucracies and rank and file to a 
common purpose. Opposition to an apparent union organising agenda is inherently 
problematic in that context. However the lack of analysis around union purpose in 
organising strategies has contributed to a position where union bureaucracies 
establish their own purpose, as in recruitment targets, and extend managerial roles, 
controls and techniques through FTOs to lay representatives. Organising analyses have 
failed to sufficiently examine the nature of trade unions and the complex relations 
between full time officialdom, union activists and members. 
Examination of relations with employers confirms it was business as usual with 
industrial relations strategy being the encouragement of partnership agreements, a 
reminder of failed business unionism practices of previous eras. Such collaborative 
arrangements produced negative consequences for union organisation and 
membership aspiration. With exceptions among ROs, partnership with employers was 
embraced producing in some instances collaborative arrangements which altered the 
position of lay representatives as advocates of the workers, reducing their 
accountability to members and undermining the legitimacy of the union at the 
workplace. The quid pro quo was in the facilities obtained for recruitment activity. Of 
consequence was the entrenchment of a lay bureaucracy both at the workplace and 
within the structures of Unison compliant with the direction of the national union 
delivered through the regional organising strategy.  
Conclusion  
The organising model emerged from a collation of approaches to union work 
encouraging collectivism in resolving workplace issues. However the attraction of 
union membership is undermined by a strategy which weakens the ability to represent 
workers. The delegation of representational work to lay representatives was a 
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potential panacea for addressing the resource implications presented by organising 
and member’s requirements for representation. Two decades of UK union organising 
strategies have failed to attract the number of new activists envisaged. Whilst the 
exact number of workplace union representatives is undetermined in the case of 
Unison (see Chapter Seven) and more generally (Darlington 2010) it is acknowledged 
that it is less than half the number of 300,000 thought to be so prior to union decline. 
Anecdotally in Unison it is expected that austerity policies will impact on retention of 
experienced lay representatives. To reiterate at least twenty five per cent of Unison 
recognised workplaces have no representative (see chapter seven), consistent with the 
broader picture for UK trade unions identified by Van Wanrooy et al.(2011) in the 
WERS. Problems such as work intensification, employer hostility, and procedural 
methods for dispute resolution of the plethora of individualised employment rights 
combine with a weakening of industrial support for that work discourage new activists.  
The attempts to manage and refocus union organisation to prioritise recruitment 
exacerbates this position. In such circumstances theories of trade union bureaucracy, 
oligarchy and the potential dominance of the representatives over the represented 
(Michels 1962 Webb et al. 1920) assist in analysis and assessment of strategic 
objectives and their consequence. The organising model promised an approach to 
trade unionism which would encourage an inversion from ‘top down’ to ‘bottom up’ 
trade unionism. Although as Milkman (2006) argues there remains the need for ‘top 
down’ support. In practice the inversion became the dominance of recruitment 
motivated by short term institutional interest over representation of workers. This 
inversion is achieved through a combination of managerialism, union bureaucracy and 
the permeation of that bureaucracy through lay structures.  
Analysis of the research presents a number of concerns for Unison which stemmed 
from the uncritical adoption of an approach to union organising from abroad without 
proper consideration of its appropriateness for a UK public services union. The 
maintaining of rhetoric of organising while effectively abandoning it in favour of 
recruitment underpinned by a servicing philosophy produced incoherence and 
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confusion. The narrative of the FTO as the business agent (in the United States) or the 
arbitration procedure expert (in Australia) was incorrectly applied to UK full time 
officers. Given the key position of FTOs as the main link between the union and the 
membership at workplace level it follows that any inaccurate assessment of their role 
inevitably brings into question the subsequent union organising strategy. 
Organising work in Unison was disconnected from the workplace issues relevant to 
Unison members. Organising strategy had no impact or relevance to the vitality of 
Unison. However increasing managerial controls impacting on the role of the RO and 
relations with Unison branches were increasingly problematic given the 
aforementioned disconnection. The defining of organising work was itself an issue and 
was applied within a narrative of strategic choice between organising or servicing as 
opposed to workplace issues and practices. After fifteen years of organising Unison 
failed to increase membership levels and density, saw the number of workplace 
representative’s decline significantly and provided no evidence for increased industrial 
or political influence. Indeed the failure to link workplace issues to organising strategy 
was replicated at regional and national levels. Organising became in effect the 
management of staff and workplace activists for purposes of achieving arbitrary 
recruitment targets set by Unison nationally. 
Any transformation in Unison is not into an organising union as suggested by 
Waddington and Kerr (2009). Those changes that did occur increased resources for 
recruitment activities, underpinned by greater management control and the 
incorporation of the union FTO into a managerial role through encouraging branches 
to focus their facility time towards recruitment work. There is no evidence that Unison 
promoted a more grassroots led confrontational approach to industrial relations, if 
anything quite the reverse with promotion of employer partnerships. Whilst the 
numbers of workplace activists continued to decline, the union structure distracted the 
remaining representatives from a workplace focus by encouraging internally-focused 
activism producing in the process characteristics of a lay bureaucracy. 
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Trade Unions attempt to achieve industrial objectives through the power of their 
members organised in combination within a workplace or related workplaces. Effective 
representation to achieve those industrial objectives is dependent on a number of 
factors including the continual recruitment of workers to the union. Trade unions can 
adopt different methods, approaches and orientations in order to achieve their 
objectives. Additionally as Hyman (2001) identified trade unions can be organisations 
positioned based at various points between class, market and society. In Unison the 
emphasis on recruitment, encouragement of workplace partnerships and the 
promotion of union membership as an insurance cover suggested a shift in position 
from one of social to business unionism or from a societal point to a position closer to 
the market. Unison strategy became emphasising the importance of trade union 
support in the workplace while simultaneously downgrading the importance and 
resources for that support producing a developing crisis in representation. This crisis of 
representation will only deepen with continuing outsourcing of public services and 













2015 Chapter 10 Conclusions 
Introduction 
Already concerned at the decline of trade unions in Britain, and of the fortunes of 
Unison in particular, when I started this thesis seven years ago, my mood has not been 
lifted in the intervening period.  The period has seen the further fall in membership, 
density and collective bargaining coverage. The public sector faces continued cuts in 
funding with further privatisation and pay restraint.  Opposition to attacks on both 
standards of public service provision and terms and conditions will be hamstrung by 
proposed legal reforms including  ending the check-off system for the deduction of 
trade union subscriptions by employers, potentially causing a severe contraction in 
union income; an imposition of thresholds for industrial action turn outs and votes in 
favour of industrial action to be legal; increasing the period of notice required for 
employers before action can be taken; and enabling employers to use agency labour to 
replace strikers during disputes (see Trade Union Bill 2015 - 2016).  Unison is weaker 
and less well prepared than ever to counter these changes despite its attempts to 
increase recruitment and its claim to be an organising union. 
This concluding chapter provides some reflection on the work I have completed 
including recognition of the importance of bureaucracy and organisation in addition to 
the merits of other research work on union organising. It contributes some explanation 
for why unions appear incapable of learning the lessons from the failure of organising 
strategies and how organising objectives become distorted and limited to recruitment 
targets. The uniqueness of the research is identified. I also reflect on how this work 
may have been improved and finally suggest some further avenues for research. 
Purpose of the Thesis 
The aim of the research was to consider the impact of organising strategies on union 
FTOs and how they respond to, influence and contribute to the delivery of the 
strategy: a much neglected area of analysis. The research also sought to examine the 
importance of bureaucracy when considering attempts at potentially radical change. 
Examining the social relations inside trade unions enables a synthesising of classical 
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sociological theory with more contemporary considerations of decline and renewal. 
The thesis thereby sought to provide explanation for why trade union organising 
strategies have failed to lead to union renewal. 
Structure of the argument 
The thesis commenced by posing the question as to whether union organising 
strategies, and within such strategies, the full time officer, were building workplace 
trade unionism or reinforcing bureaucracy. It asserts that organising strategies can be 
radical or conservative in nature. Trade union leaderships have a track record in 
adopting approaches to union renewal which fail to provide for any critical analysis of 
the strategy to be adopted. The introduction of US organising approaches was 
consistent with this position. The potential for a more radical union form emerging 
from such strategy was undermined through the simultaneous promotion of employer 
partnerships and later reducing the practical application of organising to recruitment 
campaigns.  
In the US the influence of business unionism had kept industrial relations academics at 
arm’s length viewing them with suspicion for possessing agendas alien to the general 
interests of union members (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Subsequently their 
embrace by rapidly weakening US unions desperate for allies produced conditions for 
optimistic assessments of US organising experience and potential. Isolated examples of 
organising successes became the future ideal modus operandi for union renewal. The 
dominant narrative became one that trade unions had control of their destiny by 
switching union resources to organising which led to the adopting of comprehensive 
organising techniques (Bronfenbrenner 1998).  
Criticisms of union bureaucracies were not articulated by US academics but ironically 
by those who by position as union organisers both colluded and clashed with them 
(see Erem 2001 and McAlevey 2012). The issue of bureaucracy is significant and in 
Unison of particular relevance given its structure. The apparent influence of incumbent 
bureaucracy within the newly formed union raises questions of in whose interest later 
union strategy supports. Mindful of Michels (1962) ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and the 
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potential for the usurping of union democracy by bureaucracy, rather than bringing 
radical change, organising strategies can be utilised to reinforce the position of existing 
union oligarchies.  
In Unison the already embedded managerial approach contributed to the distortion of 
organising moving the emphasis from promoting workplace issue-based approaches to 
one of bureaucratic procedures monitoring progress towards arbitrary recruitment 
targets. Explicit in Meeting the Organising Challenge (MtOC) and later JABO 
assessments ROs were increasingly incorporated as managers themselves by attempts 
to direct their work to national as opposed to local union priorities. 
In accepting that unions had a strategic choice between servicing and organising, 
credence was given to a mistaken view that somehow union work could be 
compartmentalised in this way. This supported a narrative that FTOs had spent too 
much time servicing and not organising, contrary to the available evidence. It provided 
for a union focus on the short term interests of those in union bureaucracies 
concerned with membership numbers and associated subscription income. This policy 
position was integral to ‘organising’, changing the emphasis of FTO roles, and making 
evident that they were external to the protected positions enjoyed by a core in senior 
posts. 
Whilst some Unison ROs acknowledge these developments and used their increasingly 
limited autonomy to ensure a more membership centred and industrial focus, it was 
ROs who followed the desired approach of Unison management, the ‘prototypes’, who 
were viewed as the progressive ‘good officers’. Perversely, whilst those ‘traditional’ 
ROs recognised the disconnection between expectations of Unison branches and 
regional support , it was the ‘prototypes’ who advanced and in doing so colonised 
Unison staffing structures, exacerbating problems of branch support.  
The organising strategy in Unison, in accepting the primacy of recruitment over 
membership support and representation, affected industrial support for branches. The 
recruitment strategy was dislocated from the industrial concerns of members and 
consequently Unison undermined itself. Whilst trade unions have options in making 
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strategic choices in response to decline, in Unison the choices made contributed to 
that decline. 
Representation of workers is why unions exist. With continuing reduction in workplace 
representatives, the increase in individual employment rights and the encouragement 
to resolve workplace grievances through procedures, the ability for Unison to honour 
its public proclamations of the ‘essential cover’ insurance service at work is 
questionable. This campaign did confirm that notions of promoting organising had 
ended and consumer unionism was back in vogue. 
Maintaining the position of Unison within existing pluralist industrial relations 
frameworks has been weakened. Retreating from the arenas of employer negotiations 
and consultations, discipline and grievance representation and collective bargaining 
more generally through reducing resources to support such processes will and is 
resulting  in further union decline. Reorientation of Unison from a legitimate interest 
body within society to one managing internal staff meeting recruitment targets has 
become the predominant function. Organising strategies are increasingly delimiting 
both the FTO role as advocates on members’ issues and the broader aspirations of the 
union. Employer partnership agreements imply at best the maintenance of the status 
quo in which union influence is marginal: or worse the reality of the union as a junior 
partner in change management agendas. The latter suggests a form of surrender in the 
power battle at the workplace. Whilst some FTOs remain an exception to the rule, 
more generally the union ‘sword of justice’ is placed back in the scabbard. 
Reflections on Unison organising strategy  
Unison’s organising was barely implemented before being abandoned. Using Unison’s 
experience to evaluate Russo and Banks (1996), or any other model, is not therefore 
possible.  Some of the reasons for the course that Unison took were rehearsed above 
but parallels with other union experiences raise a more general question as to why 
unions appear unable to take an organising agenda forward.  If adding to our 
knowledge of trade union experiences of organising and the demands they placed on 
FTOs is the first contribution of the thesis, then the second is the attempt to answer 
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this general question by linking the question of organising to more classical literature 
on the sociology of trade unions and in particular the extent and nature of trade union 
bureaucracy. 
Unison’s transition from WOW to MtOC represented a major retreat from organising.  
As the thesis notes the context of the retreat was WOW’S lack of immediate results in 
terms of recruitment. The explanation of this failure lay in the manner in which 
organising was introduced (a lack of serious discussion at all levels of the union), lack 
of conceptual clarity around the core concepts of organising (organising and servicing, 
both necessary and opposites), and an overall lack of commitment to organising 
evident in the emphasis on short-term goals, continued central control and a failure to 
critically examine and spread successful initiatives at local level.  The outcome was 
MtOC with its semantic collapse of recruitment and organising, with its elevation of 
recruitment to the primary objective. Recruitment, rather than being an outcome of 
organising became the end in itself with little or no systematic provision for support 
and development of workplace organisation, as reflected in the new MtOC staffing 
structure in application. There is evidence that developments of this type are not 
restricted to Unison alone and was indeed signalled in the TUC’s New Unionism project 
from the very beginning (Carter and Fairbrother 1998a).  
To strengthen this orientation Unison was increasingly appointing both a new kind of 
FTO and additional posts at other levels of seniority.  New staff were recruited on the 
basis that they were deemed to have the different skills needed for the model of 
organising adopted by the union. These staff, termed prototypical because they 
appeared to represent the future, more often knew less about industrial and legal 
employment issues and had little if any negotiating and representational experience: 
their strengths were associated with campaigning and recruitment.  The new structure 
withdrew ROs from direct workplace responsibilities and gave them instead 




The optimism and potential radicalism which emanated from emphasising a grassroots 
workplace based road to union renewal soon evaporated at the altar of recruitment 
targets. The thesis set out to analyse these failings in the context of examination of 
union full time officers in organising strategies. On strategy there was a failure to 
obtain support from key union constituencies, an incorrect analysis of the role 
performed by UK FTOs in workplaces, a mistaken belief that somehow unions had 
strategic choices between servicing and organising and a failure to consider the 
inherent conservative nature of trade unions within conditions prone to the extension 
of bureaucracy.  
The failure to define organising objectives provided for ambiguity both in strategy and 
in the FTO role. The eventual limiting of the term ‘organising’ to recruitment enshrined 
in targets provided some clarity with the RO becoming in effect a recruitment 
manager. A focus on recruitment targets provides for potential conflict with branch 
agendas and priorities particularly that of demands for representation at work. Unison 
has transformed into a union where the focus is on recruitment and where industrial 
issues are no longer organic in deliberations, unless there is a crisis. In this situation 
the ability to address workplace issues is weakened by recruitment of staff whose 
capabilities and strengths lie elsewhere. 
The increased delegation of representational work and recruitment of staff from non-
industrial backgrounds has comparison with US unions (Carter et al. 2003).  The 
associated warnings regarding the importance of retaining existing members when 
considering organising strategies has gone unheeded (Williams 1999). Furthermore 
given Unison organising or recruitment work was predominantly based on in fill 
activity in recognised workplaces (Waddington and Kerr 2009), relations with 
employers are undertaken through long standing procedural arrangements rooted in 
1970s reforms (Hyman 2003). Unlike in Australia, the structures in recognised 
workplaces remained, providing for union representation through employer joint 
negotiating committees, other internal consultative bodies and grievance and 
disciplinary procedures. Beyond the workplace the Employment Tribunal system, 
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though severely curtailed with the introduction of fees, remains intact. However the 
industrial relations terrain and how that connects with organising strategy has not 
been sufficiently considered. 
The reduction in focus on such procedural arrangements has the potential to 
undermine strategies for renewal whatever the label.  The trend towards FTO 
withdrawal from representation produces a reduction in the capacity available to 
Unison for member representation or support for lay representatives engaged in such 
processes. This is compounded by the decrease in the number of workplace 
representatives available to embrace such work (Darlington 2010). As well as a 
reduced capacity, whether at lay representative or FTO, a reduction in expertise occurs 
increasing the possibility for unsatisfactory representational outcomes exacerbated by 
the colonisation of Unison staffing structures by individuals with non-industrial 
experience. The increased responsibility for representational matters placed on lay 
representatives may exacerbate the decline in their numbers adding to reported issues 
of lack of facility time support and increased work intensification within public services 
(Darlington 2004). The danger is that such downgrading of representation produces 
dissatisfaction with union support from existing members, reducing the union 
premium and undermining the rationale for union membership. Strategic choices may 
not always result in the outcome desired.  
The lack of clarity on objectives was also manifested in the promotion of the union’s 
message. The development of a national advertising campaign, ‘cover at work’, 
reinforces the perception of a union member as a passive recipient of union services. 
Yet ROs, as detailed, are increasingly recruited on a basis which disregards abilities to 
represent and negotiate on behalf of members, or support lay representatives in that 
process. A national campaign promoting an individual service, whilst on the ground 
that service is diminished, and which contradicts Unison staff promoting concepts of 
collectivism through organising work, only illustrates leadership failure to develop and 
articulate a consistent and coherent trade union vision. 
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For union FTOs the prevailing assumption that too much time is spent servicing and 
not organising was addressed through making them accountable for the management 
of recruitment activity. However Unison’s experience with the ‘traditional’ ROs 
confirmed that FTOs were not automatically emissaries of the union bureaucracy. 
Within the gamut of errors in the introduction of US organising into the UK was the 
failure to consider the role of the FTO: given the importance and complexity of their 
relations with other constituencies in the union that failure should not be 
underestimated. The common cause expressed by some FTOs and lay representatives 
confirmed it is too simplistic to suggest trade unions are characterised by monolithic 
divisions between FTOs and the rank and file. In reality divisions exist within these 
constituencies and alliances can be formed across the divide. Those divisions and 
alliances can stem from the inherent tension between national organising strategies 
and local industrial priorities. ‘Prototypical’ ROs, willingly or otherwise, became 
advocates for the union oligarchy, whilst the traditional RO adopts a position as a 
mediator attempting to balance priorities and interests. For the latter the irony is they 
continue to enable and support workplace organisation believing it is both in the 
membership and institutional interest.   
Reflections on other work on organising  
There have been three types of academic reaction to the advent of organising to the 
UK: organising comprises a set of techniques; organising is conceptually confused and 
unsustainable; and in response to the latter in particular a defence that contends that 
organising has never been consistently adopted. The first reaction  - the toolbox 
approach – most closely parallels that of the unions (see Simms et al 2013) and is 
represented most clearly by Heery et al’s. (2003:63) position where having noted that 
‘all three approaches – servicing, partnership and organizing- are present and being 
applied by considerable proportions of UK unions’, they state that ‘these are several 
ways to restore membership, not a single approach as suggested by advocates of the 
organizing model’ (Heery et al. 2003:75). It has been argued elsewhere that Heery et 
al’s. position is pragmatic, rather than critical, refraining from any rigorous evaluation 
of strengths and weaknesses of the approaches (Carter 2004). Later in acknowledging 
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the limited impact of organising Heery and Simms (2008) identify constraints on union 
organising which were limited to the characteristics of organisers, the nature of the 
projects they were assigned and how they were managed.  This uncritical approach, 
lacking explicit position and acceptance of diversity in trade union methods, both 
organising and servicing, opens the space for those like De Turberville (2004, 2007) 
who conceive the whole idea of organising as incoherent.  
De Turberville’s attack on organising likewise however stems from a position that has 
no fixed base. Rather it originates from criticisms that combine a number of theoretical 
misconceptions together with examples of trade union practice that are explicable 
without undermining the coherence and justification of an organising approach. Thus 
there is criticism of ‘managed activism’ that is indeed a practice of some unions and 
again they may designate the approach as organising, but it is not consistent with the 
original intentions of Russo and Banks (1996) or Bronfenbrenner et al. (1998). Fletcher 
and Hurd (1998) also identify key shortcomings in the articulation of the organising 
model and what it would mean for trade unions. As the case in Unison, and as well as a 
feature noted by Simms and Holgate (2010), the purpose of organising is insufficiently 
articulated. Consequently different union constituencies within bureaucracies and rank 
and file can all identify with the need to improve union organisation. Conservative and 
radical orientations can become united in union approach if not purpose. However in 
closer analysis Fletcher and Hurd point out that the organising thus becomes so broad 
that it fails to distinguish different approaches to relations with employers, how unions 
are politically represented and whether there is to be a reinvigoration of internal union 
democracy. 
Finally, there are defences of organising that are on occasions implicit in the sense of 
advancing accounts of successful campaigns (e.g. Lopez 2004) as well as those that 
while defending organising recognise at one level or another how far short unions 
generally are in adopting  the approach (Bronfenbrenner 1997, McAlevey 2012).  In 
addition Carter (2000, 2005) has attempted to explicitly defend organising while 
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locating the generalised failure on the part of trade unions in the lack of adoption of 
organising in a sufficiently comprehensive and open manner.  
My study falls very much into the third response.  There is adequate evidence from 
Unison that rather than organising failing, the union largely failed to organise.  This 
failure can be traced in a number of particular aspects such as the conceptual 
confusion about the nature of organising and servicing and the relationship between 
them.  Similarly, the collapse of the idea of organising into recruitment, the divorce of 
organising from representation and from that devolvement or discouragement of the 
basic trade union function of representing members inevitably produces failure. 
Moreover, the changing policies caused tensions and problems for a substantial 
number of FTOs.  Many, termed the traditionalists, were not hostile to the idea of 
organising as such, but did not recognize its embodiment in the policies of the union.  
In addition, how organising was interpreted and applied by Unison management 
threatened relations between FTOs and lay representatives: primarily due to the 
distancing from the issues in workplaces that would have enabled more effective 
organising. Traditionalists were, however, not the only FTOs. 
Reflections on bureaucracy and organisation in trade unions 
The classical position on bureaucracy in trade unions was proposed by Michels (1962) 
with the contention that, along with political parties, unions were subject to ‘an iron 
law of oligarchy’. Hyman (1989) while not contesting the existence of a bureaucracy 
insisted that Michels was wrong to characterize bureaucracy as inevitable as periodic 
revolts equally suggested a tendency for rank and file to restructure relations in favour 
of membership influences and interests.  Hyman also took aim at traditional socialist 
conceptions of the trade union bureaucracy by contesting the notion that it only 
comprised a small number of senior officials.  Hyman stressed the relational aspects of 
bureaucracy in which it was possible to incorporate lay officials.   
There have recently been two responses to Hyman’s perspectives.  Carter et al (2014) 
largely underwrote Hyman’s position through a study of the way that even in a union 
with a left-wing reputation a national lay body utilized a network of branch officials to 
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frustrate calls for strike action against the implementation of lean production 
methods.  In contrast, Darlington and Upchurch (2012) mounted a defence of the more 
traditional notion of bureaucracy and refuted Hyman’s perspectives by in effect simply 
reasserting the significance of full time national officials.  Their focus therefore failed 
to examine the very relationships that were central to Hyman’s contribution. 
The findings in this work add a texture to Hyman’s perspectives by illustrating that not 
only is there a series of national officials devising policies with little reference to the 
views of branches and the membership more generally but that also whole layers of 
Unison lay officials are drawn in to a web of relations that buttress the authority of the 
centre.  The extent of bureaucracy also provides a refutation of the relationship 
between de-centralisation of managerial authority and decision-making and the 
renewal of workplace trade unionism promulgated by Fairbrother and colleagues 
(1996; 2000; 2013).   
Organising a radical sheen on conservative trade unionism 
Based on a belief that trade unions are not passive organisations vulnerable to the 
prevailing winds of the political economy but have the ability to chart their own 
destiny through strategic choices (see Heery and Kelly 1994, Frege and Kelly 2004), the 
shift from servicing to workplace organising promised a more aggressive and confident 
union movement. The borrowing of US and Australian organising approaches, 
however, was undertaken without any critical assessment of appropriateness to the 
UK with its different systems of industrial relations, traditions and culture. 
Nevertheless Unison embraced the organising model as evident through training 
initiatives such as ‘Winning the Organised Workplace’ or ‘WOW’ courses. Highlighting 
how everyday workplace issues of grievance can either be used to build the union 
through encouraging workplace activism (organising) or enhance the role of the full 
time officer and thereby reinforce a passive membership (servicing) the initial 
orientation was to encourage organising. However such an approach to union work 
became distorted by the idea that any dealing with workplace issues by ROs was by 
definition servicing and the simultaneous but contradictory idea that workplace 
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representatives carrying out the same roles were organising. The WOW courses were 
dropped and organising became defined almost exclusively as recruitment activity. The 
role of the FTO in Unison was to be developed into the management of other 
organising staff and branch activists. 
The organising campaigns in the US are primarily in the context of winning election 
ballots under the NLRB process. It is questionable as to whether approaches to 
organising on this basis have successful transferability (Carter et al 2003). What does 
appear to have transferred successfully is the idea that organising unions adopt a 
toolbox of practices which are then labelled as organising. This becomes an objective 
in itself and limits organising practices to gaining membership growth.  Such an 
approach has some significance for the future vitality of UK trade unions and their 
prospects for renewal. Trade union organising as a back to basic approach to union 
work developing orientations to union building has been discarded in favour of 
recruitment targets thus providing evidence of how short term goals dominate.  
Hymans identification of the emergence of a lay bureaucracy is reinforced through the 
nature of Unison’s democracy and its organising experience in which lay officers’ 
cooperation and not resistance to recruitment targets overrode industrial issues. What 
Unison presented was divisions within both union FTOs; lay officers and rank and file 
members with an increasing disconnection in priorities at all levels of the organisation.  
Criticisms of Michels (1962) ‘iron law of oligarchy’ are well founded and legitimate 
given the obvious checks and balances within trade unions, the plurality of interest 
that inform policy and with FTOs, rather than following the oligarchy, can be 
independent in mind and action. However where Michel’s theory is legitimate is in the 
warning of the dangers or inherent tendencies within political parties and trade unions 
to develop self-serving conservative bureaucratic oligarchies. This potential is only 
heightened at times of crisis when the need for institutional survival becomes all too 
apparent. The experience of Unison confirms that suggestions of more radical forms 
emerging out of organising strategies are misplaced in the face of unions increasing 
control from the centre when implementing organising agendas. The failure to 
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organise can be attributed to the existence of a union oligarchy but to reiterate the 
idea of an ‘iron law’ is mistaken given the relations of some full time officers to 
branches, their reluctance to comply with management direction and their open 
minded criticisms of union leaderships. 
Whilst the organising model suggested an increased propensity to support workplace 
activism and militancy the kind of union which may emerge was not sufficiently 
considered. Clearly a union built around militant approaches to addressing workplace 
issues will look different to that built on partnership with employers (Danford et al. 
2009). Whatever the approach, with no evidence of enthusiasm for union 
membership, comparable to previous surges in union membership, the resource 
implications for organising strategies cannot be underestimated. In practice the 
’organising model’ was limited to a process of ‘managed activism’ (Heery et al. 2000) 
classically illustrated in the case of Unison. For workers to address power relations 
they need to organise. However the limitation of the organising model is in the failure 
to develop strategies towards the broader issues of union constituencies, politics and 
the problems for trade unions from globalisation (Carter 2006). 
Success or failure can only be judged if the rhetoric of organising had been matched in 
reality in a broader version of trade unionism beyond a set of techniques and tactics. 
Lustig (2002) points to the failure to decentralise union power and reinvigorate union 
democracy. Milkman and Voss (2004) observe the lack of genuine rank and file 
involvement in organising strategies. Claims that ‘organising’ is breaking iron laws of 
oligarchy (Voss and Sherman 2000) seem over enthusiastic at best. Indeed when local 
lay bureaucracy is disturbed by organising successes which produced an influx of new 
activists, threats to that bureaucracy were identified and addressed (see Moody 2007).   
The failure of organising and the failure to learn the lessons 
When I commenced this research the Meeting the Organising Challenge (MtOC) 
staffing structure was in its infancy. There was no such system as JABO and Unison 
management seemed convinced of their approach and direction. As I finish that 
conviction is now under question. Within ‘A’ Region’s 2015 regional plan the 
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identification of the need to raise representational standards has become a key 
objective. Prior to the plan a number of ‘traditional’ Regional Organisers had been 
consulted by the RMT on how this could be done. The rise in complaints of 
dissatisfaction from members requiring representation had led to a belief in the RMT 
that action was now required. The scale of disconnection between national union 
strategy and Unison’s membership had been starkly illustrated to me over the previous 
two years with a number of incidents which although separate taken together saw the 
culmination of years of organising without connecting to workplace issues. 
The first incident had been the news that at Unison’s annual conference the General 
Secretary in his annual address proclaimed that Unison was going to smash the 
governments pay freeze in local government. This was far removed from the key 
concerns of members faced with widespread job losses and ignored the innate 
conservatism of union members in a climate were friends and colleagues are losing 
their jobs. The second was on the day of the publication of the Francis report in 2013 
into the Mid Staffordshire hospital scandal, which coincided with a visit to ‘A’ Region 
from the Head of Unison Health Service sector. She confirmed that Unison was not 
going to comment on the key findings of the inquiry as it was all negative for workers. 
Instead of using the publication of the inquiry report for the opportunity to link poor 
treatment of patients with that of staff, the mistakes of target driven policy, the 
treatment of whistleblowers, support for union representatives and the problems of 
bullying in the NHS, Unison had nothing to say. Thirdly, coordinated ballots for 
industrial action on pay saw membership turnouts of less than 15%, (85,000 members 
out of 600,000 claimed in local government, of which just under 50,000 supported 
action) with small majorities in favour of action and leaderships too weak to call a halt 
to strikes in which one in twelve union members had voted in favour of action (Unison 
2014c). Together a damning indictment on long held strategy, on leadership and was 
indicative of the failure of trade unions to reflect on practice and policy.  
Reflection may suggest a number of changes in the development of union strategy not 
least of which would be ensuring that representation at all levels become central in 
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deliberations for renewal strategy: which would include a combination of industrial, 
organisational, political and legal actions and initiatives. A commitment to supporting 
more adversarial approaches which assert the union as an independent voice and 
advocate for workers together with a rejection of limited partnership agreements is an 
urgent requirement: as is the need to facilitate and encourage the lessons from 
success and defeats.  
If Unison was serious about change it would have sought or summoned support for 
that change through a serious dialogue with its members. Exemplars and victories 
could have been spread. Instead credibility is undermined through the authorisation of 
sham national industrial actions which knaw at the trust of members and activists 
alike. National strategy could provide for a framework that allowed workplaces to 
determine issues and priorities around which they campaigned and built union 
organisation. If these issues had broader commonality across the membership they 
would develop organically given a strategy which would support such processes 
through applying appropriate resources and ensuring the promotion of successful 
initiatives and acts of solidarity. Responses to the questions posed by Fletcher and 
Hurd (1998) relating to who is the union constituency, what is the mission of trade 
unions, what are the approaches to industrial relations and where do trade unions sit 
in relation to globalisation and solidarity would assist in developing a greater 
coherency in future strategy development. 
Distinctiveness of the research 
The research is unique in that it was undertaken by a full time officer with an internal 
perspective who has experienced the consequences of US organising being embraced 
in both MSF and Unison. It is the most extensive examination of organising in a single 
trade union. Unison as an organisational unit possesses important and particular 
characteristics which require consideration in any research on union change. Apart 
from (and to a lesser degree) Carter (2000) on MSF, this has not been done. In this case 
the work is more grounded given the internal perspective and extent of the work 
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considering different constituent parts. It has as its central feature a focus on union 
FTOs who have been much neglected in previous research in this area.  
Furthermore contribution to the organising debate is in demonstrating the importance 
of synthesising classical theories about the nature of bureaucracy with contemporary 
debates on trade unionism, including more recent literature on union renewal which 
echoes disappointment about the results of organising strategies but falters in 
providing explanation. Examination of organising strategies and their success or failure 
tends to ignore the importance of the nature of the political economy in which such 
strategies take place. This work is a reminder of that importance not least of the 
proliferation of individual employment rights from 1970s onwards which creates 
challenges of capacity and competency for trade unions as well as militating against 
collective approaches to workplace disputes and dissatisfaction. 
Finally the research provides empirical evidence in support of Hyman’s observation of 
the emergence of a lay or semi bureaucracy. 
Further reflection 
Semi structured interviews with eleven Unison FTOs (Regional Organisers), five 
managers, fourteen support staff of various grades and interviews and focus groups 
with twenty three branch activists were undertaken. The primary research was 
underpinned by observations of Unison staff and lay activists including at staff team 
meetings, conferences and branch meetings. The ability to have daily access to internal 
Unison documents, training and briefing materials and general communications was 
invaluable.  
In considering the findings and conclusions, it may have added to the robustness of the 
research had specific interviews been undertaken with the Unison General Secretary 
and national officers responsible for training and education, given the importance for 
development of lay representatives. Conversely some of those Unison activists who I 
could identify as located in the heart of Unison lay or semi bureaucracy might also 
have deepened the findings and enriched the analysis. However my focus was on the 
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RO role and my considerations developed around the direct relations to the RO within 
Unison’s structure. The exception made was interviewing national officials with 
responsibility for organising whose particular input gave valuable insight into the 
national perspective, confirming the confusion over how organising is defined and how 
organising strategy should impact on ROs. It was apparent that additional data 
collection from other senior union officials would have only added further to the 
confused picture at national level: confirmation of which is provided in the statements 
made in connection with the national recruitment campaign. 
Suggestions for further research 
This research has focused on a large general union organising mainly in public services. 
Whilst there are specific characteristics in Unison which emanate from its own 
structures and its relations with public sector employers, the tendency towards 
bureaucratisation is an issue for all trade unions given their structural position and 
competing interests. The significance of and extent of the role of lay bureaucracy is an 
area which therefore requires further examination. In doing so as a contrast it would 
be helpful to consider the nature and extent of bureaucracy in a single occupation 
union such as the Fire Brigades Union (FBU). Given the disconnection between the 
national strategy and the local workplace what may also be of interest is in examining 
other union approaches to consider how they succeed or fail in linking the national 
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May 2011 - presentation to ‘A’ Region staff conference 
June to September 2011 - Semi structured interviews with Regional Organisers   
October to November 2011 – Semi structured interviews with Regional Management 
December 201 to January 2012 – Semi structured interviews with other  Regional 
staff 
March 2012 – Semi structured interview with Branch activists 
May 2012 – First branch activist focus group discussion 
May 2012 – First senior national manager semi structured interview 
September 2012 - Second branch activist focus group discussion 
October 2012 – EDC branch activist roundtable discussion 
October 2012 – Second national senior manager semi structured interview 
March to May 2013 -  National recruitment advertising campaign  










Semi structured interview questionnaire* 
1. What is your job role? 
2. What is your experience of working for Unison or other trade unions? 
3. Any prior trade union experience? 
4. What difficulties do you think the union is currently facing? 
5. What do you understand as the main components of Unisons organising 
strategy? 
6. What do you consider as the key responsibilities of the RO role? 
7. With the emphasis on organising how have the RO responsibilities changed 
over time? 
8. What do you understand by the term organising? 
9. What are we organising for? 
10. Are you familiar with the Organising model and does it have any relevance or 
value to your work? 
11. How does national connect or support the Organising work of the RO? 
12. How does region connect etc. 
13. How do branches engage and support organising agenda? 
14. What is your view of the joint assessment of branches and Regional awards 
night? 
15. What is your experience of relations with branches and key activists in terms of 
organising? 
16. How does the structure of the union align itself to or inhibit organising? 
17. What obstructs you or creates tensions in your work? 
18. In relations with employers does the organising work create any issues? 
19. What is your understanding of partnership agreements? 
20. Do partnership agreements compliment or inhibit organising work? 
21. What is your view on the claim that all members want from the union is in AA 
type service when needed? 
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22. What is your view to the position that RO are more comfortable dealing with 
representation rather than organising? 
23. What importance do you place on the importance of representation? 
24. Who should undertake representation? 
25. Is the training and education for lay representatives fit for purpose? 
26. If so shy if not what needs to be done? 
27. In terms of RO support how do you see the management structure in Unison 
contributing? 
28. How is the current austerity climate and cuts impacting on organising? 
29. How does the labour link and political role connect with the organising work? 
30. Does the Unison structure support organising in a changing public sector? 
31. How do you view the future prospects for Unison? 
32. Anything else to add? 
*Questions were adjusted dependant on interviewee position 
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